A University of Sussex DPhil thesis Available online via Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/ This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details SELF-REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THE RUSSELLIAN IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS: A HYBRID RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS THOMAS WILLIAM MCCLELLAND DPHIL IN PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX 2012 [i] Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 4 SECTION 1: THE QUESTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS 4 1.1. CONSCIOUSNESS 5 1.2. THE PHYSICAL 8 1.3. ONTIC RELATIONS 10 SECTION 2: THE INITIAL CASE FOR PRIMITIVISM 13 2.1. THE PRIMITIVIST STRATEGY 14 2.1.1. The Epistemic Step 14 2.1.2. The Ontic Step 15 2.2. THE CONCEIVABILITY ARGUMENT (CA) 15 2.2.1. Conceivability and Entailment 15 2.2.2. Zombies and Inverts 17 2.2.3. Conceivability to Possibility 18 2.3. THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT (KA) 19 2.3.1. Mary the Neurologist 19 2.3.2. KA’s Relationship with CA 21 SECTION 3: THE REFINED CASE FOR PRIMITIVISM 22 3.1. THE RUDIMENTARY RESPONSE TO PRIMITIVISM 22 3.2. TWO CONCEPTUAL GAPS 25 3.2.1. The –tivity Gap 25 3.2.2. The –trinsicality Gap 27 3.3. THE DIALECTICAL SITUATION 28 3.3.1. The Relationship of the Conceptual Gaps 28 3.3.2. The Ramifications of the Conceptual Gaps 32 [ii] SECTION 4: THE CASE AGAINST PRIMITIVISM 34 4.1. PHENOMENAL CAUSES AND PHYSICAL EFFECTS 35 4.1.1. Efficacy and Causal Closure 35 4.1.2. Inefficacy and Epiphenomenalism 37 4.2. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM 41 CONCLUSION 42 CHAPTER 2: RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM 43 SECTION 1: TYPE-A RESPONSES 44 1.1. REDUCTIONISM 45 1.2. ELIMINATIVISM 47 SECTION 2: TYPE-B RESPONSES 49 2.1. A POSTERIORI NECESSITY 50 2.2. AGAINST BRUTE A POSTERIORI NECESSITY 53 2.2.1. The Functional Role Account 53 2.2.2. The Redescription Requirement 55 2.2.3. Semantic Rationalism 56 2.2.4. An Argument For the Apriority Thesis 58 2.3. IS CONSCIOUSNESS AN EXCEPTION TO THE APRIORITY OF ENTAILMENT? 60 2.3.1. Necessitarian Dual Attribute Theory 61 2.3.2. The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 62 CONCLUSION 64 CHAPTER 3: THE EPISTEMIC VIEW OF THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 65 SECTION 1: WHAT IS THE EPISTEMIC VIEW? 65 1.1. THE IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS 66 1.1.1. Ignorance and the Problem of Consciousness 66 1.1.2. The Explanatory Value of EV 68 [iii] 1.2. WHAT TYPE OF IGNORANCE? 69 1.2.1. Shallow Ignorance vs. Conceptual Ignorance 69 1.2.2. The Story of the Slugs 71 1.2.3. Missing Concepts vs. Misconceptions 73 1.2.4. Basic vs. Intermediate Ignorance 75 1.3. EV AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR PRIMITIVISM 77 1.3.1. EV’s General Response to Primitivism 77 1.3.2. Stoljar on EV and A Priori Entailment 78 1.3.3. EV and the Conceivability Argument 80 1.3.4. EV and the Knowledge Argument 82 SECTION 2: WHY IS THE EPISTEMIC VIEW WORTHY OF ATTENTION? 83 2.1. THE THREE CRITERIA OF SUCCESS 83 2.2. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT 87 SECTION 3: WHEN SHOULD WE BELIEVE THE IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS? 89 3.1. A METHODOLOGICAL ISSUE FOR EV 89 3.1.1. Stoljar’s Non-committal Approach 90 3.1.2. Overreaching 93 3.2. THE RELEVANCE CONDITION 97 3.2.1. The Condition 97 3.2.2. The Ignorance Hypothesis and the –tivity Gap 98 3.2.3. The Ignorance Hypothesis and the –trinsicality Gap 100 3.3. THE INTEGRATION CONDITION 101 3.3.1. The Condition 101 3.3.2. Ignorance and Knowledge 103 3.4. ARE THERE ANY FURTHER CONDITIONS? 105 3.4.1. The Coherence of Conceptual Ignorance 105 3.4.2. The Overgeneration Problem 107 3.4.3. Relocating the Mystery 107 CONCLUSION 108 [iv] CHAPTER 4: THE RUSSELLIAN IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS 109 SECTION 1: INTRODUCING INSCRUTABILITY 109 1.1. THE INTRINSIC/EXTRINSIC DISTINCTION 110 1.2. CLARIFYING THE DISTINCTION 113 SECTION 2: THE CASE FOR INSCRUTABILITY 115 2.1. THE RECEPTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 115 2.2. THE RUSSELLIAN PICTURE 117 2.3. ARE DISPOSITIONS INTRINSIC PROPERTIES? 120 2.4. EXTENSION AND SOLIDITY 124 2.5. THEORETICAL TERMS 124 SECTION 3: INSCRUTABILITY VS. PURE STRUCTURALISM 127 3.1. WHAT IS PURE STRUCTURALISM? 127 3.2. THE EMPIRICAL ARGUMENT FOR PURE STRUCTURALISM 130 3.3. THE METHODOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR PURE STRUCTURALISM 131 3.4. THE INCOHERENCE OF PURE STRUCTURALISM 133 SECTION 4: INSCRUTABLES AND CONSCIOUSNESS 136 4.1. RIH AND TYPE-F MONISM 136 4.2. RIH AND THE –TRINSICALITY GAP 140 4.2.1. Inscrutables and Phenomenal Qualities 140 4.2.2. Is Subjectivity Non-structural? 142 4.3. RIH AND THE INTEGRATION CONDITION 143 4.3.1. The Epistemic Status of Inscrutables 144 4.3.2. The Suitability of the Blind-Spot 146 4.4. RIH AND THE –TIVITY GAP 147 4.4.1. The Objectivity of Inscrutables 148 4.4.2. Alternative Strategies 149 CONCLUSION 151 [v] CHAPTER 5: REPRESENTATIONALIST ACCOUNTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS 152 SECTION 1: THE VARIETIES OF REPRESENTATIONALISM 153 1.1. THE INTENTIONALITY OF CONSCIOUS STATES 154 1.2. WEAK AND STRONG REPRESENTATIONALISM 155 1.3. PHYSICALIST AND NONPHYSICALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM 156 1.4. REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 158 SECTION 2 : REPRESENTATIONALISM AND QUALITATIVE CHARACTER 160 2.1. STRONG REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT QUALITATIVE CHARACTER 160 2.2. PHYSICALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM ABOUT QUALITATIVE CHARACTER 163 2.2.1. The Problem With Qualitative Content 163 2.2.2. Responses and Rebuttals 165 SECTION 3: REPRESENTATIONALISM AND SUBJECTIVE CHARACTER 169 3.1. HIGHER-ORDER REPRESENTATION (HOR) THEORY 171 3.1.1. The Case for HOR Theory 171 3.1.2. The Case Against HOR Theory 173 3.2. SELF-REPRESENTATIONALISM 176 3.2.1. Self-Representationalism About Subjectivity 176 3.2.2. Self-Representationalism and the Anti-Physicalist Arguments 179 CONCLUSION 183 CHAPTER 6: THE NEO-RUSSELLIAN IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS 184 SECTION 1: A HYBRID ACCOUNT OF CONSCIOUSNESS 185 SECTION 2: CHALLENGES TO NRIH 187 2.1. THE RECEPTIVITY PROBLEM 188 2.1.1. The Problem 188 [vi] 2.1.2. Response 190 2.2. THE CONTENT PROBLEM 194 2.2.1. The Problem 194 2.2.2. Response 195 2.3. THE QUALITATIVE CHARACTER PROBLEM 198 2.3.1. The Problem 198 2.3.2. Response 201 2.4. THE STRUCTURAL DIVERGENCE PROBLEM 204 2.4.1. The Problem 204 2.4.2. Response 206 2.5. THE PURPOSE PROBLEM 208 2.5.1. The Problem 208 2.5.2. Response 212 SECTION 3: NRIH AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS 215 3.1. NRIH’S SOLUTION 216 3.1.1. NRIH and the Criteria of Success 216 3.1.2. NRIH and the Epistemic Gap 218 3.1.3. NRIH and the Conceivability Argument 219 3.1.4. NRIH and the Knowledge Argument 220 3.2. A CONFLUENCE OF ILLUSIONS? 221 3.2.1. An Overdetermined Illusion 221 3.2.2. One Illusion, Two Manifestations 223 CONCLUSION 224 BIBLIOGRAPHY 226 [1] INTRODUCTION This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of Consciousness. This is achieved by offering a bipartite analysis of the epistemic gap at the heart of that problem, and by building upon the hypothesis that the apparent problem is symptomatic of our limited conception of the physical. Chapter 1 introduces the problem. The key question is whether phenomenal consciousness is onticly dependent on the physical, or onticly independent of it. There are powerful arguments for the Primitivist view that consciousness is independent of the physical. These arguments rest on the apparent epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal. I propose that this apparent gap must be understood as a composite of two deeper conceptual gaps pertaining to the subjective character and qualitative character of consciousness respectively. The ‘–tivity gap’ claims that physical states are objective, phenomenal states are subjective and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ claims that physical properties are extrinsic (structural), that phenomenal qualities are intrinsic (non-structural) and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the intrinsic. After refining the case for Primitivism, I consider the compelling reasons for rejecting Primitivism in favour of Physicalism. The challenge posed by the Problem of Consciousness is to resolve this antinomy between Primitivism and Physicalism. In Chapter 2 I consider standard responses to the problem. The failings of these positions lead me to introduce three criteria that an adequate response must satisfy. I reject the view that Primitivism can be salvaged, and hold that a satisfactory response to the problem must protect Physicalism. I reject standard ‘Type-A’ responses according to which there is no epistemic gap between the physical and the phenomenal, and argue that a satisfactory response cannot deny the manifest reality of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, I reject ‘Type-B’ responses according to which the epistemic gap does not entail ontic distinctness. I hold that if Physicalism is true, the entailment from the physical facts to the phenomenal facts must be knowable a priori for an epistemically ideal subject. [2] Chapter 3 evaluates a non-standard Type-A response to the Problem of Consciousness which promises to satisfy all three criteria.