CONSTRUCTING A 99 GERMAN EUROPE? GERMANY'S EUROPE DEBATE REVISITED Timo Behr & Niklas Helwig FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 99 • February 2012 ULKOPOLIITTINEN INSTITUUTTI UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS CONSTRUCTING A GERMAN EUROPE? GERMANY'S EUROPE DEBATE REVISITED Timo Behr Researcher FIIA Briefing Paper 99 The Finnish Institute of International Affairs February 2012 Niklas Helwig EXACT Marie Curie ITN Fellow The Finnish Institute of International Affairs • Germany’s ambiguous role during the eurozone crisis has stoked fears that a more self-confident and dynamic Germany is threatening the political independence and economic well-being of its neighbours and will lead to a “German Europe”. • German weakness, not power, is the main challenge to EU integration. In order to build a supranational EU and a “European Germany”, Germans will have to overhaul their Cold War institutions and traditions that have become a brake on EU integration. • Germany’s political elite continues to favour a federalist vision for the EU, but faces a somewhat more sceptical public as well as strong domestic veto players, such as the Federal Constitutional Court, which limit their pro-integrationist tendency. • While Germany continues to support the use of the “Community method”, Angela Merkel has increasingly resorted to the “Union method” that places function over form and prioritizes pragmatic problem-solving to address the current crisis. • Germany’s uncompromising attitude towards the eurozone crisis and its sometimes erratic foreign policy are the product of its deeply embedded stability culture and instinctive pacifism, rather than a sign of growing global ambitions. • European partners will have to help Germany in its indispensable leadership role by jointly formulating a vision for the European integration project and by assisting Germany in adapting its political institutions and culture. The European Union research programme The Finnish Institute of International Affairs ULKOPOLIITTINEN INSTITUUTTI UTRIKESPOLITISKA INSTITUTET THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Merkozy at work: The Franco-German axis has played a central role in addressing the euro crisis. Photo: P. Segrette / Présidence de la République Francaise. Germany, today, is Europe’s “indispensable nation”.1 accepted some limitations on their sovereignty and In the short run, Germany plays a central role in enthusiastically pursued the vision of a “European solving Europe’s sovereign debt crisis. In the long Germany”. run, the European project is bound to stall without an active German engine at its core. But confronted With the end of the Cold War and German re-uni- with today’s challenges, Germany’s European voca- fication, Germany regained its full sovereignty and tion appears to be waning. From Greece to Libya, central place in Europe. This has made a new genera- and from the internal market to common defence, tion of German leaders less willing to accept outside Germany has been blamed for playing an increas- constraints on their sovereignty or to shoulder the ingly evasive, unpredictable and obstructionist role. growing costs of European integration. With Germa- Long gone are the days when Germany defined its ny’s economic well-being and national security less national interests solely in European terms. Indeed, dependent on others, Germany’s new elite has been for Europe today, Germany appears to be as much a emboldened to pursue a more self-confident for- part of the problem as it is a part of the solution. eign policy. In the EU, this has meant that Germany now feels more comfortable in pursuing its narrow Germany’s ambiguous attitude towards the EU national self-interests. This has stoked fears that a has stoked fears that Europe might be faced with a re-unified and re-dynamised Germany is poised to revival of the “German Problem” of the early 20th impose a “German Europe”. century.2 Once united, Germany was simply too big and too dynamic to be accommodated within a stable However, not all analysts agree that German power European state system. Inevitably, German dyna- is at the heart of today’s crisis. Some, like Poland’s mism threatened the political independence and foreign minister Radosław Sikorski, suggest that economic well-being of its neighbours. To prevent German weakness has been equally damaging. Germany from becoming a menace to itself and oth- Germany’s failures to adjust to the changing global ers, German power needed to be contained. Europe context and its more central position in Europe have was the solution. For many decades, Germans readily created a political vacuum in the EU. Germany, they suggest, can no longer hide from history and needs to “learn how to lead”. In other words, not German 1 Timothy Garton Ash (2011), “Everywhere, the European strength, but German weakness is destabilizing project is stalling. It needs a new German engine”, The Guardian, Europe. This briefing paper analyzes the impact of 15 June 2011. German power and weakness on Europe by review- 2 David P. Calleo (1978), The German Problem Reconsidered, ing German debates and positions on EU integration, Cambridge University Press. the euro and international affairs. THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AffAIRS 3 Visions of Europe Political parties and the EU Traditionally, Germany has supported a suprana- Christian Democratic Union (cdU) / tional vision of the EU. Especially after reunification, Christian Social Union (csU) Germany pursued a policy of “integrative balanc- • Historically strong proponent of a federal Europe ing” of power within Europe. This meant that it (Konrad Adenauer; Helmut Kohl) was willing to transfer competences to the Union • Angela Merkel said to have less visionary and more in order to level out imbalances of economic power pragmatic approach to the EU between the member states. Germany favoured a • Strong support for subsidiarity has sometimes strong European Commission and was willing to clashed with its federalist vision accept over proportional representation of smaller • CSU and some CDU backbenchers have voiced member states in the EU institutions. For a long criticism about euro membership and further time, these policies were backed by both a strong integration (legal challenges against Lisbon/Greece bail-out fund) cross-party consensus on EU integration and a permissive consensus amongst the German pub- • Officially supports further EU integration (e.g. election of Commission President) lic. However, some worry that these might have changed and that Germany, as a result, now favours Social Democratic party of Germany (spd) intergovernmental solutions.3 • Supports federal EU, but has been accused of opting for more intergovernmentalism under German intellectuals remain instinctively pro- Gerhard Schröder (e.g. Maastricht criteria, budget European, even though they have questioned the negotiations) democratic nature of the EU. The German phi- • Critical of Merkel’s crisis management, but strongly losopher Jürgen Habermas promotes the idea of a supports euro membership democratic European polity with a strong role for • In favour of pooling liabilities in a “Solidarity the European Parliament. Decisions behind closed Union”, better involvement of EU institutions and doors (either by the European Commission or the strengthening of the demand side with an EU investment programme Council) stimulate resentment against Brussels and • Advocates further federal solutions and between the peoples of Europe. Similarly, Joschka concentration of power in EU Commission Fischer sees Germany in an integrated Europe as the only way forward.4 However, he considers The Greens (Die Grünen) the legitimizing power of the European Parlia- ment towards the national sovereigns as too weak. • Advocate of a strong federal vision for the EU Surprisingly, he suggested a European Chamber of (Fischer’s Humboldt Speech) national parliamentarians in order to ensure the • Launched common proposal with the SPD for solutions to the euro crisis democratic oversight of the financial rescue meas- ures. While Fischer remains a strong advocate of a • Advocates “New Green Deal” and investments for crisis-hit countries more political Union, he accepts that getting there may require functional detours via an increased The Free Democratic Party (Fdp) involvement of national parliaments or avant-garde groups of willing member states.5 • Traditionally committed to federal EU (Hans- Dietrich Genscher, Klaus Kinkel) • Has been torn about bailing out other EU member states (anti-bailout campaign in Berlin elections; failed internal referendum on rescue measures for 3 Ulrike Guérot and Leonard, Mark (2011), “The new German third countries) question: How Europe can get the Germany it needs”, European • Declining popularity has reduced its role/influence Council on Foreign Relations. as a coalition partner 4 Jürgen Habermas, Joschka Fischer, Henrik Enderlein and Christian Calliess (2011), “Europa und die neue Deutsche Frage”, The Left (Die Linke) in Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 5/2011. • Critical about the EU as an agent of neoliberalism 5 See Joschka Fischer’s “Humboldt Speech” from May 2000, and militarism “Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation - Gedanken über die Finali- tät der europäischen Integration”. THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AffAIRS 4 While some commentators identify a significant ero- But what about the German public? For Habermas, sion of pro-European party political consensus in the the inability of the German