4/2020 Putin’s New Russia Following Constitutional Reform The View from Kyiv — Volodymyr Ivanov, Pavlo Klimkin and Andreas Umland PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE Volodymyr Ivanov is a Senior Desk Officer at the Presidium of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, Kyiv, as well as a Senior Expert at the Program on European, Regional and Russian Studies at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, Kyiv. Pavel Klimkin was, among other things, Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany in 2012–2014 and Ukraine’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2014–2019. He is Head of the Program on European, Regional and Russian Studies at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, Kyiv. Andreas Umland is editor of the book series “Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society,” a Senior Expert at the Ukrainian Institute for the Future, Kyiv, and an Associate Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm. © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Language editing: Andrew Mash Cover photo: TT NYHETSBYRÅN Russia’s recent domestic political changes was also facilitated by energy prices that and the constitutional reform first proposed remained high. by President Vladimir Putin in January 2020 will not only have far-reaching implications One year later, the grandiose celebration of for the Russian population. They will also the 70th anniversary of the Soviet victory in have certain repercussions for Moscow’s World War II reinforced the Putin regime’s stance on foreign affairs, above all its official maxim that Russia is strong and will attitude to Ukraine and other post-Soviet always win in the end. The mythology of states. They have recently also acquired an Russian invincibility has facilitated the rapid additional international dimension in the spread of a siege mentality among many light of the ongoing political upheaval in ordinary Russians. The West’s relatively Belarus. Various new provisions in Russia’s united rejection of Moscow’s increased Constitution could become relevant in assertiveness in the post-Soviet region since justifying this or that action by Russia 2014 has been used by the Kremlin to claim against pro-Western tendencies not only in that the country is surrounded by enemies. Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi, but now also with regard to Minsk. The increasingly aggressive behavior of Putin and his backers was facilitated by the Russia’s constitutional change has been fact that the Western sanctions imposed on accompanied by mounting socio-economic Russia in 2014 were relatively moderate. problems. The Russian economy had The various limitations that have been in already entered a period of stagnation force now for six years have touched only a before the onset of the Corona virus narrow circle of individuals and a select pandemic in Eastern Europe in March 2020. range of economic activities. The sanctions The COVID-19 calamity has merely were designed to have an impact over time, accelerated and compounded a number of and thus took effect only gradually. Some of existing structural problems. The Russia of them limit the sale to Russia of specific mid-2020 is already significantly different extractive technologies that, following the from that of early 2020 and may change decline in energy prices since 2014, are no further by the end of the year. What does longer needed by Russia. Russia’s ongoing transmutation mean for Ukraine and for other post-Soviet states, In spite of their unimpressive record, the EU including Belarus? and US sanctions were a relatively big step for the West in 2014. Brussels and The Background Washington did not repeat the mistake they had made after Russia’s invasion of Georgia In the spring/summer of 2014, the swift in 2008. Following Russia’s annexation of military occupation of Crimea and parts of Crimea and intrusion into eastern Ukraine, Ukraine’s Donets Basin (Donbas) allowed the European Union and the United States the Kremlin to temporarily change the did not seek a rapid restoration of relations emotional temperature in Russia. As Putin with Russia or a lowering of sanctions once experienced a steep surge in his popularity the conflict’s intensity had lessened. While as a result of Russia’s Crimean adventure, the sanctions imposed have a circumscribed several deep socio-economic problems, reach, they still work within the context of such as Russia’s dependency on oil exports Russia’s ineffective economic model that is and rampant corruption, retreated to the largely based on the extraction of rents background for the time being. This luxury from the export of natural resources. © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 3 Approximately 40% of the Russian In a democracy, if a government announced Government’s budget is derived from such aims and then failed to come even revenues from the sale of oil and gas. close to delivering any of them, voters would simply change the government. That The Economy before the is not possible in Russia, however, in spite of Pandemic the level of grievances increasing at rapid speed. The June 2018 pension reform and its raising of the retirement age for men to Mounting economic dislocations in the 65 and women to 63 led to widespread Russian Federation were becoming salient protests throughout 2018. In 2019, there before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. were over 300 significant protests. By the end of 2019, the Russian Federation’s According to opinion polling, the proportion post-great recession economic record was of Russians willing to entrust Putin with already looking less than impressive. Over "important matters" had fallen to 34%. the previous 11 years, it had experienced the de facto stagnation of an average annual growth rate of 1.1% in the main From Semi- to Full Autocracy sectors of the economy. At the end of 2019, investment was 7.1% below its 2013 peak. Against this background, Putin decided – Real consumer spending was 6.6% below apparently early in 2019 – to reset the the peak of 2014, and purchases in retail political system. In the summer of 2019, trading 8.8% below their 2014 peak. These Vyacheslav Volodin – the Speaker of the and similar developments had led to State Duma, the lower house of the Russian declining trust among foreign investors in parliament, and a close associate of Putin – Russia. Between April and December 2018, addressed the issue of constitutional reform the proportion of Russian government in an article called “The Living Constitution bonds held by foreign investors fell from of Development”. Volodin proposed 34.5% to 24.4%. amendments to the Russian Constitution that would “correct” what he labelled an The strategic goals of Russia's future "imbalance" between the legislative branch development, as defined by Putin in his May and executive power. The resulting 2018 Executive Order on National Goals and constitutional changes, however, have not Strategic Objectives of the Russian strengthened the legislature but instead Federation to 2024, were already looking further increased the already considerable unattainable before the pandemic hit Russia powers of the executive branch. The in the spring of 2020. The goals Putin set to recently enacted constitutional reform has be achieved before the next regular replaced the existing semi-autocracy with a presidential elections in 2024 included new more explicitly dictatorial regime sustainable population, pensions and wages characterized by even tighter presidential growth; increasing the life expectancy to 78 control over the bureaucracy, society and years; halving poverty; improved housing municipalities. conditions for at least 5 million households each year; an increase in the proportion of The Russian plebiscite on the new corporations engaged in technological Constitution on 1 July 2020 was not a innovation to 50 per cent; and to make referendum, but a vote of confidence in Russia one of the five largest economies in Putin and a test of loyalty for the elites. The the world. figure of 78% in favour of the constitutional reform had been determined in advance. It was set high intentionally to ensure the © 2020 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 4 involvement of as many regional authorities which remains in place, and states that: “If as possible in the vote-rigging. The regime an international treaty or agreement of the is disciplining its own servants. The new Russian Federation fixes other rules than constitution enables a cleansing of the elites those envisaged by law, the rules of the for such aberrations as holding dual international agreement shall be applied”. citizenship, or the possession of residence permits or private assets in other countries. Article 69 of the new Constitution says that: Candidates for President of the Russian “The Russian Federation provides support Federation are required to have lived in to compatriots living abroad in exercising Russia continuously for 25 years – a new rule their rights, ensuring the protection of their meant to keep away any candidates interests and preserving the all-Russian educated or with work experience in the cultural identity”. This new provision West. creates an explicit constitutional basis for foreign meddling by Moscow under the The reconfigured Putin regime is pretext of humanitarian intervention and attempting to build a new socio-political provides a framework for global promotion reality with a tightly controlled bureaucracy, of the “Russian world” within a broadly a nationalized Internet and an imperial defined “all-Russian cultural identity”. This historical mythology. The executive now formulation could be used to refer to ethnic has a de facto veto on any law adopted by Russians abroad, and to other people the State Duma and Federation Council, by identified as being affiliated with Russia’s way of declaring it unconstitutional in a culture and thus in need of the Kremlin’s decision of the presidentially controlled support.