The Navy has decided stealth is not that important and has pegged its future to the F/A-18E/F. By John A. Tirpak, Senior Editor he F/A-18 Hornet is the new version the F/A-18F. It argues that T centerpiece of naval aviation. the new fighter has a “balanced” Carrier air wings today are made design that doesn’t rely on stealth up mostly of F/A-18s, and within a because stealth is “perishable.” By decade only Hornet variants will be that, the Navy means that aeronau- flying combat missions from Amer- tic engineers eventually will come ica’s flattops. A large new model, up with a countermeasure that will called Super Hornet, currently is negate the LO advantage. in flight test and is expected to The Navy says that part of the achieve initial operational capabil- reason it needs a larger version of ity in 2001. the F/A-18 is to get the additional However, the new Super Hornet room it needs for systems that carry is a compromise design, shaped to out defensive electronic counter- a large extent by budget pressures, measures—jamming—as well as major missteps in other earlier fighter the attendant power and cooling programs, and the need to have some- requirements such systems require. thing ready in time to replace large Nevertheless, the Navy has sought numbers of carrier-based strike and to buy as much stealthiness as pos- fleet-defense aircraft that will have sible for the Super Hornet. Canopy to retire in the next decade. coatings, special materials and treat- No one—certainly not the Navy— ment for leading edges, and an considers the Super Hornet to be a F-22–style engine air intake have all low-observable, or “stealthy,” fighter; helped produce a modest reduction it has only a small degree of bolt- in the Super Hornet’s frontal radar on stealthiness. Moreover it offers cross section. no advantage in speed, turning, or However, the new inlets do not acceleration over today’s standard mask the fighter’s engine fan blades, Hor net. The revisions that it offers a big reflector of radar energy. Noth- can be itemized: an extra weapon ing at all has been done to reduce station on each wing, room for more the airplane’s considerable infrared fuel, somewhat more range, and more signature or its radar signature from room for improvement than can be the side or rear. Super Hornet will found in the current F/A-18C/D still carry weapons externally, a version. That Hornet model, in the practice that greatly magnifies the words of the Navy’s top aviator, is aircraft’s signature. “maxed out.” Making the airplane any stealthier The Navy is well aware of the would have forced the Navy to put Super Hornet’s limitations, but it has the Hornet through a costly and built a new carrier strategy around it, unacceptably lengthy redesign, and insisting that the “state of the art” in the Navy decided against it. modern combat aircraft design—that The Navy promotes the Super is, stealth—isn’t all it’s cracked up Hornet as an aircraft able to best to be. any fighter it might encounter on to morrow’s battlefields. The service “Perishable” maintains that “with the AMRAAM The service has published nu- missile, enhanced radar, and ad- merous brochures, white papers, vanced onboard sensor fusion ca- and analyses promoting the Super pability, there is not a threat fighter Hornet—the single-seat version is in the world today—or projected to called the F/A-18E and the two-seat exist in the next 20 years—that Super 34 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 1998 The Super Hornet Making its first “trap” aboard a carrier is the Super Hornet, latest in the Navy’s family of Hornet strike fighters. This two-seat F/A-18F landed aboard USS John C. Stennis Jan. 18, 1997. The new airplane is about the same size as the USAF F-22 but descends from fighters not designed with stealth in mind. AIR FORCE Magazine / March 1998 35 Super Hornet Chronology 1987: Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger launches study of naval air requirements. June 1992: Navy awards McDonnell Douglas a $3.1 billion contract to conduct F/A-18E/F engineering and manufacturing development. May 1995: McDonnell Douglas begins final assembly of F/A-18E1. GE delivers first production F414 engines. September 1995: F/A-18E1 rolls out at McDonnell Douglas plant in St. Louis. November 1995: F/A-18E1 makes first flight. The original Hornet, the F/A-18A/B, emerged from a Northrop in-house design January 1996: Naval Air Warfare called Cobra, shown here in mock-up. It became an entrant in the 1972 Air Force Center at Patuxent River, Md., begins Lightweight Fighter Competition but lost to General Dynamics’ YF-16. The Super three-year flight test program. Hornet is bigger and heavier. April 1996: F/A-18E1 conducts supersonic test flights, achieving Mach 1.1 on April 2 and Mach 1.52 Hornet cannot decisively defeat and dependent upon parameters [such as] on April 13. totally dominate in combat.” ... electronics and the weapon system Many have challenged the Navy and less on brute force.” August 1996: F/A-18F1 performs first catapult launches at Patuxent to state the basis for such claims, However, many of those features River. given the fact that modern com- are not present in the initial version peting aircraft such as the French of the Super Hornet. The AIM-9X January 1997: F/A-18F1 completes initial sea trials aboard USS John C. Rafale and multinational Euro- missile is still in early development. Stennis. fighter 2000 not only are far more The improved radar system would agile and stealthy but also boast be an expensive add-on to the Super March 1997: DoD approves initial production of 12 aircraft. up-to-date avionics which are at Hornet because it is not funded and least on par with those of the Super included in the baseline cost of the April 1997: F/A-18F2 fires first Hornet. When asked, the service’s airplane. missile (an AIM-9) in the flight test program. director of air warfare supplies the small print: These threats can be “Best ... We Can Get” January 1999: First production Su- defeated by the Super Hornet “with The new F/A-18 can catch up to the per Hornets to enter service. improvements.” threat “with continual improvements May 1999: Navy to begin operational Rear Adm. Dennis V. McGinn ... as we have [made] with every testing. agrees that the Super Hornet most airplane we’ve ever built,” McGinn 2001: Planned IOC of first squadron. likely won’t win against some other asserted. The Navy’s approach with modern aircraft using “brute force.” Super Hornet has been to “shoot for ... Source: Boeing He explained, “If I get into a turn- the best capability we can get” at the ing fight” with the E/F against these stage of IOC, “based on technology other aircraft, “then I’ve made a big and afford ability [and] on the threat mistake.” that you project at that time. We He explained that, in the Navy’s never, ever design to the end point view, “things like ... thrust-to-weight of performance.” radar will make the E/F “world class,” ratios, turn radius, and climb perfor- McGinn maintained that the Super said McGinn. mance [and] acceleration ... are still Hornet will be better than its over- The Navy also needs the Super Hor- important, but they are not important seas competitors “overall,” taking net in order to avoid wasting valuable in the same way as they were ... as into account the factors working munitions, he added. Because of landing recently as five years ago.” to its advantage. The reduced radar load restrictions, the F/A-18C/D model McGinn maintained that the ad- signature, modest increase in range must frequently jettison fuel and un- vent of features such as a helmet- and payload, and improvement in expended ordnance before landing on mounted cuing system, AIM-9X self-defense avionics, coupled with a carrier; during a rough “trap,” such short-range dogfight missile, elec- better tactics to stay clear of enemy weight might rip off a fighter’s wings. tronically scanned array radar, and defenses, improved access to US The E/F model, however, has ever-improving AMRAAM radar- intelligence and surveillance data, stronger wings, a factor that increases guided missile means “the air-to-air new standoff weapons, better crew the fighter’s “bringback” capability, mission is becoming more and more training, and, eventually, an upgraded reducing the need to throw away 36 AIR FORCE Magazine / March 1998 bombs or missiles before landing. the Navy is “very, very happy” with sophisticated air defenses foreseen This is becoming particularly im- the progress of its version of the JSF, for the 1990s and beyond. Faced with portant, McGinn said, in operations there is no guarantee the program advanced Soviet-made SAMs and like Bos nia, where an airplane will will succeed. If it were to fail, the associated radar, the A-6 was rapidly take off with a full load of ordnance Navy would have the Super Hornet losing the capacity to win through but usually does not use it before the as a fallback system, a “flexible” to the target and return in one piece. end of the mission. platform that could be adapted to If the deterioration of naval strike Critics of the Super Hornet, though, new missions and threats.