THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: DECISION UNITS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS CHRISTOPHER CHUNG A thesis submitted to the University of New South Wales in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2004 DECLARATION I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by colleagues, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, during my candidature, is fully acknowledged. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. Christopher Chung i ABSTRACT This thesis presents a cross-national, cross-regime examination of foreign policy decision-making in the Spratly Islands dispute, focusing on China, Malaysia and the Philippines. It argues that how and why these countries have acted in particular ways towards the dispute relates to the relationship among foreign policy decision-making, government behaviour and domestic politics. The theoretical foundation of the study is foreign policy analysis. It applies the decision units approach advanced by Margaret and Charles Hermann and Joe Hagan to investigate who made foreign policy decisions on the Spratly Islands dispute in the three countries during the period 1991-2002, and how this influenced government behaviour. In addition, the contextual influence of domestic politics is considered. Four case studies inform the empirical analysis: the approaches taken by Malaysia and the Philippines to bolster their respective sovereignty claim, China’s establishment of a comprehensive maritime jurisdictional regime covering the Spratly Islands among other areas, China- Philippines contestation over Mischief Reef and the development of a regional instrument to regulate conduct in the South China Sea. Three conclusions are drawn. First, the decision units approach identifies the pivotal foreign policy decision-makers in each of the countries examined and the process involved. Second, it explains the relationship between decision unit characteristics -- self-contained or externally influenceable -- and each government’s behaviour towards the dispute. Injecting domestic politics into the analysis highlights motivations of and constraints faced by decision-makers, conditioning the form and content of government action. Third, it demonstrates a low predictive capability: the ‘fit’ between hypothesised and actual government behaviour is poor. While it is not a comprehensive analytical tool, the combined decision units-domestic politics approach offers deeper insight into government decisions and behaviour on the Spratly Islands dispute than hitherto reported in the literature. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For guiding my intellectual and personal journey in preparing the thesis, I thank the following. To my supervisor, Associate Professor Anthony Bergin, School of Politics, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, my deep gratitude for his clear guidance, enthusiasm about the research and generous friendship. Dr. John Walker, my co-supervisor in the School of Politics, provided helpful comments in reviewing the draft thesis. From the earliest stage of the project, Professor James Cotton, also of the School of Politics, provided encouragement and friendship, for which I remain very grateful. In undertaking the fieldwork many people contributed generously of their time, expertise and networks. In China, I thank Professor Gao Zhiguo, Executive Director, China Institute for Marine Affairs, State Oceanic Administration and Professor Chu Shulong, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University. In Malaysia, I am indebted to Dr. B.A. Hamzah, Maritime Consultant and former Director-General, Maritime Institute of Malaysia; Dato Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan, Director-General, Institute of Strategic and International Studies; Mr. Max Herriman, Chief Executive Officer, Sea Resources Management SDN BHD; Mr. Mak Joon-Num, Director of Research, Maritime Institute of Malaysia; Associate Professor Hari Singh, Strategic and Security Studies Unit, National University of Malaysia; and Ms. Susan Teoh, Director, Information Services Division, Institute of Strategic and International Studies. In the Philippines, I thank Ms. Sandra Arcamo, Chief, Fisheries Resource Management Division, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources; Mr. Jay Batongbacal, Director, Philippines Centre for Marine Affairs; Associate Professor Aileen Baviera, Asian Centre, University of the Philippines; Professor Benito Lim, Asian Centre, University of the Philippines; Mr. Francisco Meir, Assistant Director-General (Policy and Strategy), National Security Council; Mrs. Teresita Navata, Philippines Centre for Marine Affairs; Ms. Emma Sarne, Director, Department of Foreign Affairs; and Ms. Princess Tomas- Tayao, Head, Security and Strategic Studies Section, Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs. iii The School of Politics, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy was a very congenial research home. For this, I thank Dr. Graeme Cheeseman, Associate Professor David Lovell, Ms. Shirley Ramsay and Associate Professor Hugh Smith. Particular thanks are given to Dr. Jian Zhang for critically reviewing drafts of chapters 1 and 2, the many stimulating discussions of China’s foreign and defence policies and warm friendship. I also acknowledge with much appreciation the tireless efforts of Ms. Mary-Jane Burk, Mr. Christopher Dawkins, Mrs. Edith Hackworthy, Ms. Vicky Hudson and Ms. Anna Papoulis of the university library in sourcing many of the works cited. Mrs. Sevilay Esat provided timely advice regarding bibliographic formatting in Endnote. I am grateful to the University of New South Wales for awarding me a University College Postgraduate Research Scholarship. To Professor Bob Kirk of the Department of Geography, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand my sincerest thanks for his inspirational teaching that sparked my interest in marine policy, for the unstinting encouragement to extend myself intellectually and the constant friendship. For showing me the stars in the night sky and inspiring me to dream of reaching beyond them, I thank my parents. Finally, I dedicate the thesis to my wife, Rosemary, and daughter, Laura. Their love, encouragement and understanding made it possible. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION …………………………………………………………………..i ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………………………..ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ………………………………………………………..iii LIST OF FIGURES ………………………………………………………………..ix LIST OF TABLES …………………………………………………………………x ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ………………………………………….xi 1.0 INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………1 1.1 Literature Overview ………………………………………………………..2 International Relations: General Analyses ……………………...................3 International Relations: Realist Focus ……………………………………. 4 International Relations: Intra-state Focus ………………………………... 6 International Law …………………………………………………………. 8 Marine Political Geography ……………………………………………….10 Marine Resource Management …………………………………………….11 Security and Strategy ………………………………………………………12 Dialogue and Confidence-building ………………………………………...15 Regime Development ………………………………………………………17 1.2 Analytical Niche and Contribution of the Thesis ………………………….17 1.3 Methodology ……………………………………………………………….19 1.4 Structure of the Thesis ……………………………………………………..24 2.0 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, DECISION UNITS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS …………………………………………………..27 2.1 Foreign Policy Analysis ……………………………………………………27 2.2 Analysing Foreign Policy Decision-making ……………………………….32 Snyder, Bruck and Sapin’s Decision-making Framework …………………33 Rosenau’s Pre-theory of Foreign Policy …………………………………...34 Allison’s Models of Decision-making ……………………………………... 36 2.3 Limitations of the Approaches ……………………………………………..40 2.4 The Decision Units Approach …………………………………………….. 44 Predominant Leader ………………………………………………………. 46 Single Group ………………………………………………………………. 53 Multiple Autonomous Actors ……………………………………………….58 v 2.5 Identifying the Decision Unit ………………………………………………60 2.6 The Decision Unit and Foreign Policy Behaviour ………………………….62 2.7 Bringing In Domestic Politics ……………………………………………...65 2.8 Summary ……………………………………………………………………72 3.0 THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: AN OVERVIEW …………………. 74 3.1 The Spratly Islands …………………………………………………………74 Geography ………………………………………………………………….74 Natural Resources ………………………………………………………….80 Strategic Significance ……………………………………………………... 89 3.2 Sovereignty Claims ………………………………………………………...94 Brunei ………………………………………………………………………94 China ……………………………………………………………………….97 Malaysia ……………………………………………………………………104 Philippines ………………………………………………………………….107 Taiwan ……………………………………………………………………...110 Vietnam ……………………………………………………………………. 111 4.0 BOLSTERING SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS: THE APPROACHES OF MALAYSIA AND THE PHILIPPINES ……………………………… 115 4.1 Acquisition of Territory under International Law ………………………… 117 4.2 Making Waves: Malaysia Moves on Investigator Shoal and Erica Reef …..120 4.3 Reaching Out: The Philippines and Internationalisation of the Spratly Islands Dispute ……………………………………………………………..141 4.4 Identifying the Decision Unit ………………………………………………151