Brown Odigie L–R: Presidents Buhari (Nigeria); Johnson-Sirleaf (Liberia); Jammeh (The Gambia); Koroma (Ghana) and former President Mahama (Ghana) in talks with Jammeh on 13 January 2017. Policy & Practice Brief Knowledge for du rable peace In Defense of Democracy: Lessons from ECOWAS’ Management of The Gambia’s 2016 Post-Election Impasse Author: Brown Odigie, PhD PPB # 046 This Policy & Practice Brief forms part of ACCORD’s January knowledge production work to inform peacemaking, 2017 peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Executive summary The years 2015 and 2016 were crucial for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) from the perspective of its efforts to ensure sustainable peace and stability in the region, through supporting the conduct of peaceful elections and the orderly transfer of power.1 A total of 10 of its 15 member states held elections in 2015 and 2016.2 ECOWAS has a rich history of managing political transitions and elections in the past 18 years, following the adoption of the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security (referred to as "the mechanism"), as well as the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. This Policy and Practice Brief (PPB) examines ECOWAS’ interventions around the electoral processes of its member states, with particular focus on its management of the 2016 post-election impasse in The Gambia. This highlights how effective a mediation process can be when mandates are grounded within institutions’ normative and legal instruments, and when international actors work in partnership with regional organisations with respect to the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantages. The lessons from this intervention might therefore be relevant to other regional economic communities (RECs), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) in avoiding the pitfalls of working in silos or engaging in a multiplicity of interventions, which are often at cross-purposes. Introduction made several arrests. It was alleged that at least 50 opposition members of the UDP, including Prior to the 1 December 2016 presidential election Ousainou Darboe, the party leader, and other and in fulfilment of Article 13 of the ECOWAS senior executive members of the party had been Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, arrested and detained. It was further alleged that ECOWAS dispatched a four-member pre-election three people, including the party youth leader, Solo fact-finding mission to The Gambia on 14–15 July Sandeng, were killed while in government custody. 2016.1 The key objectives of the mission were to Subsequently, on 19 April 2016, 15 people were ascertain the country’s level of preparedness for the released, while the rest of the detainees remained in scheduled presidential elections; gauge the political custody. On 20 April 2016, the Gambian High Court and security situation in the country; and hold charged 37 people, 18 of whom were accused on five consultations with key political stakeholders, with counts: unlawful assembly, rioting, incitement of a view to providing the required support that would violence, interfering with vehicles, and holding a assist the country in achieving peaceful, free, fair procession without a permit. and credible elections. Former president Jammeh came to power in a The period leading to the bloodless coup in 1994 and, in 1997, transformed 1 December 2016 presidential himself to a civilian president, subsequently winning all further presidential elections (2001, 2006 and election was characterised by 2011), thus dominating the political landscape deep political and security of the country. For the 22 years of his presidency, tensions, resulting from the face- his government was variously accused of human rights violations and the emasculation of political off between government and the opponents. The period leading to the 1 December opposition parties 2016 presidential election was characterised by deep political and security tensions, resulting from Responding to the crackdown of the opposition, the face-off between government and opposition former Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, parties. Specifically, from 14 to 16 April 2016, the called on Gambian authorities on 21 April 2016 United Democratic Party (UDP), The Gambia’s to immediately and unconditionally release all main opposition political party, had led protests arrested protesters, and to conduct a prompt, in the country and demanded political reforms. thorough and independent investigation into the In the wake of these protests, security agencies circumstances surrounding the alleged deaths. 2 In Defense of Democracy: Lessons from ECOWAS’ Management of The Gambia’s 2016 Post-Election Impasse The AU and ECOWAS had also condemned the technical observation team, noting the request arrests, torture and killing of opposition leaders and arrived late. This notwithstanding, ECOWAS paid activists, and called for thorough investigations. keen attention to the evolution of the electoral process; and stood as a vanguard for the defence of Prior to the pre-election ECOWAS fact-finding democracy, and the will of the people. mission ECOWAS, the AU and the UN Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), in an increasing spirit of partnership and collaboration, As with the ECOWAS, AU and UN undertook a joint mission to The Gambia on joint mission, the ECOWAS pre- 4–5 May 2016 to engage political stakeholders election fact-finding mission of ahead of the election. The joint mission was led by the president of the ECOWAS Commission, Marcel July 2016 equally identified chall- Alain de Souza; the AU Commissioner for Political enges that could hinder the Affairs, Dr Aisha Labara Abdullahi; and the Special conduct of a peaceful, free and Representative of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas. fair elections. The mission also included the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights through its This PPB therefore highlights how ECOWAS, in its regional representatives for West Africa. Jammeh defence of democracy – and the will of the people – however, refused to grant them an audience. effectively used the instrument of mediation, In their press statement, the joint mission expressed supported by the threat of use of force as a last the wish “that The Gambia will emulate the ongoing resort, in successfully facilitating a bloodless and trend of peaceful and inclusive elections across West peaceful transfer of power. One therefore needs to Africa, as a precondition to confront challenges of understand the nature of the mediation mandate development, in line with the aspirations by the that warrants such, as well as how a combination of Gambian people”.2 threat of use of force – which included positioning soldiers in neighbouring Senegal, a warship in As with the ECOWAS, AU and UN joint mission, The Gambian waters, and air surveillance over the ECOWAS pre-election fact-finding mission of the state capital, Banjul – yielded a peaceful July 2016 equally identified challenges that could transfer of power without shedding a single drop of hinder the conduct of a peaceful, free and fair blood. One equally needs to understand the roles elections. Notable among these challenges were played by actors outside of the ECOWAS region – the government’s denial of equal access to state notably the president of Mauritania who played a media to the opposition; the lack of press freedom, key role in negotiating the last minute talks with intimidation, unlawful arrest and detention of Jammeh, and Equatorial Guinea which agreed to opposition members by state security agents, and host Jammeh. Although mediation accommodates the unfair denial of access to political campaign various options for consideration in negotiation, permits to the opposition. ECOWAS judged that these factors would compromise the integrity of including power-sharing – which before now had the election by giving undue advantages to the been the modus operandi in settling similar post- then-incumbent Jammeh, as happened in previous election crises in Africa – one is tempted to wonder elections. Consequently, for the second consecutive why this option was not considered in the case time (the first being the 2011 presidential election), of The Gambia. If, however, it is understood that the ECOWAS Commission declined to send an mediation takes place within normative and legal observation mission to monitor the 1 December frameworks, and that mediators conduct their work 2016 presidential election. Rather, it opted to on the basis of the mandates they receive from their deploy a four-member technical observation team appointing entity and within the parameters set consisting of political, early-warning and human by the entity’s rules and regulations, it can be seen rights experts, to strengthen its Zonal Bureau in why power-sharing was not explored. On a general Banjul to monitor the electoral processes and the note, this PPB posits that ECOWAS’s handling of evolving political and human rights issues prior to The Gambia’s post-election impasse is testament to the conduct of the election, among other things. the virtue and benefit of coherence, complemen- The Gambian authorities denied ECOWAS the tarity and coordination of mediation initiatives by election observation accreditation request for the international organisations. In Defense of Democracy: Lessons from ECOWAS’ Management of The Gambia’s 2016 Post-Election