CO-OPTATION FOR THE COMMON GOOD? A CASE STUDY OF JAPAN’S NATIONAL MACHINERY FOR GENDER EQUALITY Kristin Wilson 51188240 A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of Tokyo in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master’s of Public Policy in the Graduate School of Public Policy. Tokyo, Japan 2020 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW OF STATE FEMINISM ............................................................. 13 Literature Review ................................................................................................................ 13 Methods ............................................................................................................................... 23 CHAPTER II: UNDERSTANDING JAPAN’S NATIONAL MACHINERY FOR GENDER EQUALITY ............................................................................................................................. 26 Structural Traits—Form, Power, Resources ........................................................................ 27 Contextual Traits—Leadership, Political Will .................................................................... 34 Distinctive Traits—Policy Subsystem, Legal System ......................................................... 39 CHAPTER III: EXAMINING THE STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP IN JAPAN ................................................................................................................................................. 49 History of the Bureaucracy and the Women’s Movement .................................................. 50 International Influence and Civil Society ............................................................................ 54 National Machinery and the Women’s Movement ............................................................. 58 CHAPTER IV: ASSESSING THE ACTIVITIES OF JAPAN’S NATIONAL MACHINERY ................................................................................................................................................. 70 Four Policy Debates ........................................................................................................... 71 “Womenomics” Policies ...................................................................................................... 85 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 100 APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................... 110 WORKS CITED .................................................................................................................... 120 2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CEDAW Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women DPJ Democratic Party of Japan DV Domestic Violence EEOL Equal Employment Opportunity Law GEB Gender Equality Bureau (内閣府男女共同参画局) IWYLG International Women’s Year Liaison Group LDP Liberal Democratic Party MHLW Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare MOJ Ministry of Justice MOL Ministry of Labor NGO Non-Governmental Organization NPO Non-Profit Organization RNGS Research Network on Gender, Politics, and the State UN United Nations WPA Women’s Policy Agency 3 INTRODUCTION In December of 2019, the World Economic Forum released its annual Global Gender Gap report for 2020. In addition to a sobering and disheartening assessment that the world would not achieve gender parity for another 100 years, it also indicated a disappointing and embarrassing outcome for Japan, which was ranked at an all-time low of 121st place out of 153 countries (World Economic Forum, 2019, p.9). Yet, this placement was despite the fact that Japan has appeared to make greater efforts to improve gender equality in Japanese society over the past 20 years. In 1999, the Japanese Diet passed the Basic Act for Gender Equal Society (hereafter “Basic Law”), which established a vision for a gender equal society “in which men and women respect each other's human rights and share responsibilities, and every citizen is able to fully display their individuality and ability regardless of gender,” and outlined the provisions and responsibilities necessary to carry it out (Basic Act for Gender Equal Society, 1999). Furthermore, the Basic Law formally established the national machinery for Japan in the form of a Council for Gender Equality and the Gender Equality Bureau in the Cabinet Office. The Gender Equality Bureau (GEB) was tasked with the planning and coordination of Japanese government policies regarding gender equality in order to carry out the vision enshrined in the Basic Law. However, despite the presence and the activities of the GEB over the past 19 years, Japan’s ranking for gender equality has fallen from 79th place out of 115 countries in 2006, the first year the Global Gender Gap report was published, to its current 121st—with an improvement of only 0.007 points in its score over that timeframe (Hausmann et al., 2006, p.9). Moreover, in 2012, Prime Minster Shinzo Abe launched his new initiative styled “Womenomics” (borrowing the term from chief Japan strategist at Goldman Sachs, Kathy Matsui) that intended to boost the Japanese economy and address the pressing labor shortage brought on by a declining birthrate by encouraging Japanese women to be active in the labor market. The initiative included seemingly pro-women’s empowerment goals that had been carried over from previous administrations for almost a decade, as they were initially launched in 2003 by the Koizumi administration in response to recommendations by the 1985 Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action. These goals, which received renewed vigor under “Womenomics,” committed Japan to aiming for a 30% target of female representation in leadership positions by 2020, placing special emphasis on these targets in the government’s Fourth Basic Plan for Gender Equality. Yet, while the GEB has continued to promote these targets for several years, 4 as they have received mention in all basic plans dating back to the original 1996 Vision of Gender Equality, it is clear that most of them are projected to fall well short of the 30%, with many targets being adjusted to significantly lower numbers to reflect more realistic goals (such as a new target of 7% for female directors in the national civil service and 15% for female directors in private corporations) (Gender Equality Bureau, 2015a). What’s more, the strategy has also not succeeded in boosting the fertility rate, with the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) announcing at the end of 2019 that Japan had recorded under 900,000 births, a record low, while retaining its stubbornly low fertility rate of 1.369 (Kurabe, 2019). Therefore, despite these efforts, Japan has yet to substantially move the needle on gender equality outcomes. While multiple factors are responsible for Japan’s low rankings and lack of advancement for women, in particular the poor results with regards to economic and political opportunities for women, it begs the question as to the effectiveness and impact of the GEB regarding gender equality policy and outcomes in Japan. Why has the national machinery for gender equality been unable to achieve significant progress in realizing a gender equal society? It is the intention of this paper to analyze the efficacy and impact of the GEB and related national machinery bodies, from their primary upgrade in 2001 until the present day, as an in-depth case study, taking into consideration factors such as agency structure and resources, agency activities, the greater policy environment of Japan, the nature of the Japanese bureaucracy, and other structural characteristics of Japanese society—most importantly the relatively weaker women’s movement and its relationship with the state. It is important to note that the establishment of national machinery in Japan did not occur in a vacuum. A precursor to the modern GEB was the Women’s Affairs Office, which appeared inside the Prime Minister’s Office in 1975 as a response to calls from the United Nations (UN) during International Women’s Year for countries to establish their own women’s policy agencies (WPAs) (Iwamoto, 2007, p.4). The UN declared these bodies to be the “main engines for achieving gender equality for women” (McBride & Mazur, 2010, p.101). The importance of national machinery was emphasized again in 1985 at the Third United Nations World Conference held in Nairobi; thus, over the 1970s and 1980s, many postindustrial democracies heeded this advice and over 100 countries established their own machinery (McBride & Mazur, 2010). Initially, the Women’s Affairs Office lacked any authority or legal standing, and its upgrade in 2001 to an official bureau with legal backing was long advocated for by women’s movement actors in Japan who were able to utilize political opportunities to see it through (Iwamoto, 2007). With the existence and proliferation of such state institutions, naturally what would follow is an academic imperative to study 5 these agencies to determine their ability to act as “main engines” for gender equality by assessing their effectiveness and impact for both the women’s movement and state-society relations—which