Minimum Deterrence and its Critics Three things came to mind while writing “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons.”1 First, the intent was to reinvigorate debate within the policy-making community regarding nu- clear weapons; second, to introduce the idea of minimum deterrence;2 and third, to sketch out a force structure suitable for the United States to achieve minimum deterrence. Judging from the attention the article re- ceived, we were successful in our first bid, less successful in the second, and largely unsuccessful in our third.3 Before addressing our critics, it is important to clarify the meaning of “minimum deterrence” and specify how the number 311 was derived. Minimum Deterrence Minimum deterrence is an argument about states, security, and nuclear weapons.4 It makes three assumptions. First, minimum deterrence as- sumes that all states strive to survive; all statesmen want a state to rule. Second, it assumes that nuclear weapons produce political effects; that is, they compel statesmen to behave cautiously in the face of grave danger. This cautiousness produces restraint, which shores up international stability. Third, minimum deterrence assumes that large arsenals buy statesmen little. As in other areas of competition, there comes a point of diminishing returns, and with nuclear weapons that point comes quickly. This pre- supposes that statesmen are not sensitive to the actual number of nuclear weapons a state may possess. The mere fact that a state may have a nuclear weapon or seek to acquire one is enough to condition them to act cau- tiously, even in times of crises. As Steve Walt aptly put it, “American policy- makers clearly understand the logic of minimum deterrence or they would not be so worried when a state like North Korea or Iran makes a move to join the nuclear club.”5 In other words, they freely recognize that a hand- ful of nuclear weapons in the hands of a hostile country can constrain what we can do to that country. If a small number of weapons can pro- duce such sobriety on our part, why do we need thousands? A small number of nuclear weapons is all that is needed for states to achieve relative security. Security is always relative, and deterrence is no different. As Bernard Brodie once described it, the effectiveness of STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2010 [ 3 ] 02-Forsyth.indd 3 11/29/2010 2:21:00 PM deterrence “must be measured not only in terms of the power it holds at bay, but the incentives to aggression which form the pressure behind that power.”6 In effect, nuclear weapons socialize statesmen to the dangers of adventurism, which conditions them to set up formal and informal sets of rules that constrain behavior. Statesmen do not want to be part of a system that constrains them, but that is the kind of system that results among nuclear powers. Each is conditioned by the capabilities of the other, and the relationship that emerges is one tempered by caution despite the com- position, goals, or desires of its leaders. In short, leaders of nuclear powers are risk averse; they must act with deliberate restraint, even if this is not their preference.7 Leaders in Russia, China, and the United States understand this. Adopt- ing a minimum deterrent strategy, China’s nuclear numbers remain rela- tively small compared to those held by Russia and the United States. Yet, despite these rather large nuclear inequities, China continues to modern- ize its conventional capabilities, extending its influence throughout the region. How does one explain this behavior? China has reasoned that its small nuclear arsenal is sufficient to deter its most powerful rivals. There is little Russia or the United States can do, militarily, to dissuade China from pursuing its armament program. The three countries have, tacitly, entered into a period of mutual deterrence; nothing official has been declared, but all know that the stakes are too high for anyone to make a run, militarily, at the other. If leaders of the big three understand this, others do too, which is why the slow, steady spread of nuclear weapons is likely to continue. Unlike the spread that occurred during the Cold War, however, where the United States and the Soviet Union raced to increase nuclear stockpiles, new nu- clear states will mimic the behavior of India, Pakistan, and North Korea and keep their arsenals relatively small. In other words, as the number of nuclear states in the world increases, the actual number of weapons in the world will decrease. Much has been written about deterrence in the post– Cold War world, but this has been overlooked: The age of minimum de- terrence has arrived. 311—All the Nukes you Need Nothing has drawn more attention than the number 311, so it is impor- tant to explain how it was derived.8 First, we assumed that deterrence and [ 4 ] STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2010 02-Forsyth.indd 4 11/29/2010 2:21:01 PM war winning are not the same thing. Second, we assumed that the nuclear triad is worth maintaining. Lastly, we assumed that the political effects pro- duced by nuclear weapons do not stem from countervalue or counterforce targeting but from the destructive power of the weapons themselves. A state does not have to demonstrate a capacity to win a nuclear war to deter one, because the devastating consequences of nuclear war are transparent, well understood, and universally recognized. Reflecting on this, McGeorge Bundy commented, “A decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one’s own country would be recog- nized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.”9 Along these lines, Brodie observed that “few people were unexcited or unimpressed with the first atomic weapons. That something tremendously important had happened was immedi- ately understood by almost everyone.”10 That the United States would propose to turn over its nuclear weapons to an inter national governing council under the Baruch Plan at a time when it enjoyed an unbroken monopoly of nuclear weaponry testifies to the collective realization that these weapons were, in today’s parlance, game changers. From the very beginning, nuclear weapons and policy were devised to prevent the out- break of a nuclear war, not to win one. Even in an age of minimum deterrence, readiness, survivability, and flexibility are vital ingredients of nuclear deterrence, and the nuclear triad appears to be the most effective scheme to achieve those aims. That a small state like Pakistan can achieve deterrence without one does not mean that the United States ought to abandon its. On the contrary, if small states could afford a nuclear triad, they would probably opt for one, because it enhances flexibility and complicates an adversary’s task.11 Therefore, it makes sense to maintain a land, sea, and air leg. The land component would be comprised of two ICBM squadrons of 50 Minuteman III mis- siles located at two different locations. These missiles would be spread over a large area in two wings, complicating enemy targeting. The naval com- ponent would be comprised of 192 SLBMs with 24 weapons loaded on each of eight Ohio-class submarines, with four in port at any given time. This would allow four fully armed submarines to simultaneously patrol both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The air component would include 19 B-2 bombers, which would provide the needed flexibility for escalation control and strategic signaling. While it would be ideal to enable the B-2s STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2010 [ 5 ] 02-Forsyth.indd 5 11/29/2010 2:21:01 PM to carry air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) to give them standoff capa- bility, this is not necessary to ensure a viable triad. Lastly, the political effect of nuclear weapons does not stem from counter- value or counterforce targeting but from the destructive power of the weapons themselves.12 Put another way, the mere prospect of the punish- ment delivered by nuclear weapons tames the most bellicose of statesmen. This cannot be overstated: one 300 Kt weapon is more than enough to destroy a city the size of London. If a bomb of that size were detonated above Trafalgar Square on a workday, approximately 240,000 people would die instantly and 410,000 casualties would be sustained. Nearly everything within a 3 km radius would be destroyed, with burn victims reaching out as far as Victoria Park. The same bomb detonated above Mumbai on a workday would kill over one million people and produce more than two million casualties.13 Even if one were to assume the worst, a “bolt from the blue” where a state loses 50 percent of its nuclear capability to a first strike, a force of 311 weapons would allow that state to strike back over 150 times before it had to negotiate.14 There is not a state on the planet that could withstand that sort of punishment or a leader who would run that sort of risk. So why would a state need thousands? 311 and Its Critics Apparently, there are several reasons.15 First, critics contend that we over- look or downplay the importance of large numbers when considering deter- rence. That Russia holds thousands of weapons and China hundreds makes a force of 311 untenable; fewer weapons means less target coverage, which means less deterrence in an uncertain world. Secondly, they claim a smaller force would be less efficient and more difficult to maintain than a larger one; a smaller force means a smaller industrial base, which means greater depen- dencies on a relatively small number of suppliers.