Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation: A Buddhist Approach. Edited by László Zsolnai. London & New York: Springer, 2011. vii + 213 pages. Includes general bibliography, “about the authors,” and index. $159.99 (hardcover and softcover), $119.00 (eBook). ISBN 97848193103. Richard K. Payne Institute of Buddhist Studies This is a collection of ten essays: an introduction and conclusion by the editor, and then eight essays divided into two sections. The first section, “Buddhist Ethics Applied to Economics,” comprises four essays: “The Relational Economy” by Julie A. Nelson, “Buddhism and Sustainable Consumption” by Peter Daniels, “Economic Sufficiency and Santi Asoke” by Juliana Essen, and “Pathways to a Mindful Economy” by Joel C. Magnuson. The next section is titled “Achieving Happiness and Peace.” While the first section presumes to identify universaliz- able Buddhist ethical principles, so this second section presumes to identify universalizable Buddhist ethical values—happiness and peace. The four essays in this section are “Do Our Economic Choices Make us Happy?” by Colin Ash, “Gross National Happiness” by Sander G. Tideman, “The Application of Buddhist Theory and Practice in Modern Organizations” by Bronwen Rees and Tamas Agocs, and “Leadership the Buddhist Way” by Laurens van den Muyzenberg. The title of the first section, “Buddhist Ethics Applied to Economics,” can be taken as indicating one term of a semiotic opposition between “Buddhist economics” and the “economics of Buddhism.”1 Buddhist economics identifies the prescriptive project of applying what are identified as universalizable Buddhist ethical principles to economic 1. See Elizabeth Williams–Ørberg, “Introduction: Buddhism and Economics,” in “Buddhism and Economics,” special focus, Journal of Global Buddhism 20 (2019): 19–29. 73 74 Pacific World, 4th ser., no. 1 (2020) relations. In contrast, the economics of Buddhism identifies an aca- demic project that attempts to understand the relation between Buddhist institutions and the economy of societies where Buddhism exists as an institution. While not limited to the individual, Buddhist economics largely references the individual person, their values, and their economic actions as the locus of inquiry. Buddhist economics on the other hand largely looks to institutional organizations as the locus of inquiry. In other words, Buddhist economics participates in the dis- course of ethics rather than that of economics. As Matthew King has summarized, “Buddhist Economics is a thing quite apart from econom- ics proper. It is instead a Buddhist scale of value aimed not only to con- front but actually to absorb the authority of normative, ‘Western’ eco- nomics and the dominant forces of materialist development in Asia.”2 The economic study of Buddhism extends the economic study of reli- gion, itself a relatively new field, to the study of Buddhism. As a personal note, let me say that I largely agree with the values expressed by the contributors to this collection. The criticisms below involve questioning the claims that those values are, somehow, Buddhist in nature. Rather than being based on research into the his- tory and thought of Buddhism, in many cases it seems as if the label “Buddhist” is being attached to a value for the sake of its rhetorical value. For instance, an odd note is struck in the work’s preface when the editor suggests that the goals of Buddhism are the achievement of “happiness, peace and permanence” (p. v). As almost anyone who has taken an undergraduate world religions course knows, a central tenet of Buddhist thought is impermanence. Where then does this charac- terization (caricature?) of Buddhism come from? CHAPTER 1, “WHY BUDDHIST ECONOMICS?,” LASZLO ZSOLNAI “Why Buddhist Economics?” identifies the variety of themes found in the balance of the collection and simultaneously highlights the editor’s own conceptions of Buddhist praxis—that is, the interaction between doctrine and practice. Generally, economics only treats desire—the motivation for consumption—as a monolithic category. Zsolnai calls 2. Matthew King, “Buddhist Economics: Scales of Value in Global Exchange,” in Oxford Handbooks Online (7 Jul. 2016; DOI: 10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780199935420.013.64), https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/ 10.1093/ oxfordhb/9780199935420.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199935420-e-64. Payne: Review of Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation 75 attention to the distinction made by Payutto between taṇhā and canda (p. 5). The former is familiar as one of the “three poisons”—greed, cu- pidity, acquisitiveness; and as the second of the four noble truths— desire, thirst, etc. An important example that elucidates Zsolnai’s conceptions re- garding Buddhist praxis is his claim that “The purpose of the Buddhist agenda is to stop suffering” (p. 14). This is ambiguous, allowing for two opposing interpretations, one negative the other positive. The nega- tive understanding of the cessation of suffering is simply the absence of suffering. However, a positive interpretation of the cessation of suf- fering as the only meaning is now widely and uncritically accepted and facilitates the popular image of Buddhism as the religion of happiness. Zsolnai notes this difference in interpretations when he clearly asserts that “happiness is not the ultimate goal of Buddhism. The cessation of suffering is” (p. 14). CHAPTER 2, “THE RELATIONAL ECONOMY,” JULIE NELSON Nelson addresses a key issue for contemporary discourse in Buddhist economics—how capitalism is conceived. As she notes, while many au- thors claim to ground their views in interdependence, their descrip- tion of capitalism is that “the contemporary economic system is radi- cally impersonal and non-relational” (p. 24). Taking her cue from those few authors who have asserted the possibility of an active Buddhist engagement within a capitalist system, she points out that the image of economies as driven by abstract and inhuman/e values is often as- serted by proponents and critics alike is itself an artificial image. “If we take off the blinders of mechanical thinking and look at economic life as it is actually lived, we can see that—far from being ‘locked up’—it provides numerous interstices for wise and compassionate response” (p. 28). CHAPTER 3, “BUDDHISM AND SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION,” PETER DANIELS At the interface of concerns regarding economics and ecology is the issue of consumption. Daniels points out that a simplistic interpre- tation of Buddhist doctrine as opposing consumption is not viable. Instead he proposes that 76 Pacific World, 4th ser., no. 1 (2020) the Buddhist world view can inform and enrich the efforts to modify consumption into “sustainable consumption” forms that can bring about and sustain better quality of life and well-being for humans and the living environment of which they are a part. (p. 36) The prescriptive part of his essay balances rather precariously be- tween social action and neoliberal individualism. The latter seems evi- dent when he prescribes two levels of change that would move toward sustainable consumption. “Firstly, we can reduce the environmental demands from what we purchase by minor, incremental shifts in the bundle of specific items that effectively provide the same levels and [of?] end–use services” (pp. 40–41). And, second, “sustainable con- sumption can occur via more profound changes in people’s overall consumption bundles or lifestyles” (p. 41). In Daniels’ view, “With this resolution upon demand-side aspects of the economy, Buddhism can help achieve sustainable consumption” (p. 42). The focus is, in other words, on individual consumption choices, that is, on demand, rather than supply. One of his examples is particularly revealing: a shift from leisure activity based on jet skis, to yoga and hiking, would probably have very significant and positive environmental ef- fects per unit leisure time or well-being service. Such a qualitative shift would be aligned with the reshaping of actual preferences into true preferences that truly yield satisfaction. (p. 52) Considered closely, the language of “actual preferences” and “true preferences” seems rather confusing. Does it simply reveal the author’s own value judgment, his own personal preferences, about the worthiness of different kinds of leisure activities? Here the rationale for such changes seems to be a typically neo- liberal one that individual changes somehow accumulating to make a significant collective change. Fortunately, Daniels balances this with some proposed societal actions and indicates the dialectic between so- cietal actions and individual education needed to support them. CHAPTER 4, “ECONOMIC SUFFICIENCY AND SANTI ASOKE,” JULIANA ESSEN More directly societal in orientation is Essen’s chapter. Like Daniels, Essen asserts that there is no inherent opposition between Buddhist and “mainstream Western economics.” Key to understanding the in- tellectual context of her essay is the claim that immediately follows: “Like its Western sibling, the Buddhist model is based on individual Payne: Review of Ethical Principles and Economic Transformation 77 rational choices concerning material well-being. The accumulation of wealth is even allowed and in many cases encouraged, contrary to popular belief (p. 62). Rational choice theory is more complex than can be explicated in brief here, but it is worth noting that what Essen calls the “Rational Buddhist Householder” is not simply identical with the reward-maximizing model of human beings hypothesized in rational choice