Center for Security Studies STRATEGIC TRENDS 2016 Key Developments in Global Affairs Editors: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor: Andreas Wenger Authors: Severin Fischer, Daniel Keohane, Prem Mahadevan, Oliver Thränert, Lisa Watanabe CSS ETH Zurich STRATEGIC TRENDS 2016 is also electronically available at: www.css.ethz.ch/publications/strategic-trends Editors STRATEGIC TRENDS 2016: Oliver Thränert, Martin Zapfe Series Editor STRATEGIC TRENDS: Andreas Wenger Contact: Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich Haldeneggsteig 4, IFW CH-8092 Zurich Switzerland © 2016, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich Images © by Reuters (p. 29 and p. 65), Bundeswehr / French Navy / Cindy Luu (p. 9), Peter Gawthrop / flickr (p. 47) and Royal Dutch Shell (p. 83); additional images for cover page © by Freedom House, US Navy, IFRC, NATO and Royal Dutch Shell (from top to bottom, left to right). ISSN 1664-0667 ISBN 978-3-905696-53-0 CHAPTER 2 Borderline Practices – Irregular Migration and EU External Relations Lisa Watanabe Irregular migration to Europe from the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and beyond will have ramifications for theEuropean Union that go beyond the immediate challenges posed to border control-free travel and asylum pro- cedures in the EU. The EU’s migration agenda is increasingly being taken up within the foreign policy realm as the need to focus on the external dimension of migration takes on greater urgency. However, ‘externalizing’ migration management practices through coopting neighboring states is likely to come at a normative price, given that a migration control oriented agenda that primarily serves EU interests is being outsourced. A memorial stone for the Schengen Agreement is erected in the small village of Schengen, Luxembourg, 27 January 2016. The treaty with the goal of eliminating internal border controls was signed at the quay of the Moselle river at the tripoint of France, Germany and Luxembourg. 29 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2016 Acute irregular migration to Europe do so, and the EU may have more lev- over recent years has important impli- erage with some countries than with cations for the EU as a foreign policy others. The recent deal with Turkey, actor, though the shaky future of the for example, has shown that certain Schengen System and an increasingly countries hold considerable bargain- moribund ‘Dublin rule’ have drawn ing chips of their own. Even employ- the most attention as a sense of cri- ing the EU’s normative agenda strate- sis has gripped the Union. Unprec- gically may prove difficult when faced edented numbers of people arriving with fairly reform-resistant countries irregularly in the EU, due to conflict that are important from a migration and instability in the EU’s immediate viewpoint. Outsourcing control prac- and wider neighborhood, have had the tices could also lead to the violation of effect of pushing the management of human rights, including those linked the migration further into the foreign to international protection, raising policy realm, reinforcing an already yet more troubling issues for the EU. emergent trend. This chapter sets out the scale of irreg- The process of ‘externalizing’ the man- ular migration to Europe and the ma- agement of the EU’s external border jor migration routes used to reach the beyond the Union’s actual frontier, EU. It then outlines the pressure that primarily through ‘outsourcing’ border recent irregular migration flows have control practices to source or transit placed on border control-free travel countries had, to be sure, begun even in Schengen Europe and related EU before the current migration crisis. Yet, asylum practices. It then looks at how this process is now being taken a step the EU has sought to reduce irregular further, involving more dimensions of migration to its territory through ex- foreign policy and heightened efforts ternalizing border management to its to share the burden of curbing irregu- neighbors. Finally, it deliberates the lar migration with non-EU countries. dilemmas this generates for EU for- eign policy. As such, the viability of the ‘border- less’ Schengen zone and the future of Acute migration flows: Pressure at EU asylum procedures are increasingly the EU’s border dependent on the willingness and abil- Significantly elevated irregular migra- ity of neighboring countries to reduce tion to Europe over the past five years irregular migration to the EU. Yet, is a reflection of increased instability in these countries will need incentives to Europe’s near abroad and beyond. The 30 BORDERLINE PRACTICES Arab uprisings that swept across North people undertaking irregular migra- Africa and the Middle East in 2010 tion are economic migrants, people and 2011 were initially responsible for fleeing conflict and persecution, who more acute irregular migration to Eu- intend to claim asylum, and people rope. More recently, ongoing conflict who fall somewhere in between. As and political instability in the Middle such, irregular migration to Europe is East, Africa and South Asia have been mixed in nature. responsible for the largest irregular ar- rivals of migrants to the EU to date. The number of people coming to the EU irregularly is at an all-time high. First, some definitions are essential. 2014 was considered an unprecedent- Migrant arrivals generated by such ed year for irregular migration to the geopolitical developments are irregu- EU, with some 280,000 instances of lar in so far as they take place out- irregular entries. Yet, this number was side the regulatory norms of sending, surpassed in the first six months of transit and receiving states. From the 2015 alone, when 340,000 ‘irregu- viewpoint of receiving countries in lar’ migrants entered the EU. Syrian, Europe, this implies entering, staying Afghan and Eritrean nationals con- or working without the necessary au- stituted the majority of people un- thorization or documents. Among the dertaking irregular border crossings. 31 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2016 By September, this figure had al- stress, due to higher numbers of Syr- most doubled again, reaching almost ians and Afghans taking this route. 617,412 irregular border crossings, and the number kept growing. From the Greek Aegean islands, many migrants then take the Western Bal- Migrants entering the Schengen/EU kan route to the EU. This has placed zone irregularly use three main routes, the Hungarian and Croatian land bor- in addition to international airports. ders with Serbia under intense pres- The primary route used is the Eastern sure. Syrian and Afghan nationals are Mediterranean route, which comprises especially well represented in irregular the sea passage from Turkey to Greece, migration flows across this route. Cyprus and Bulgaria. This is followed by the Western Balkan route, which Given diverse reasons for irregular comprises migratory flows from the migration to Europe, the EU has also Western Balkans and secondary move- witnessed a corresponding surge in ments of migrants from the Eastern asylum applications, mostly in Ger- Mediterranean route. The third major many, Sweden and Hungary. The route is the Central Mediterranean figures for Hungary appear especially route to Europe, which until 2015 con- high due to the speed with which it stituted the major route and consists of appears to have processed claims. the sea passage from North Africa, es- Moreover, most of those who sought pecially Libya, to Italy and Malta. asylum in Hungary have made sec- ondary movements. The high number Pressure points reflecting the relative of asylum requests in 2015 has been importance of these routes exist along primarily propelled by the conflicts particular sections of the EU’s external in Syria and Iraq, as well as ongoing border. In 2014, Italy became a ‘front- turmoil in Afghanistan; with Syrians, line’ country, given the predominance Afghans and Iraqi nationals constitut- at the time of the Central Mediterra- ing the majority of asylum claimants nean route. As the Eastern Mediterra- in the EU. nean and Western Balkan routes have gained in importance, additional pres- Schengen strained, Dublin defunct sure points have emerged. As more The migration crisis has placed the people attempt to enter the EU irregu- Schengen and Dublin Systems under larly from Turkey via the Aegean Sea, severe strain. To make matters worse, the Greek islands of Lesbos, Chios and uncoordinated responses from Schen- Kos have also come under particular gen/EU member states have not only 32 BORDERLINE PRACTICES 33 STRATEGIC TRENDS 2016 led to tensions between them, but also particular emphasis on the German- prompted a crisis of confidence in the Austrian land border. The latter did future of both systems. the same along all its land border, with a particular focus on the Austrian- Schengen shambles Slovenian border, where border cross- Since its creation in 1995, the ‘border- ings can only be made at authorized less’ Schengen zone has depended on crossing points. These states were then the effective management of the EU’s joined by Slovenia, Sweden, the Neth- external border. The Schengen Agree- erlands, Norway, France and Malta, all ment thus provided for a common set of which temporarily re-imposed bor- of rules on border controls and visa re- der controls. In early 2016, this trend quirements designed to meet that end. persisted, with Sweden introducing border controls at its border with In a bid to stop irregular border cross- Denmark. The latter then followed ings to their territories, EU/Schengen by introducing controls at its borders states have taken a number of emer- with Germany to prevent Sweden- gency measures. Some states have even bound migrants travelling irregularly erected razor-wire fences to secure from getting stuck on its territory. their borders. Hungary, an EU Schen- gen state, has constructed a fence One should not forget that the along the land border with Roma- Schengen zone has always allowed the nia, Serbia and Croatia. Austria, also possibility of the temporary re-intro- an EU Schengen state, is planning to duction of border controls.