Back to the Rough Ground: Towards a Conservative Theory of Democracy by Jared Giesbrecht J.D., Queen’s University, 2008 B.A., University of Lethbridge, 2004 A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Faculty of Law © Jared Giesbrecht, 2013 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. ii Supervisory Committee Back to the Rough Ground: Towards a Conservative Theory of Democracy by Jared Giesbrecht J.D., Queen’s University, 2008 B.A., University of Lethbridge, 2004 Supervisory Committee Jeremy Webber (Faculty of Law) Supervisor Michael M’Gonigle (Faculty of Law) Departmental Member Dr. James Tully (Department of Political Science) Outside Member iii Abstract Supervisory Committee Jeremy Webber (Faculty of Law) Supervisor Michael M’Gonigle (Faculty of Law) Departmental Member Dr. James Tully (Department of Political Science) Outside Member This work seeks to recover the critical spirit of conservatism and re-emphasize its goal of stability and resilience in society. I will argue that we should strive to view ourselves as deeply dependent and persistently vulnerable beings rather than free, equal, and rational individuals. An understanding of ourselves as embodied and interconnected patternings-in-the-world – res ecologia – will allow us to better recognize a diffuse violence at work in the modern world. I consider the nature of causation and suggest that the internal stability of res ecologia, when disrupted, should be a primary concern when considering the nature of violence and domination. I then invite us to understand the violence and domination arising in modern liberal societies – protocolic modulations – as abstract standardization that ensures efficient synchronization between individuated or atomized actors. Further, I suggest that the rapid modulations of this kind of protocolic domination disrupt the structural causation within and between res ecologia. In chapter five, I begin to show how this kind of violence and domination is manifest in and through the tradition of liberalism by tracing out a shared, underlying dualistic logic that simultaneously individuates and totalizes. In chapter six, I turn to the role of reason in creating freedom and legitimizing violence. Reason is seen to be contributing to both freedom and domination depending upon whether or not it creates resilience within society that resists standardizations. In chapter seven, I argue that the only way to effectively counter the excessive violence within the dualistic logic of liberalism is to cultivate an ethic of mutual support and restraint that invests society with stability and resilience. Finally, I conclude by contending that a resilient society requires intermediate structures and civil enterprises to instill tradition and reciprocal responsibilities in interdependent familial, socio-economic, and religious life. iv Table of Contents Supervisory Committee ................................................................................................................. ii Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ iii Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... iv I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 II. Relation .................................................................................................................................. 22 III. Causation .............................................................................................................................. 84 IV. Modulation ......................................................................................................................... 129 V. Liberalization ....................................................................................................................... 168 VI. Legitimation ....................................................................................................................... 222 VII. Democratization ................................................................................................................ 272 VIII. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 335 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 338 v List of Figures Figure 1 Centralized, Decentralized, and Distributive Networks ..................................... 35 Figure 2 Source Code and Machine Code ...................................................................... 133 Figure 3 Socio-Phenomenological and Eco-Logical Analyses ....................................... 173 I. INTRODUCTION “We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!” – Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 46e A. The Problem of Liberalism The problem of liberalism begins with the fact that our world is speeding up. In stating this, I mean to say something that is as sweeping as it sounds. Everything in our modern world is accelerating. Although acceleration is taking place in all manner of relations, it can be most easily understood in technological and social terms: the speeding up of processes of, for example, computation, communication, transportation, resource extraction, manufacturing, consumption, as well as increasing rates of change in attitudes and values, familial relations, religious practices, sexual practices, vocations, social obligations, and mores. And, importantly, these changes have facilitated the push to ensure legal, economic, and political interactions are taking place with ever-increasing rapidity. The kind of acceleration I refer to, therefore, is a distinct feature of modern industrial society; it takes place through a causal interplay between technological, natural, and social changes as well as certain shifts in normative philosophy.1 This causal interplay of acceleration is a relatively recent development in world history, but it has become a globally pervasive phenomenon. Nothing in our world today remains untouched by this acceleration. Everything in our world is speeding up. But why do I understand this as a concern? Why is it motivating me to re-evaluate our tradition of liberal democratic theory and its particular approach to justice in law and politics? Simply put, acceleration is a central concern to me because the speeding-up of everything in the world around us, and indeed, our very selves, is not 1 Causation between behaviour and thought goes two ways, but this dynamic will not be investigated here. The focus is upon how normative reasoning alters behaviour. 2 simply pervasive – it is transformative. The forward-thrust of acceleration has very real material, social, and spiritual consequences. It means not simply a quantitative speeding-up, but a qualitative change that takes place within the relations that make up our lives and the world. So, it is not simply more movement. It is different movement. Changes in our temporal structures transform, for example, our culture, economy, and relations with the natural world. Because our being is historical, changes in the networked patternings of our lives means fundamental, qualitative changes in who and what we are. In other words, these transformations have significant normative implications that deserve our attention. There are some theorists who problematize acceleration simply because they understand liberal democracy as requiring sufficient time for representation, deliberation, etc. They feel that acceleration, if intense enough, will hinder or even dismantle liberal democratic models of political decision-making.2 Although these folks are tuned in to an interesting problem regarding acceleration, this is not my concern. I do not seek to protect our liberal democratic model of governance from the pressures of acceleration. Instead, I endeavour to problematize liberal democracy itself and to demonstrate how acceleration, and the dramatic transformations that accompany it, are fueled by its underlying philosophy. Indeed, my goal is to show how liberalism itself is fueling this acceleration and then suggest some reasons why we should seek to re-discover a normative philosophy that developed in opposition to the liberal tradition. Before discussing liberalism and examining its theoretical foundations, however, we might question a little further why acceleration is a problem worthy of our consideration. I will 2 For example, William Scheuerman argues that traditional institutions of liberal democracy (e.g. a separation of power) are grounded in temporal assumptions and, more importantly, “[t]he legitimacy of liberal democratic rule is predicated on the necessity of wide-ranging but time-consuming deliberation and debate.” William Scheuerman, Liberal Democracy and the Social Acceleration of Time (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) at 3, 4. Specifically, he suggests that the legislative branch was to be slow, deliberate