CHAPTER 6 THE THERMOPYLAE LINE ENERAL Wavell arrived in Athens on the 19th April and immediately e Gheld a conference at General Wilson's quarters . Although an effectiv decision to embark the British force from Greece had been made on a higher level in London, the commanders on the spot now once agai n deeply considered the pros and cons . The Greek Government was unstable and had suggested that the British force should depart in order to avoid further devastation of the country. It was unlikely that the Greek Army of Epirus could be extricated and some of its senior officers were urging sur- render. General Wilson considered that his force could hold the Ther- mopylae line indefinitely once the troops were in position.l "The arguments in favour of fighting it out, which [it] is always better to do if possible, " wrote Wilson later,2 "were : the tying up of enemy forces, army and air , which would result therefrom ; the strain the evacuation would place o n the Navy and Merchant Marine ; the effect on the morale of the troops and the loss of equipment which would be incurred . In favour of with- drawal the arguments were : the question as to whether our forces in Greece could be reinforced as this was essential ; the question of the maintenance of our forces, plus the feeding of the civil population ; the weakness of our air forces with few airfields and little prospect of receiving reinforcements ; the little hope of the Greek Army being able to recover its morale . The decision was made to withdraw from Greece ." The British leaders con- sidered that it was unlikely that they would be able to take out any equip- ment except that which the troops carried, and that they would be lucky "to get away with 30 per cent of the force" . This British discussion was followed by a conference at the Greek King' s palace, attended, as on the previous day, by the King himself, Sir Michae l Palairet, General Papagos, General Wilson, Air Vice-Marshal D 'Albiac and Rear-Admiral Turle; but, on this occasion, also by General Wavell an d by General Mazarakis, a leader of the Venizelist Republican party to who m the King had suddenly offered the Prime Ministership. Wavell, who spoke first, said that the British Army would fight as lon g as the Greek Army fought . On the other hand it would embark if the Greek Government wished. Papagos then said that the morale of the Greek Army had been shaken . The Epirus Army had now to be supplied along a single road (through Yannina) and the vehicles available were too fe w to maintain that army in the field. Some of the senior officers wished to cease fighting. The King, the Government and the high command had ha d to order them to fight on . Greece would be devastated if the armies con- tinued fighting for another month or two . Palairet then read a telegram from Mr Churchill to the effect that if the British force left Greece it mus t Baillie-Grohman, Report . 2 Wilson, pp . 93-4. 132 THE THERMOPYLAE LINE 20Ap r be with the full consent of the Greek King and Government . Mazarakis said that "he had been called in too late to retrieve the situation and tha t evacuation was the best solution" . 3 It was decided that the British force should be embarked and that the Greek forces in Epirus should continue fighting as long as possible, or at an y rate as long as [required for] the withdrawal of the British forces . The war was of course to continue in the islands with all the means and the naval forces available, since Greece was indissolubly bound up with Britain and her resolve was to fight t o the end by the side of the British Empire.4 The belated effort to bring the Venizelists into the Government failed. They had been obliterated from Greek public life after 1935, when Metaxas established his dictatorship . In 1935, and later, large numbers o f republican army officers had been dismissed . When the Italians invaded Greece some relatively junior officers of republican leanings were allowe d to rejoin the army but none of the rank of colonel or above was recalled. 5 These republican officers considered the monarchists generally to be half- hearted about the war and inefficient. They thought that, as soon as Italy attacked, a coalition government should have been formed and the com- pulsorily-retired republican officers recalled . Now, at the eleventh hour , the King proposed to form a coalition government . Mazarakis agreed to lead a coalition on condition that M . Maniadakis, the Minister for Internal Security, who controlled the police force, was excluded . As this matter affected security (wrote Wilson afterwards) it was referred to m y headquarters for decision as to the advisability of a change at this juncture ; in view of the impending evacuation we were unable to agree to any step which would ten d to loosen the control exercised by the police in Athens . (Two years were to elapse before a Venizelist entered the Greek Government .) 6 It was ironical that, as a result of a British decision, the followers o f the great Greek liberal who had been a devoted ally of Britain and Franc e in the first world war should thus have been excluded from the Greek Government in this crisis . Although, on the 18th, Mr Churchill had issued a directive about th e principles that should govern the evacuation, on the 20th, evidently encouraged by news that the British force was successfully falling back to the Thermopylae line, he wrote to Mr Eden in an optimistic vein . I am increasingly of the opinion that if the generals on the spot think they can hold on in the Thermopylae position for a fortnight or three weeks, and can keep the Greek Army fighting, or enough of it, we should certainly support them, if th e Dominions will agree . every day the German Air Force is detained in Greec e enables the Libyan situation to be stabilised, and may enable us to bring in the extr a tanks [to Tobruk] . If this is accomplished safely and the Tobruk position holds, we a Wilson, p. 95 . Papagos, p . 382. 5 In Greek Resistance Army (Eng edition, 1951) General Sarafis, one of the republicans, say s that General Heywood (the leader of the British Military Mission to Greece) presented a list o f 600 such officers to the Government and asked that they be employed, but the Governmen t refused. 4 Wilson, p. 95 . 19-21 Apr THE SURRENDER IN EPIRUS 13 3 might even feel strong enough to reinforce from Egypt. I am most reluctant to se e us quit, and if the troops were British only and the matter could be decided o n military grounds alone I would urge Wilson to fight if he thought it possible . Anyhow, before we commit ourselves to evacuation the case must be put squarely to the Dominions after to-morrow's Cabinet . Of course, I do not know the conditions in which our retreating forces will reach the new key position.? It was too late, however, for such a change of heart and change of plan . That day there was a meeting of Greek generals in Epirus . With the support of the Bishop of Yannina, General Tsolakoglou (whom we last saw driv- ing westward from Kalabaka leaving his troops behind him) and hi s two fellow corps commanders, removed General Pitsikas, the leader of th e Epirus Army, from his post, and opened negotiations for surrender with the commander of the "Adolf Hitler" Division, then nearing Yannina. Next day at Larisa, Tsolakoglou signed an agreement to surrender. When Papagos learned of Tsolakoglou 's preliminary negotiations he sent a signal to Pitsikas ordering him to dismiss Tsolakoglou immediately, but Pitsikas had already been deposed. 8 That day the gallant little British air force struck its last blow. About 100 German dive bombers and fighters attacked the Athens area . The fifteen Hurricanes which were still serviceable went up to intercept them and reported having brought down twenty-two German aircraft for certain , and possibly eight others, for a loss of five Hurricanes. Meanwhile, at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st, Wavell arrived at Blarney's headquarters and informed him that the force was to be evacuate d as soon as possible. At that stage it was considered that embarkation woul d not begin before 27th April ; but, at a conference between Wilson, Blarney , and Rear-Admiral Baillie-Grohman9 (in charge of the naval arrangements ashore) on the roadside near Thebes the following night, Wilson informed Blarney that as a result of the surrender in Epirus he had decided t o accelerate the program . It would be Blarney's task to deliver the first troop s to the beaches by dawn on the 24th, for embarkation on the night of the 24th-25th. In the meantime the Anzac Corps had gone into position on the Ther- mopylae line . By sunrise on the 19th it had succeeded in placing some 40 to 50 miles of cratered roads and demolished bridges between itself an d the German advance-guard. The Germans were not then in Larisa, wher e police of the 7th Australian Division' s provost company were still coolly directing the few vehicles straggling behind the main columns . The 6th New Zealand Brigade group was in Volos ; the divisional cavalry and a company of the 25th Battalion occupied a rearguard position across the * Quoted in Churchill, Vol III, p .