Truth and Reality: The Importance of Truthmaking for Philosophy Arthur Schipper A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at University College London (UCL) 2016 Supervised by Paul F. Snowdon (Principal) Tim Crane José Zalabardo Examined by Stacie Friend (Internal) Julian Dodd (External) 1 2 Statement of Originality I, Arthur Schipper, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 3 4 Abstract In this dissertation, I attempt to improve our understanding of truthmaker theory (TT) by defending the modest importance of TT for philosophy via addressing in-house issues. I am not addressing the TT-skeptic. In Part 1, I articulate a metaphysically modest version of TT which focuses on the notion of aboutness. In Part 2, I apply this version to three further debates, to which TT has been thought to have substantial applications, radically reinterpreting each of these applications in a metaphysically modest way. Part 1 starts, in §1, with a presentation of what I call the basic account of TT (BATT), which posits the bare-bones requirements of TT, stripping it of its immodest and question-begging metaphysical commitments concerning the nature of truthbearers and truthmakers. In §2, I present my favoured, aboutness-based, version of TT (TAAT) which goes beyond BATT in an explicitly modest way. In §3, I sketch how TAAT can provide a piecemeal strategy to address the problem of negative truths. In §4, I detail TAAT’s metaphysical modesty. Part 2 starts, in §5, by rejecting a rival account which I call Truthmaker Fundamen- talism. In §6, I undermine the orthodox conception of “cheater-catching” and reinterpret that task as semantical rather than metaphysical. In §7, I argue that TT, on pain of being question-begging, must retreat from its association with substantial realism to what I call Modest Realism, which is compatible with anti-realism. In §8, I distinguish between truth-conditions, truthmakers, and truthmaker-conditions and articulate a two- step conception of inquiry and a modest conception of understanding truthmakers. In conclusion, I hope to have defended and reinvigorated an approach to understand- ing the relation between truth and reality, which has been much neglected in the recent TT-literature, but which must be taken seriously as a metaphysically modest alternative to current, metaphysically extravagant, orthodoxy. 5 Abstract 6 Contents Statement of Originality 3 Abstract 5 Contents 7 Acknowledgements 13 Introduction 15 0.1 General Aims of the Dissertation: A Plea For Modesty . 15 0.2 Note About TT-skepticism: I am not addressing the skeptic . 16 I A Modest Proposal: The Aboutness Account of Truthmaking 17 1 The Basic Account of Truthmaking 19 1.1 Introduction . 19 1.2 Some Basic Assumptions of TT . 19 1.2.1 T-REL and Entailment: T-REL Isn’t a Logical Relation . 21 1.2.2 T-REL as Dependence on the Being of TMKs and not just on the Existence of TMKs . 22 1.3 A Note on the Nature of TBRs: Tolerance . 24 1.4 The Relations-come-easy view of Relations . 26 1.5 TT and the Correspondence Theory of Truth . 28 1.6 TT and Theories of Truth . 30 1.6.1 Example 1: TT is Compatible with Pragmatism & Rejecting T-NEC 31 1.6.2 Example 2: TT is Compatible with Some Versions of the Identity Theory of Truth .......................... 32 1.6.3 Example 3: TT is Compatible with Non-Substantive Theories of Truth ................................ 33 1.6.4 Conclusion: TT’s Compatibility with Most ToTs and Anti-ToTs . 34 1.7 A Note on the Nature of TMKs: Pluralism . 34 1.8 Conclusion of this Chapter . 38 2 Truthmaking and Aboutness: My Favoured Account 39 2.1 Introduction: TT, SAC, and going beyond the Basic Account . 39 2.2 The Aboutness Condition of Truthmaking . 39 2.3 Historical and Current TAATs: Aboutness and T-REL as Dual Relations . 40 7 Contents 8 2.4 Some Basic Commitments of TAAT: Strict and Full Aboutness & What the Best Semantic Account Says TBRs are About ................................. 44 2.4.1 What the Best Semantic Account Says TBRs are About . 44 2.4.2 Strict and Full Aboutness as What the Best Semantic Account Says TBRs are About . 45 2.4.2.1 Aboutness Apparatuses, Existence-entailing Expressions, and Context-Sensitivity . 46 2.4.2.2 SAC and Derivative Aboutness . 48 2.4.2.3 Strictness . 50 2.4.2.4 Fullness (and Partiality) . 51 2.4.2.5 SAC is Not Unique Aboutness . 52 2.4.2.6 Not All TBRs are About the-World-as-a-Whole . 53 2.4.2.7 More on the the Aboutness Apparatuses of SAC: On the Aboutness of Sentential Vehicles . 54 2.5 Some of the Basic Commitments of TAAT: Non-Identity, Asymmetry . 58 2.6 Some Basic Commitments of TAAT: The Problem of Intentionality and the Explanation of Falsity and Truth as the Failure and Satisfaction of Aboutness (Respectively) ......................... 60 2.6.1 Crane vs Searle on The Problem of Intentionality . 65 2.6.2 Cranean vs Representationalist Terminology: Broad and Narrow Aboutness ............................. 66 2.7 SAC and Dependence: A Broadly Externalist View of Content . 67 2.8 The Motivation for Aboutness and the Relevance Objection to Necessitation 69 2.8.1 The Problem of Necessary Truths . 69 2.8.2 The Problem of Malignant TMKs . 70 2.8.3 Adding the Aboutness Requirement to NEC? . 70 2.9 Accepting SAC & Rejecting NEC . 71 2.9.1 Responses to Possible Objections . 73 2.10 Conclusions . 76 3 Aboutness and Negative Truths: A Modest Strategy 77 3.1 TAAT and the Problem of Negative Truths . 77 3.2 The Problem of Negative Truths & Some Difficulties for Addressing It . 77 3.3 A Note on Addressing Molnar (2000) . 82 3.3.1 Cameron and Parsons’s Strategy, and the Real Distinction be- tween Negatives and Positives . 82 3.4 SAC’s Solution to the Problem of Negative Truths . 84 3.5 Responses to Potential Objections . 87 3.5.1 Objection 1: Higher-Order Incompatibility? . 87 3.5.2 Objection 2: Does My Account Make Truth and Truthmaking Disunified? ............................. 88 3.5.2.1 Response 1: My Account is not Arbitrary, but Piecemeal 88 3.5.2.2 Response 2: My Strategy is not Radical, but Conservative 89 3.5.2.3 Truth is a Success Term . 89 3.5.2.4 My Strategy Lets Us Conserve Classical Logic . 90 3.5.2.5 Knowing Which Terms are Truth-entailing is Essential to Understanding What the TBRs are Fully About . 91 Contents 9 3.5.3 Objection 3: Does My Understanding of TT Reject Everything the TT-ist Holds Dear? ...................... 92 3.6 Conclusion . 92 4 Some Ontological Modesty Concerning TMKs 93 4.1 Introduction: SAC and Ontological Modesty Concerning TMKs . 93 4.1.1 More on the Immodesty of T-NEC . 93 4.1.2 SAC’s Ontological Modesty . 94 4.2 An Illustration of the Importance of Getting Right What We Are Talking About: States vs Events .......................... 99 4.2.1 The Argument from Aspectual Markers . 101 4.2.1.1 Objection 1: Counterexamples Concerning Unspecified Event Descriptions: Processes vs Events . 105 4.2.1.2 Objection 2: Can States be in the Process of Finishing? 107 4.2.1.3 Don’t Change the Subject Matter! . 108 4.2.1.4 Changing the Subject is Not Talking About a Different Entity . 109 4.2.2 The Argument from Countability & Nominalisation . 111 4.3 Conclusions: Part One . 115 4.4 Brief Sketch of the Plan for the Next Four Chapters . 116 II Some In-House Debates: Fundamentality, Cheater-Catching, Modest Realism, and In- quiry 117 5 Truthmaking and Fundamentality: Rejecting TT-Fundamentalism 119 5.1 Introduction . 119 5.2 Truthmakers and Fundamentality . 120 5.2.1 Some Background: Truthmaking, Dependence, and Schaffer’s Grounding Project .........................121 5.3 Varieties of Fundamentalist Structure: Hierarchical and Two-tier Funda- mentalism .................................123 5.3.1 Levels or Hierarchical Fundamentalism . 123 5.3.2 Two-tier Fundamentalism . 124 5.3.3 Against Hierarchical TF . 125 5.3.4 Against Two-tier TF 1: Aboutness as More Modest . 127 5.3.5 Reply & Response: Deflationary vs Inflationist Fundamentality . 128 5.3.6 Against Two-tier TF 2: The Falsity Paradox of TF . 129 5.3.7 Against Two-tier TF 3: Intentionality and Fundamentality . 132 5.3.8 Against Two-tier TF 4: Problematic Examples . 134 5.3.9 General Moral of this Discussion: Varieties of Dependence . 135 5.4 Specific Accounts of TF . 136 5.4.1 Specific Accounts 1: The Case of Schaffer’s TGro and the Modest Usefulness of Truthmaking . 136 5.4.2 Specific Accounts 2: Heil’s Moderate TT as TF . 138 5.4.2.1 Problem 1: Fundamental Physics Does Not Rule Out Non-Fundamentals as TMKs Nor as Part of the Story of Ontology . 140 5.4.2.2 Problem 2: What Grounds TBRs About Grounding? . 142 Contents 10 5.4.2.3 Problem 3: Fundamental Physics Doesn’t Capture Meta- physical Relations ....................143 5.5 The Aboutness Objection against TF . 144 5.6 SAC vs TF: On Cheater Catching . 145 5.7 Concluding Remarks . 146 6 Truthmaking and Cheater Catching Deflated 149 6.1 Introduction: TT’s Cheater Catching Power . 149 6.2 Is the Charge of CC-ing Against Theory X Merely Begging the Question Against Theory X? . 150 6.3 Eliminating Metaphysical Theory From TT . 154 6.4 WEAK-CC and STRONG-CC .