The Path of the European Union Battlegroups A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Development of the EU Battlegroups since 1998 Caroline Schoofs 3856410 RMA Modern History (1500-2000) Utrecht University Supervisor: prof. dr. Jacco Pekelder Second Reader: dr. Marloes Beers Date: 21 February 2018 Abstract This thesis analyses the development of the EU Battlegroups, aiming to shed light on the question why the ambitious rhetoric of the EU deviates from reality considering the fact that these forces have not been deployed yet. Since the literature does not offer a proper theoretically informed explanation for this discrepancy, this thesis addresses the theoretical lacuna. After outlining the benefits and shortcomings of European integration and International Relations theory, this thesis argues that historical institutionalism has the best credits for analysing the EU decision-making process regarding the development of the Battlegroups. This approach highlights the importance of the historical institutional context in which rational actors make decisions, thus looks further than EU member states’ intentions. This context proved instrumental for understanding why the outcome of the development process (e.g. the inactive Battlegroups) deviates from the ambitious rhetoric of the EU on the need to play a full role at the international stage. This thesis invokes the metaphor of a tree to explain how the historical institutional context influenced EU decision-making regarding the Battlegroups. This thesis argues that the EU member states started to climb the tree in the late 1990s when a critical juncture took place. The decisions made in and influenced by the historical context subsequently could not be changed or reversed due to the institutional context. Only when a new critical juncture took place, after the successful Operation Artemis in 2003, the EU was able to climb on a new branch. This decision was again embedded within the historical context. The consequence of these past decisions, as well as of the decisions not made, was that there were political, military, and financial obstacles to the Battlegroups deployment. The institutional context again restricted the Union from transferring to another branch or to climb down to the trunk of the tree. In practice, this meant that the EU failed to change the concept of the Battlegroups and that abolishment of these forces was undesirable. Therefore, the EU member states continue to argue in favor of the concept, even though it has proven to be an inefficient outcome because deployment was difficult or even impossible. 3 Contents Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ 6 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 9 Academic debates ................................................................................................................. 11 History matters ..................................................................................................................... 12 Sources .................................................................................................................................. 15 Outline of the thesis .............................................................................................................. 16 Chapter 1 – Theoretical framework ..................................................................................... 19 1.1 European Integration Theory .......................................................................................... 19 1.2 International Relations Theory ....................................................................................... 23 1.3 Historical institutionalism ............................................................................................... 28 1.4 Process-tracing ................................................................................................................ 32 Chapter 2. The critical juncture of St. Malo ........................................................................ 35 2.1 Drawing together Europeanists and Atlanticists ............................................................ 35 2.2 Defining new goals ......................................................................................................... 37 2.3 Outlining the institutional framework ............................................................................ 40 2.4 Establishing new institutions .......................................................................................... 43 2.5 Committing capabilities .................................................................................................. 45 2.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 46 Chapter 3. Limits to the European project .......................................................................... 49 3.1 Rules and norms ............................................................................................................. 49 3.2 Endogenous institutional pressure .................................................................................. 54 3.3 Exogenous institutional pressure .................................................................................... 55 3.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 61 Chapter 4. A new juncture .................................................................................................... 63 4.1 Pressure for developing the CSDP ................................................................................. 63 4.2 Testcase for autonomous rapid military action ............................................................... 70 4.3 Introducing the Battlegroups .......................................................................................... 73 4.4 Revising the Headline Goal ............................................................................................ 75 4.5 Copy-paste ...................................................................................................................... 76 4.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 79 Chapter 5. Inefficient outcome .............................................................................................. 81 5.1 Obstacles to deployment ................................................................................................. 81 5.2 Battlegroups in action or inaction? ................................................................................. 83 4 5.3 Institutional change ......................................................................................................... 88 5.4 Attempts to change ......................................................................................................... 91 5.5 Small breakthrough ......................................................................................................... 95 5.6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 98 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 101 Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 107 Primary sources .................................................................................................................. 107 News articles ....................................................................................................................... 110 Secondary sources .............................................................................................................. 116 5 Abbreviations CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy CESDP Common European Security and Defence Policy DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDC European Defence Community EEC European Economic Community ESDI European Security and Defence Identity ESDP European Security and Defence Policy ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union EUMC EU Military Committee EUMS EU Military Staff GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy IFOR Implementation Force KFOR Kosovo Force NAC North Atlantic council NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO IMS NATO International Military Staff NATO MC NATO Military Committee NRF NATO Response Force OAF Operation Allied Force PSC Political and Security Committee SFOR Stabilization Force SHAPE Strategic Headquarters Allied Force Europe SHIRBRIG Standby High-Readiness Brigade 6 UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UN OCHA UN Office of for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNPROFOR UN Protection Force US United States WEU Western European Union WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 7 Introduction We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to