Anthony Pagden Imperialism, liberalism & the quest for perpetual peace Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/134/2/46/1828909/0011526053887301.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 For at least two generations, ‘empire’ who had lived under imperial rule would and ‘imperialism’ have been dirty much rather not have and ½nally they words. Already by 1959, when neither had all risen up and driven out their con- the French nor the British Empire had querors. yet quite ceased to exist, Raymond Aar- Very recently this picture has begun to on dismissed imperialism as a “name change. Now that empires are no more given by rivals, or spectators, to the di- (the last serious imperial outpost, Hong plomacy of a great power”–something, Kong, vanished in 1997), a more nuanced that is, that only others did or had. By account of their long histories is begin- the 1970s, a consensus had emerged in ning to be written. It has become harder liberal circles in the West that all em- to avoid the conclusion that some em- pires–or at least those of European or pires were much weaker than was com- North American origin–had only ever monly claimed; that at least some of the been systems of power that constituted a colonized collaborated willingly, for at denial by one people of the rights (above least some of the time, with their colo- all, the right to self-determination) of nizers; that minorities often fared better countless others. They had never bene- under empires than under nation-states; ½ted anyone but their rulers; all of those and that empires were often more suc- cessful than nation-states at managing the murderous consequences of religious Anthony Pagden is a professor in the departments differences. of history and political science at the University Ever since 9/11 and the war in Afghan- of California, Los Angeles. His main area of re- istan, a few intrepid voices have even search is the prolonged contact between Europe been heard to declare that some empires and the non-European world. He is the author of might in fact have been forces for good. more than a dozen books, including “Lords of All Books both for and against–with such the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Brit- titles as The Sorrows of Empire, America’s ain, and France c. 1500–c. 1800” (1995) and Inadvertent Empire, Resurrecting Empire, “Peoples and Empires: A Short History of Euro- and The Obligation of Empire–now ap- pean Migration, Exploration, and Conquest, from pear almost daily. As these titles suggest, Greece to the Present” (2003). the current revival of interest in empire is not unrelated to the behavior of the © 2005 by the American Academy of Arts current U.S. administration in interna- & Sciences 46 Dædalus Spring 2005 tional affairs, and to the widespread (the so-called Aztec and Inca Empires), Imperialism, assumption that the United States has tribal conquest states (the Mongol and liberalism & the quest become a new imperial power. Even so, Ottoman Empires), European composite for perpetual most Americans continue to feel uncom- monarchies (the Hapsburg and Austro- peace fortable with the designation, which Hungarian Empires), and even networks (forgetting Hawaii, the Philippines, and of economic and political clientage (the Puerto Rico) they have long regarded as current relation of the First to the Third a European evil. Yet ever since the mid- World)–not to mention the British Em- 1990s, the rhetoric of U.S. international pire, which combined features of all of relations has become increasingly impe- these. Faced with such diversity, simple Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/134/2/46/1828909/0011526053887301.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 rial. “If we have to use force, it is because de½nitions will clearly be of little use. It we are America,” declared Madeleine is, of course, possible to de½ne the word Albright in 1998, taking care not to pro- so narrowly as to exclude all but the nounce the word ‘empire.’ “We are the most obvious European (and a few indispensable nation, We stand tall, We Asian) megastates. On the other hand, see further into the future.”1 No British de½ning it so widely as to include any proconsul could have put it better. kind of extensive international power runs the risk of rending the concept But for all the talk about a new Ameri- indeterminate. can empire, is the United States today So let me begin by saying that an em- really, in Niall Ferguson’s words, “the pire is an extensive state in which one empire that does not dare to speak its ethnic or tribal group, by one means or name–an empire in denial”?2 another, rules over several others– This would appear to suggest that the roughly what the ½rst-century Roman United States behaves like and pursues historian Tacitus meant when he spoke the recognized objectives of an empire of the Roman world as an “immense while being unprepared to commit itself body of empire” (immensum imperii cor- ideologically to imperialism, or to take pus).3 As such, empires have always been the necessary measures to ensure that more frequent, more extensive political those objectives constitute a long-term and social forms than tribal territories or success. Is that really so? nations have ever been. Ever since antiq- Before these questions can be an- uity, large areas of Asia were ruled by swered, we need to answer a rather more imperial states of one kind or another, fundamental one–namely, what is an and so too were substantial areas of Af- empire? The word has been used to rica. Vishanagar, Assyria, Elam, Urartu, describe societies as diverse as Meso- Benin, Maori New Zealand–all were, in american tribute-distribution systems this sense, empires. All empires inevitably involve the ex- 1 Quoted in Emmanuel Todd, Après l’empire: essai sur la décomposition du système américain ercise of imperium, or sovereign author- (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 22. Ironically–or per- ity, usually acquired by force. Few em- haps not–she was justifying a missile attack on pires have survived for long without sup- Iraq. pressing opposition, and probably all were initially created to supply the 2 Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global 3 See P. A. Blunt, “Laus imperii,” in Peter Garn- Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 317; Fer- sey and C. R. Whittaker, eds., Imperialism in the guson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 3–7. sity Press, 1978), 159–191. Dædalus Spring 2005 47 Anthony metropolis with goods it could not oth- concept that, in its recognizably modern Pagden on erwise acquire. In 1918, the great Austri- form, the Romans invented and that, imperialism an economist Joseph Schumpeter de- ever since the early days of the Republic, scribed territorial expansion as “the had been the main ideological prop of purely instinctual inclination towards the Roman world. Of course, not all war and conquest” and relegated it to Rome’s subject peoples wished for such an earlier atavistic period of human his- things; but if a substantial number had tory that he believed was now past.4 He not, its empire could not have survived would have to wait another half centu- as long as it did. ry for the ½nal dismemberment of the All the later European empires did the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/134/2/46/1828909/0011526053887301.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 world’s last signi½cant colonial outposts. best they could to follow at least part of But he could see that in the new global the example Rome had set them. The economies that he projected for the Spanish and the French both attempted world in the wake of the Great War, con- to create something resembling a single quest would no longer be possible and society governed by a single body of law. that without conquest there could be no Similarly, the British in India could nev- empire er have succeeded in seizing control of But Schumpeter’s view is only part of the former Mughal Empire without the the picture. War and conquest would active and sometimes enthusiastic assis- have achieved very little if that is all tance of the emperors’ former subjects. there had been. To survive for long, Without Indian bureaucrats, Indian all empires have had to win over their judges, and, above all, Indian soldiers, conquered populations. The Romans the British Raj would have remained a learned this very early in their history.5 private trading company. At the Battle of “An empire,” declared the historian Livy Plassey in 1757, which marked the begin- at the end of the ½rst century b.c., “re- ning of the East India Company’s politi- mains powerful so long as its subjects cal ascendancy over the Mughal Empire, rejoice in it.” twice as many Indians as Europeans Rome had a lot to offer its conquered fought on the British side.6 populations–architecture, baths, the It was this process of absorption–and ability to bring fresh water from distant with it the ambition to create a single hills or to heat marble-lined rooms in community that would embrace, as the villas in the wilds of Northumberland. Roman Empire had, both the mother (The historian Tacitus acidly comment- country and the indigenous inhabitants ed that in adopting baths, porticos, and of its colonies–that allowed Edmund banquets, all the unwitting Britons had Burke to speak of the victims of the bru- done was to describe as “humanity” tal regime of Warren Hastings, governor what was in reality “an aspect of their of Bengal, as “our distressed fellow-citi- slavery.”) Ultimately, however, Rome’s zens in India.”7 Empire was a sacred greatest attraction was citizenship–a trust, “given,” as Burke insisted, “by an 4 Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social 6 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the Classes, trans.