United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees September 2016 AIR FORCE TRAINING Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve Effectiveness Accessible Version GAO-16-864 September 2016 AIR FORCE TRAINING Further Analysis and Planning Needed to Improve Effectiveness Highlights of GAO-16-864, a report to congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found The Air Force establishes combat aircrew training requirements for the full range For more than a decade, the Air Force of core missions based on an annual process, but these requirements may not focused its training on supporting operations in the Middle East. The Air reflect current and emerging training needs, because the Air Force has not Force has established goals for its comprehensively reassessed the assumptions underlying them. Specifically, combat aircrews to conduct training for assumptions about the total annual live-fly sortie requirements by aircraft, the the full range of core missions. Both criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced, and the mix the Senate and House Reports between live and simulator training have remained the same since 2012. For accompanying bills for the FY 2016 example, Air Combat Command has set the same minimum number of live-fly National Defense Authorization Act sortie requirements across aircraft platforms, but has not conducted the analysis included a provision for GAO to review needed to determine if requirements should differ based on the number of core the Air Force’s training plans. missions for each platform. Reassessing the assumptions underlying annual training requirements would better position the Air Force to meet its stated goals This report discusses the extent to which the Air Force has (1) determined for its forces to achieve a range of missions for current and emerging threats. requirements to train combat aircrews Combat fighter squadrons were generally able to complete mission training for the full range of core missions, requirements for ongoing contingency operations, such as close air support to (2) met annual training requirements ground forces, but were unable to meet annual training requirements across the for combat fighter squadrons across full range of core missions. Further, the Air Force does not systematically the full range of core missions and evaluate the effectiveness of training that has been completed against evaluated the effectiveness of this established expectations. Selected unit commanders that GAO interviewed cited training, and (3) established virtual four common factors that limited their ability to complete training, such as high training plans that include desirable deployment rates, and other factors that affected the training that aircrews were characteristics of a comprehensive strategy. GAO reviewed Air Force able to accomplish. However, Air Force processes used to record and monitor training requirements and plans and annual training do not include a systematic evaluation of training effectiveness interviewed officials with a non- against expectations. Specifically, Air Combat Command has not established the generalizable sample of units based on desired learning objectives or training support elements needed to accomplish the units’ range of core missions. training expectations and does not collect data to assess effectiveness. A more consistent basis for monitoring results is critical in tracking the Air Force’s What GAO Recommends progress in training units for the full range of core missions. GAO recommends that the Air Force Air Force plans for virtual training do not include all desirable characteristics of a (1) reassess assumptions for annual comprehensive strategy, such as a risk-based investment strategy or a time line training requirements, (2) establish and for addressing training needs. A strategy that included these elements would collect data on desired learning help ensure that the Air Force’s plans addressed its capability needs. objectives and training support elements for its training expectations, This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2016. It omits and (3) develop a risk-based sensitive information and data on some of the Air Force’s training priorities, investment strategy for its virtual completion of annual training requirements for active-duty fighter squadrons, and training plans. DOD concurred with the aircraft maintenance generation capabilities. third recommendation and did not concur with the first and second recommendations, stating that existing initiatives and policies address these issues. GAO believes the recommendations remain valid for the reasons discussed in this report. View GAO-16-864. For more information, contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 or [email protected]. United States Government Accountability Office Contents Letter 1 Background 5 The Air Force’s Process for Developing Combat Aircrew Annual Training Requirements for the Full Range of Core Missions Is Based on Dated Assumptions 10 Combat Fighter Squadrons Are Not Meeting All of Their Annual Training Requirements across the Full Range of Core Missions, and Completed Training Is Not Being Evaluated for Effectiveness 16 Air Force Planning Documents for Virtual Training Do Not Include All Desirable Characteristics of a Comprehensive Strategy 27 Conclusions 33 Recommendations for Executive Action 33 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34 Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 40 Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 45 Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49 Table Table 1: Extent to Which the United States Air Force Live Virtual Constructive Operational Training Flight Plan and Combat Air Force Live, Virtual, Constructive Vision Address GAO’s Desirable Characteristics for Comprehensive Strategies 28 Figures Figure 1: Characteristics of Selected Fourth- and Fifth-Generation Combat Aircraft Platforms 7 Figure 2: Air Combat Command’s Process for Developing Annual Training Requirements 11 Figure 3: F-22 Aircraft Conducting a “Hot Pit” Refueling and an F- 15C Aircraft Conducting an Aerial Refueling 22 Page i GAO-16-864 Air Force Training Abbreviations AFI Air Force Instruction DOD Department of Defense FOUO For Official Use Only LVC Live, Virtual, and Constructive RAP Ready Aircrew Program This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. Page ii GAO-16-864 Air Force Training 441 G St. N.W. Washington, DC 20548 Letter September 19, 2016 Congressional Committees For more than a decade, the Air Force focused the training of its forces on supporting operations in the Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Commanders established training requirements that they deemed necessary to prepare aircrews to conduct missions in these locations—such as close air support to ground forces—limiting training opportunities in other areas. According to Air Force reports, in the coming years, the Air Force will confront an increasingly complex security environment that will demand a wider range of skill sets and different capabilities than are currently being employed.1 For example, aircrews may be called upon to conduct missions that require freedom of maneuver in highly-contested air spaces. To meet these emerging needs, the Air Force has established goals for its fighter aircrews to conduct training for a full range of core missions.2 Replicating complex threats—such as a highly-contested airspace—in a live training environment is resource intensive and can be constrained by several factors, including airspace restrictions, weather, and range capabilities, among others. The Air Force has stated that by integrating live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) components into training it could overcome some of the limitations of training in a live-only environment but notes that it will take time and dedicated resources to address technological and capacity limitations.3 The Air Force has further stated 1See, for example, Secretary of the Air Force, America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future (July 2014); U.S. Air Force, USAF Strategic Master Plan (May 2015). 2For the purposes of this report, we use the phrase “full range of core missions” to describe the primary and secondary missions as established in each aircraft’s Designed Operational Capability statement, which summarizes specific capabilities that an Air Force unit can be called on to provide. 3According to Air Force documents, the live (L) environment is defined as real people operating real weapons systems, the virtual (V) environment is defined as real people operating simulated systems, and the constructive (C) environment is identified as software models and code that are used to improve training scenarios with computer- generated entities—such as terrain, threats, aircraft, people, and vehicles, among others. For the purposes of this report, we refer to training that includes a simulator as virtual training. Page 1 GAO-16-864 Air Force Training Letter that the integration of these components is particularly important for fifth- generation aircraft, such as the F-35, which will rely more heavily on virtual training because of the limitations of training in the live environment