Paul K. Moser ed. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002 end p.iii Preface Epistemology, also known as the theory of knowledge, will flourish as long as we deem knowledge valuable. We shall, I predict, continue to value knowledge, if only for its instrumental value: it gets us through the day as well as the night. Indeed, it's hard to imagine a stable person, let alone a stable society, indifferent to the real difference between genuine knowledge and mere opinion, even mere true opinion. The study of knowledge, then, has a very bright future. In the concept-sensitive hands of philosophers, epistemology focuses on the nature, origin, and scope of knowledge. It thus examines the defining ingredients, the sources, and the limits of knowledge. Given the central role of epistemology in the history of philosophy as well as in contemporary philosophy, epistemologists will always have work to do. Debates over the analysis of knowledge, the sources of knowledge, and the status of skepticism will alone keep the discipline of epistemology active and productive. This book presents some of the best work in contemporary epistemology by leading epistemologists. Taken together, its previously unpublished essays span the whole field of epistemology. They assess prominent positions and break new theoretical ground while avoiding undue technicality. My own work on this book has benefited from many people and institutions. First, I thank the nineteen contributors for their fine cooperation and contributions in the face of numerous deadlines. Second, I thank Peter Ohlin, Philosophy Editor at Oxford University Press, for helpful advice and assistance on many fronts. Third, I thank my research assistant, Blaine Swen, for invaluable help in putting the book together. Finally, I thank Loyola University of Chicago for providing an excellent environment for my work on the project. P. K. M. Chicago, Illinois June 2002 end p.vii Contents Contributors, xi Introduction, Paul K. Moser 3 1. Conditions and Analyses of Knowing, Robert K. Shope 25 2. The Sources of Knowledge, Robert Audi 71 3. A Priori Knowledge, Albert Casullo 95 4. The Sciences and Epistemology, Alvin I. Goldman 144 5. Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology, Richard Foley 177 6. Theories of Justification, Richard Fumerton 204 7. Internalism and Externalism, Laurence BonJour 234 8. Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge, Ernest Sosa 264 9. Virtues in Epistemology, John Greco 287 10. Mind and Knowledge, John Heil 316 end p.ix 11. Skepticism, Peter Klein 336 12. Epistemological Duties, Richard Feldman 362 13. Scientific Knowledge, Philip Kitcher 385 14. Explanation and Epistemology, William G. Lycan 408 15. Decision Theory and Epistemology, Mark Kaplan 434 16. Embodiment and Epistemology, Louise M. Antony 463 17. Epistemology and Ethics, Noah Lemos 479 18. Epistemology in Philosophy of Religion, Philip L. Quinn 513 19. Formal Problems about Knowledge, Roy Sorensen 539 20. Bibliography on Epistemology, Paul K. Moser 569 Index, 587 end p.x Contributors louise m . antony Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University robert audi Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska, Lincoln laurence bonjour Department of Philosophy, University of Washington, Seattle albert casullo Department of Philosophy, University of Nebraska, Lincoln richard feldman Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester richard foley Department of Philosophy, New York University richard fumerton Department of Philosophy, University of Iowa alvin i . goldman Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University john greco Department of Philosophy, Fordham University john heil Department of Philosophy, Davidson College mark kaplan Department of Philosophy, Indiana University philip kitcher Department of Philosophy, Columbia University peter klein Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University noah lemos Department of Philosophy, De Pauw University william g . lycan Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill paul k . moser Department of Philosophy, Loyola University of Chicago philip l . quinn Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame robert k . shope Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Boston roy sorensen Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College ernest sosa Department of Philosophy, Brown University and Rutgers University end p.xi Introduction Paul K. Moser 1. Representative Distinctions and Debates Epistemology, characterized broadly, is an account of knowledge. Within the discipline of philosophy, epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge and justification: in particular, the study of (a) the defining components, (b) the substantive conditions or sources, and (c) the limits of knowledge and justification. Categories (a)- (c) have prompted traditional philosophical controversy over the analysis of knowledge and justification, the sources of knowledge and justification (in the case, for instance, of rationalism vs. empiricism), and the status of skepticism about knowledge and justification. Epistemologists have distinguished some species of knowledge, including: propositional knowledge (that something is so), nonpropositional knowledge of something (for instance, knowledge by acquaintance, or by direct awareness), empirical (a posteriori) propositional knowledge, nonempirical (a priori) propositional knowledge, and knowledge of how to do something. Recent epistemology has included controversies over distinctions between such species, for example, over (i) the relations between some of these species (for example, does knowledge-of reduce somehow to knowledge-that?) and (ii) the viability of some of these species (for instance, is there really such a thing as, or even a coherent notion of, a priori knowledge?). A posteriori knowledge is widely regarded as knowledge that depends for its end p.3 supporting ground on some specific sensory or perceptual content. In contrast, a priori knowledge is widely regarded as knowledge that does not depend for its supporting ground on such experiential content. The epistemological tradition stemming from Immanuel Kant proposes that the supporting ground for a priori knowledge comes solely from purely intellectual processes called "pure reason" or "pure understanding." In this tradition, knowledge of logical truths is a standard case of a priori knowledge, whereas knowledge of the existence or presence of physical objects is a standard case of a posteriori knowledge. An account of a priori knowledge should explain what the relevant purely intellectual processes are and how they contribute to nonempirical knowledge. Analogously, an account of a posteriori knowledge should explain what sensory or perceptual experience is and how it contributes to empirical knowledge. Even so, epistemologists have sought an account of propositional knowledge in general, that is, an account of what is common to a priori and a posteriori knowledge. Ever since Plato's Theaetetus, epistemologists have tried to identify the essential, defining components of propositional knowledge. These components will yield an analysis of propositional knowledge. An influential traditional view, inspired by Plato and Kant among others, is that propositional knowledge has three individually necessary and jointly sufficient components: justification, truth, and belief. On this view, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. This tripartite definition has come to be called "the standard analysis." (See the essay by Shope on this analysis.) Knowledge is not just true belief. Some true beliefs are supported merely by lucky guesswork and thus are not knowledge. Knowledge requires that the satisfaction of its belief condition be "appropriately related" to the satisfaction of its truth condition. This is one broad way of understanding the justification condition of the standard analysis. We might say that a knower must have adequate indication that a known proposition is true. If we understand such adequate indication as a sort of evidence indicating that a proposition is true, we have adopted a prominent traditional view of the justification condition: justification as evidence. Questions about justification attract much attention in contemporary epistemology. Controversy arises over the meaning of "justification" as well as over the substantive conditions for a belief's being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge. An ongoing controversy has emerged from this issue: Does epistemic justification, and thus knowledge, have foundations, and, if so, in what sense? The key question is whether some beliefs (a) have their epistemic justification noninferentially (that is, apart from evidential support from any other beliefs), and (b) supply epistemic justification for all justified beliefs that lack such noninferential justification. Traditional foundationalism, represented in different ways by, for example, Aristotle, Descartes, Bertrand Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Roderick Chisholm, offers an affirmative answer to this issue. (See the essay by Fumerton on foundationalism.) end p.4 Foundationalists diverge over the specific conditions for noninferential justification. Some identify noninferential justification with self-justification. Others propose that noninferential justification resides in evidential support from the nonconceptual content of nonbelief psychological states: for example, perception, sensation, or memory. Still others understand noninferential justification in terms of a belief's being "reliably produced,"