EVALUATION DEPARTMENT Report 7 / 2020 Evaluation of Norway’s Engagement in Somalia 2012–2018 Evaluation of Norway’s Engagement REPORT 7/2020 EVALUATION DEPARTMENT 2 in Somalia 2012–2018 Commissioned by The Evaluation Department Carried out by Tana Copenhagen in association with Chr. Michelsen Institute Written by Erik Bryld (team leader), Charlotte Bonnet, Christine Kamau, Mohamed S Mohamud, Abdikadir Osman, Joar Svanemyr, Elling Tjønneland, Simon White This report is the product of the authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors alone. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Evaluation Department. October 2020 Evaluation of Norway’s Engagement REPORT 7/2020 EVALUATION DEPARTMENT 3 in Somalia 2012–2018 Content Foreword 4 3.2.2 Effectiveness in Other Areas 36 Acknowledgements 5 3.2.3 Humanitarian Effectiveness 41 Executive Summary 6 3.2.4 Unintended Consequences 46 3.2.5 Women, Men and Vulnerable Groups 47 1. Introduction 10 3.3 Coherence 50 2. Methodology and Approach 11 3.4 Conflict Sensitivity 63 2.1 Evaluation Focus 11 3.5 Learning and Adaptability 66 2.2 Methodology 11 2.2.1 Evaluation Criteria 12 4. Conclusions 70 2.2.2 Sample Interventions 14 2.2.3 Data Collected 17 5. Recommendations 73 2.2.4 Limitations 18 2.2.5 Ethics 19 References 75 Annex 1: Terms of Reference 92 3. Findings 20 Annex 2: List of People Interviewed 103 3.1 Norway’s Goals and Priorities in Somalia, 2012–2018 20 List of Annexes 111 3.1.1 Operationalising the Country Strategies 23 List of Tables, Figures and Boxes 112 3.1.2 The Humanitarian Strategy 24 Acronyms and Abbreviations 113 3.1.3 Norwegian Aid to Somalia 25 3.2 Effectiveness 31 3.2.1 Effectiveness of Statebuilding and Stabilisation 31 Evaluation of Norway’s Engagement REPORT 7/2020 EVALUATION DEPARTMENT 4 in Somalia 2012–2018 Foreword The purpose of this evaluation is to draw lessons from Norway's This evaluation aims to provide some insights into how these dilemmas involvement over time in a country affected by conflict. Norway's and challenges are managed by Norwegian actors. We hope this insight support to countries in fragile situations has increased in recent years. can be of use in future support to countries in fragile situations. Such support requires a different approach than support to more stable countries. Often there is a need for peacebuilding, humanitarian The evaluation was carried out by a team from Tana Copenhagen in aid and long-term development assistance at the same time. collaboration with Chr. Michelsen’s Institute (CMI). The strategic framework for Norwegian engagement in fragile states and regions emphasises that Norway should have a high tolerance for Oslo, October 2020 risk, while at the same time adhere to principles of “do no harm”. This raises several dilemmas. Siv J. Lillestøl Acting Evaluation Director Evaluation of Norway’s Engagement REPORT 7/2020 EVALUATION DEPARTMENT 5 in Somalia 2012–2018 Acknowledgements Quality assurance was provided by Finn Skadkær Pedersen, Tana of Foreign Affairs, particularly the Section for the Horn of Africa and Copenhagen, and Lovise Aalen, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Additional West Africa, and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi. The team quality assurance was provided by senior evaluator Ian Christoplos would also like to thank the partners that provided information and from Glemminge Development Research AB. logistics relating to our case studies in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Garowe and Hargeysa, including the Norwegian Refugee Council, Nordic The evaluation team would like to thank everyone who contributed to International Support Foundation, United Nations Development this evaluation. We are grateful to the helpful staff of the Norwegian Programme, Somali Red Crescent Society, and the United Nations Food Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad) and Norway’s Ministry and Agriculture Organization. Evaluation of Norway’s Engagement REPORT 7/2020 EVALUATION DEPARTMENT 6 in Somalia 2012–2018 Executive Summary The Somali Context Evaluation Purpose and Methodology The evaluation team reviewed extensive documentation Somalia has been marred by civil war, frequent The evaluation covered by this report took place from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad droughts and flooding since the early 1990s and has from October 2019 till June 2020. It sought to and the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi, in been a significant recipient of humanitarian assistance identify lessons from Norway’s engagement in the addition to a large number of resources from Norway’s for many years. Since the Federal Government of challenging environment of Somalia and to assess implementing partners, other donors and online Somalia was formed in 2012, development aid to the whether Norway’s assistance was effective, coherent research. The team travelled to Somalia and Kenya, country has increased considerably. and conflict-sensitive. And it paid specific attention visiting Mogadishu, Baidoa, Hargeisa, Garowe and to identifying how Norway managed three dilemmas Nairobi. Team members interviewed 120 people who Norway has been a core contributor to this process. arising from engaging in the complex Somali context. had first-hand knowledge of Norway’s engagement in From 2012–2018, Norway spent NOK 3.2 billion on Somalia in 2012–2018, including representatives from funding for Somalia. This catapulted Norway into the The evaluation identified Norway’s objectives for all key stakeholder organisations. top six Organisation for Economic Co-operation and engaging in Somalia and the aid provided to the country Development – Development Assistance Committee from various Norwegian channels. It provided an Key Findings (OECD-DAC) donors to Somalia and the top 10 overall analysis and recommendations on what worked Overall, the evaluation found that Norway was able to among all donors to the country. Although Somalia is and what did not work in achieving these objectives. identify a number of individual engagements that were a Norwegian focus country, Norway does not have a The team used a sample of 10 specific interventions effective in meeting the planned objectives, but that the permanent diplomatic mission in Somalia. Norwegian to gather additional field data to examine in more combined results of Norway’s engagement in Somalia development aid in Somalia is managed from Oslo and depth the relationships between three elements of were mixed. Norway’s limited use of a systematic its embassy in Nairobi. Norway’s engagement: its policies, management and approach to conflict sensitivity, communication and interventions. learning means that it could have achieved more and minimised risks. Evaluation of Norway’s Engagement REPORT 7/2020 EVALUATION DEPARTMENT 7 in Somalia 2012–2018 The evaluation found that the many times when Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad and was not democratic processes during their formation and the Norwegian engagement in Somalia was effective were systematically coordinated. Although this was a Norwegian support to the UN constitutional process because: weakness, these aid channels did not appear to be in has not been able to improve this situation. conflict. — It supported partners that understood the fragile While stability remains challenging in large parts of context Although Norway’s strategies in Somalia were very Somalia, Norway contributed to outputs aimed at broad, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassy in stabilising areas that had been recently liberated from — Decision-makers in Norway were prepared to risk Nairobi focused on statebuilding, primarily enabling the al-Shabaab. It did this by supporting immediate needs, taking the first step country’s new federal government to function financially. such as infrastructure projects. However, the evaluation Norway was effective in this, largely because of the has not been able to identify long-term results from — Norway could respond swiftly to partner requests Special Financing Facility it established at a time when these engagements. Norway also made important when emergencies occurred. other donors refrained from direct engagement with the contributions beyond areas prioritised by its Somalia federal government. This support also paved the way country strategies – particularly the education sector. Norway aligned its aid with the Federal Government for World Bank involvement in building the government’s of Somalia’s plans and priorities and contributed capacity. Norway’s statebuilding support yielded better In terms of humanitarian effectiveness, Norway to developing joint coordination mechanisms in the results at the federal government level than within its responded swiftly to partner requests during crises in country. However, these mechanisms were not effective member states. Somalia and supported partners who could access in coordinating a fragmented donor community. Norway people in need. The recently introduced Norwegian is now working to improve this. Norway has not been effective in the promotion of three-year funding frameworks provided an opportunity democratic values at the federal and member state for more long-term support across the humanitarian– Managing Norway’s support in Somalia was divided level. The legitimacy of the federal member states development nexus. Norway, as well as other donors, between the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi, the remains challenged by the lack of public dialogue and however, are still challenged in delivering