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The original document from which this microfiche haa been prepared has these imperfections: missing pagei/fi^na rowrtiiTBiii Wt An 22 OJU A 0-J> 1 | wrong pagination | 1 poor overall printing quality { \ combinations of the above IMS Clearinghouse | | other IAEA P. 0. Box 100 A-1400, Vienna, Austria 0 INIS-mf--11273 P.J.SprattS- Associates Irx. FII MAI REPORT SEPTEMBER 1985 Volume 1 THE TRITIUM ISSUES V7ORKINTG GROUP REPORT IS NOT AN ONTARIO HYDRO REPORT Members Peter Spratt, Chairman David Hardy Denny Peirce Ron Smith Alan Wyatt Suite 120 - 421 I Kingsway, Bumaby. B.C. V5H 125 2242 Lake Shore Boulevard West, Toronto. Ontario M8V I AS (61 A\ 430-6449 (41'3) 251-657! ;*/ P.J. SprattS Associates Inc. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS While much of the research and analysis of this report was undertaken by members of the Tritium Issues Working Group a considerable amount was supplied by others. In this regard we especially note Dr. Jim Hunt, Dr. Dirk Leemans, and fir. Colin Hunt. Putting together a report such as this involves many drafts and much rewriting. The fact that Lise Jacob, Audrey Bisson, and Michelle Moss tolerated the Working Group's constant revisions with such good humour attests to both their humanity and professionalism. Finally we are indebted to all those contacted who provided not only advice and council during the research phase but as well through our many drafts. Any success this report enjoys is in large part a function of all of the above individuals. Responsibility for omissions or errors lies of course with us. Peter J. Spratt, Chairman Tritium issues working Group. P.]. Spratt& Associates Inc. TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY^ONCLUSIONS^ND RECOMMENDATIONS i CHAPTER 1 - PLUTONIUM AND TRITIUM: PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY Part A - Plutonium Introduction ! 1.1 A Plutonium isou , i primer 3 1.2 Location of Plutonium production facilities 3 1.5 Current sources of fissile material 5 1.4 Estimates of production of plutonium in U.S. military program.6 1.5 Plutonium inventory 8 1.6 U.S. capacity to supply future plutonium requirements 3 Part B - Tritium Introduction 10 1.7 Tritium: Savannah River weapons facility 10 1.8 Military tritium production in other countries 11 1.9 Estimates of production of tritium in U.S. military program 12 1.10 Tritium supply from Ontario Hydro for commercial purposes 14 1.11 Commercial supplies of tritium from U.S 17 1.12 Future directions in tritium demand for military purposes IS CHAPTER 2 - TRITIUM ISSUES Introduction 21 2.1 Adequacy of present U.S. tritium production capabilities 21 2.2 Ability of U.S. to meet future military tritium needs 23 2.3 vertical proliferation through direct aquisuion or diversion of Canadian commercial tritium to U.S. nuclear weapons program 23 2.4 Vertical proliferation through substitution 26 2.5 Horizontal proliferation r 3.0 2.6 A ban on tritium production? 33 P.J. SprattS Associates Inc. CHAPTER 3 - TRITIUM AHD THE EHVIROHMEHT Introduction 35 3.1 Commercial uses of tritium 37 3.2 Tritium in the environment 33 3.3 Irradiation Dy tritium light sources 39 3.4 Tritium immobilization and storage 40 CHAPTER 4 - REGULATIONS Introduction 45 Part A: Environmental and Health Regulations 4.1 Overview , 45 4.2 Production of tritium 46 4.3 Transportation 46 4.4 Packaging of tritium 47 4.5 Manufacturing of tritium products 48 4.6 Domestic end-use licensing and waste disposal 50 4.7 Tritium regulation in the United States ."....51 4.5 Tritium regulation in Britain 52 4.9 Tritium regulation in the Federal Republic of Germany 54 4.10 Conclusions for commercial regulations 54 Part. B: Non-proliferation regulations 4.11 The Export-Import Permits Act 56 4.12 Conclusions on export regulations 57 CHAPTER 5 - TRITIUM - COMMERCIAL ASPECTS Introduction 59 5.1 Darlington TRF - production and supply capability 59 5.2 World tritium supply 62 5.3 Supply - discussion 67 5.4 Commercial markets - history 67 5.5 Commercial markets - existing users 69 5.6 Commercial markets - future trends 71 5.7 Commercial markets - discussion 73 P.J. Spratt& Associates Inc. 5.9 Projected fusion use of tritium - discussion 75 5.10 Tntium technology sales 76 5.11 Summary of tritium commercial and fusion prospects 78 5.12 Other commercial issues 82 513 Value added manufacturing in Ontario 82 P.J. SprattS Associates Inc. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS Introduction Early in 1985 the proposed sale of the isotope, "tritium" by Ontario Hydro became a public issue. A number of community groups claimed in public forum that tritium recovered from Ontario Hydro's nuclear reactors would be sold or diverted to American thermonuclear (fusion) weapons Their position was based on the following presumptions: . that tritium was a major component in American nuclear weapons, . that the United States'had a supply problem with or shortage of this material, . and that. Ontario Hydro would directly or indirectly support the American nuclear weapons program: a) by providing tritium directly to the U.S. Department of Energy for use in nuclear weapons, or • ' D) by supplying tritium to certain buyers - either traditional commercial facilities or the developing fusion research agencies associated with the Department of Energy, thus allowing or making possible the diversion of this isotope to nuclear weapons purposes. This argument is based on the significant linkage between many large U.S. companies and the U.S. defense program. It also presumes shortaae of supply of this isotope by the Department of Energy in the U.S., or c) by answering the needs of the commercial market, at present, supplied from production reactors dedicated to supplying U.S military requirements, indirectly allowing the U.S. government to concentrate its efforts on the production of tritium for nuclear weapons. This is generally known as the "substitution argument". When members of what has become known as the "Tritium Issues 'Working Group" were first approached by Dr. T.S. Drolet in mid-April 1985, we were asked if we would agree to participate in a study to assess whether Canadian tritium, which is to be produced only for commercial and research purposes, could be inadvertently utilized, either directly or indirectly, in the American nuclear weapons program. Our discussion of these issues is covered in Volume I of this report and is supplemented by appropriate Appendices in Volume 2. P.J. SprattS Associates Inc. methodology and approach This report has been written by a Working Group composed primarily of individuals with considerable experience in research, analysis., and information transfer with regard to nuclear power and public utilities. The report is the result of extensive gathering of literature on tritium and related topics, and of interviews with individuals from Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., the United States Department of Energy, the United States Department of Defense, and many public interest and research groups.* The path of the research has taken members of the group to interview or consult with individuals in Ottawa, Toronto and Washington D.C. While the Working Group has chosen to study and draw conclusions about the nuclear weapons program of the United States in detail, we do have some evidence that the conclusions reached regarding nuclear weapons, tritium and the other issues we discuss may be valid for other countries, at least for the United Kingdom and its Chapelcross facility. However, we have not been asked to research extensively tritium as it may pertain to other countries' nuclear-weapons programs. In validating our findings, some surprise and concern was raised, particularly in the United States, by the data we had accumulated about nuclear weapons design and facilities. It was suggested that publishing this information might be aiding and abetting a technological transfer concerning the design of nuclear weapons to irresponsible parties.