Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 25: 4 (Fall 2017): 455-480 ELECTORAL SOURCES OF AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE IN RUSSIA: VARIETIES OF ELECTORAL MALPRACTICE, 2007-2016 MARGARITA ZAVADSKAYA EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY AT ST. PETERSBURG MAX GRÖMPING THE UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY FERRAN MARTINEZ I COMA GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY Abstract: Elections do not always serve as instruments of democracy, but can successfully sustain modern forms of authoritarianism by maintaining political cooptation, signaling the regime’s invincibility, distributing rent among elites, and maintaining linkages with territorial communities. Russia exemplifies electoral practices adapted to the needs of authoritarian survival. Recent institutional reforms reflect the regime’s constant adjustment to emerging challenges. This study traces the evolution of the role of elections in Russia for ruling elites, the opposition, and parties. It argues that the information-gathering and co-optation functions of elections help sustain authoritarian rule, whereas insufficient co-optation and failure to signal regime strength may lead to anti-regime mobilization and Dr. Margarita Zavadskaya is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Sociology at the European University at Saint Petersburg and senior research fellow at the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research, Higher School of Economics (Russia). Contact: [email protected]. Dr. Max Grömping is Research Associate with the Department of Government and Interna- tional Relations, University of Sydney (Australia). Contact: [email protected]. Dr. Ferran Martínez i Coma is Research Fellow at the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University, Brisbane (Australia). Contact: [email protected]. 455 456 Demokratizatsiya 25:4 (Fall 2017) weaken the regime. The study utilizes new data from an expert survey on electoral integrity and malpractice in Russia carried out immediately after the legislative elections to the State Duma in September 2016. uccessive uninterrupted election cycles – even rigged and substandard Sones – are often expected to foster democratic rule through gradual learning and the embedding of the electoral game as the standard procedure for transitioning power.1 However, evidence from a number of political regimes suggests that this is not always the case. The post-Soviet space and Southeast Asia are two regions where repetitive elections over more than two decades have not strengthened democratic practices but rather seem to have solidified authoritarian regimes. Russia, for instance, holds regular national and subnational elections, yet a range of indicators clearly indicate that the political regime falls short of an electoral democracy.2 The blossoming literature on electoral authoritarianism has already demonstrated that elections do not always serve as instruments of democra- cy,3 but can instead successfully sustain modern forms of authoritarianism.4 Some scholars claim that elections maintain political cooptation,5 while others draw attention to how elections may scare off the opposition by signaling the regime’s invincibility.6 Still others stress the role of authoritarian election in distributing rents among elites,7 or in maintain- ing linkages with territorial communities.8 Yet, few studies to date have explicitly examined the possible interplay of these functions and their dependence on the needs of a regime at any given point in time. Our study addresses this gap by arguing that each autocracy relies on a strategically deployed toolbox of instruments, or “menu of manipulation” 1Staffan I. Lindberg. 2006. Democracy and Elections in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; Staffan I. Lindberg. 2009. Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2Vladimir Gel’man. 2014. “The Rise and Decline of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia.” Demokratizatsiya 22: 4: 503; Vladimir Gel’man. 2016. “The Politics of Fear: How Russia’s Rulers Counter Their Rivals.” Russian Politics 1:1: 27-45. 3Bingham Powell. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Propor- tional Visions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 4Andreas Schedler. 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers; Milan W. Svolik. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press. 5Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. 2007. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.” Comparative Political Studies 40: 11: 1279-1301. 6Beatriz Magaloni. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press. 7Ellen Lust. 2009. “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East.” Journal of Democracy 20: 3: 122–35; Lisa Blaydes. 2010. Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak’s Egypt. New York: Cambridge University Press. 8Henry Hale. 2006. Why Not Parties in Russia? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Authoritarian Resilience in Russia 457 to facilitate the exercise of political power over the ruled. The toolbox may include “lies, fear and economic prosperity,” as posited by Adam Przeworski.9 This involves restricting the flow of information; censor- ship; targeted or wholesale repression; and specific forms of upholding political legitimacy. On the one hand, elections make it easier for the incumbent to collect politically relevant information. On the other hand, they urge the ruling elites to minimize electoral uncertainty, specifically uncertainty about remaining in office, ex ante. This leads incumbents and regime officials to tilt the electoral playing field through a variety of manipulations, from re-drafting electoral and party legislation to ballot stuffing or the intimidation of voters and opposition.10 Recent research has demonstrated that the role of elections varies dramatically from one form of authoritarianism to another, reflecting its ambiguous role in triggering democratization.11 But does the role of elections also change over time and space within a given autocracy? The research question we pursue in this study is: what role do elec- tions have in authoritarian regimes for a) the regime, b) the opposition, and c) the citizenry? More specifically, how can one understand the functional evolution of the role of elections in the context of electoral authoritarian- ism and shifts in the international environment? We pursue this research question with a longitudinal case study of electoral malpractice in the Russian Federation from 2007 to 2016. Russia provides a vivid example of how electoral practices were adapted to the needs of authoritarian survival, sending signals to the real and potential opposition and maintaining political cooptation and rent distribution via electoral means. Moreover, the role and function of elections in upholding electoral authoritarianism has changed from one electoral cycle to another. The recent institutional reforms and the variety of electoral malpractice observed throughout electoral cycles reflect constant adjustment to emerg- ing challenges on the part of the regime. Previous research has argued that on the eve of national elections, the incumbent deals with a trade-off between the need to learn about the genuine level of popular support and the imperative to keep electoral uncertainty as low as possible.12 This is known as the Electoral Dictator’s Dilemma. The incumbent chooses whether s/he seeks to send a signal 9Adam Przeworski. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press. 10Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism…; Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler. 2010. “Nod- ding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament.” American Political Science Review 104: 03: 482–502; Lee Morgenbesser. 2016. “The Failure of Democratisation by Elections in Cambodia.” Contemporary Politics 27 (September): 1–21. 11Jason Brownlee. 2007. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. New York: Cam- bridge University Press; Lee Morgenbesser and Thomas Pepinsky. States, Neopatrimonial- ism, and Elections: Democratization in Southeast Asia. New York: Oxford University Press. 12Malesky and Schuler, “Nodding or Needling.” 458 Demokratizatsiya 25:4 (Fall 2017) about his/her strength or, alternatively, obtain credible information about the compliance of regime subordinates, elites support, and potential pockets of political resistance. In a contribution to this research, we argue that Russian elections have evolved from being a mere tool for coopting elites or opposition and gathering information about regime support and potential ruptures to being a means of sending signals about the regime’s strength and moni- toring loyalty. We thereby consider another trade-off facing an incumbent, namely his/her rewarding strategies. Does s/he wish to please either his/ her core constituency (members of the ruling coalition) or swing constitu- encies? In following existing game-theoretic reasoning, we argue that this depends on the political context and the size of the economic pie.13 In developing this argument, the study draws on a variety of empiri- cal evidence – specifically mass and expert surveys, as well as comparative indicators of electoral integrity. In particular, the study takes advantage of new data on electoral integrity and malpractice in Russia from an expert survey carried out