1 THE CHILEAN NAVAL MUTINY OF 1931 Submitted by Carlos René Manuel Tromben Corbalán to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Maritime History, September 2010 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgment. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. (signature) ......................................................................................... 2 ABSTRACT On 1st September 1931, the most serious mutiny affecting the Chilean Navy in nearly two centuries of existence broke out. The various books and articles which have examined this subject have used as their sources the local press and the participants´ own stories. Just in a few cases, historians have had access to official documents, because they were seldom published or access was restricted until now. This has led to gross factual mistakes in the existing historiography, leading to questionable interpretations and to the creation of legends still alive in Chile and elsewhere. This thesis discusses these topics. The Chilean Navy has in its archives a collection of 35 volumes (about 9,200 pages) of Courts Martial official documents and proceedings never studied by historians. The author used these sources under a special authorization for academic purposes. The following theories of the causes of the mutiny commonly expounded by contemporaries and subsequent historians have been researched: a. Participation of Marxist groups in the origin of the mutiny and exploitation of it. b. Participation of the two Chilean populist political groups in the movement’s generation (headed by the former presidents Arturo Alessandri and Carlos Ibáñez) c. Army and Navy officers’ participation in politics during 1924 to 1931 and the consequence in the behaviour of the mutineers. Examination has also been made of connections with the mutiny on board HMS Lucia in Devonport in January 1931 which occurred while the Chilean battleship Latorre was being refitted at that port. Months later and being anchored in the port of Coquimbo, Chile, serious mutiny or revolt started on board Latorre and spread to other naval units as well as other Navy’s, Army’s and Air Force’s shore establishments. One week after the Chilean mutiny, the Invergordon mutiny started in the Royal Navy Atlantic Fleet. This thesis also compares both mutinies because they had many aspects in common. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 2 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (MAPS) 6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 11 1. INTRODUCTION. 12 1.1. The Chilean Naval Mutiny of 1931 in brief. 12 1.2. A discussion of the literature covering the period of the Mutiny. 14 1.3. The theory of mutinies 20 1.4. The crime of sedition or mutiny in the Chilean Military Code. 28 1.5. An introduction to the following parts of this thesis. 30 PART I: THE ORIGINS 32 2. THE REMOTE ORIGINS OF THE MUTINY. 32 2.1. The war against Perú and Bolivia (1879-1883) shaped an attitude in the Navy. 32 2.2. The 1891-1924 period in Chilean politics. 33 3. 1924-1931: A PERIOD WHEN DISCIPLINE WAS BROKEN IN THE ARMED FORCES. 40 3.1. Alessandri and the meddling of military and naval officers in political affairs 40 3.2. January 1925, the peril of another civil war. 48 4. THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE 1925 CRISIS AND ITS FAILURE TO LAST. 77 4.1 The meddling of Ibáñez in the Navy. 77 4.2 Summary: the development of active participation by the Navy in Chilean politics and its significance for the 1931 Mutiny. 97 5. THE FAILED SOLUTIONS OF 1925-1931. 99 5.1. The brief presidential period of Emiliano Figueroa-Larraín. 99 5.2. Carlos Ibáñez finally becomes President of Chile. 112 4 6. THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OF THE MUTINY 124 6.1. Alessandri’s plots against Ibáñez. 124 6.2. Communist plots against political stability. 130 6.3. The battleship Latorre in Devonport, UK. 141 6.4. Before the mutiny in Chile: salary reductions. 145 PART II: THE MUTINY 150 7. COQUIMBO. 150 7.1. Organizing a mutiny in Coquimbo, Chile. 150 7.2. The outbreak of mutiny in the flagships. 163 7.3. The mutiny unleashing on board the destroyers. 166 7.4. First days of the mutiny in Coquimbo. 171 8. TALCAHUANO 180 8.1. Organizing a mutiny in Talcahuano. 180 8.2. The mutiny erupts in Talcahuano. 187 9. VALPARAÍSO AND THE END OF THE REBELLION. 193 9.1. The mutiny in Valparaíso. 193 9.2. The final events in Valparaíso, Talcahuano and Coquimbo. 199 9.3. Final comments. 222 PART III: THE AFTERMATH 227 10. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE NAVY. 227 10.1. Introduction to this part. 227 10.2. Consequences of the mutiny. 227 10.3. The presidency of Juan Esteban Montero-Rodríguez: the civilist reaction. 228 11. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. 242 11.1. The Chilean Communist Party after the mutiny. 242 11.2. Anther period of political instability in Chile. 250 5 11.3. Towards political stability. The end of an era. 260 AN INTERPRETATION 264 12. THE CHILEAN NAVAL MUTINY OF 1931: A REASSESSMENT. 264 12.1. Background. 264 12.2. The author’s opinion. 265 12.3. Similarities and differences between the Chilean naval mutiny and the Invergordon mutiny. 266 12.4 Author's interpretation of this thesis 272 APPENDICES 281 APPENDIX A: IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS. 281 A1. Evaluation of the situation made by the consulting board [Navy Board] on the night of 1/ 2 September 1931. 281 A2. First mutineers’ manifesto. 281 A2. Second mutineers’ manifesto. 283 APPENDIX B: SHIPS AT COQUIMBO ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1931 286 APPENDIX C: SHIP AND SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS IN TALCAHUANO ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1931 287 APPENDIX D: SHIPS AND SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS IN VALPARAÍSO ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1931. 289 APPENDIX E: MEMBERSHIP OF OFFICERS’ COMMITTEES OR JUNTAS 291 GLOSSARY 294 SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 297 6 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS (MAPS) Map 1. Chile. Important cities and ports during the mutiny. 7 Map 2. From Copiapó to Temuco. Places mentioned in this thesis. 8 Map 3. Coquimbo Bay. Places mentioned in this thesis. 8 Map 4. Quintero and Valparaíso Bays. Places mentioned in this thesis. 9 Map 5. Concepción Bay (Talcahuano). Places mentioned in this thesis. 9 Map 6. Talcahuano Naval Base. Places mentioned in this thesis. 10 7 Map 1. Chile. Important cities and ports during the mutiny. 8 Map 2. From Copiapó to Temuco. Places mentioned in this thesis. Map 3. Coquimbo Bay. Places mentioned in this thesis. 9 Map 4. Quintero and Valparaíso Bays. Places mentioned in this thesis. Map 5. Concepción Bay (Talcahuano). Places mentioned in this thesis. 10 Map 6. Talcahuano Naval Base. Places mentioned in this thesis. 11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My thanks to Dr William F. Sater for obtaining for me the copies of the US primary sources used in this thesis. 12 1. INTRODUCTION. 1.1. The Chilean Naval Mutiny of 1931 in brief. General Carlos Ibañez’ regime ended suddenly on 26 July 1931 after weeks of civil unrest and financial problems resulting from the world-wide Great Depression. Four weeks later, the new Government decided on a salary reduction for all civil servants (Armed Forces included) to face the situation. This decision was badly communicated, in particular to two squadrons of the Chilean Navy anchored in Coquimbo. As a result, the ship’s companies already in a state of unrest for several reasons to be discussed later, expressed their dissatisfaction by different means, including menaces through the presentation of collective complaints. Since this was an act specifically against the regulations, the Commander in Chief of one of the squadrons decided to call for a muster on 31 August 1931 to be attended by all the crew of his flagship plus delegations headed by commanding officers from the other units of this force. He addressed them in a harsh way and after this some symptoms of unrest were visible, although the crews obeyed the dismissal order and returned to their normal activities. At the same time, he sent an officer to the other squadron also anchored in Coquimbo with news about what was happening in his force. In this other squadron everything seemed normal, although its Commander in Chief had reports that the ship companies were concerned about the announced salary reductions. He was about to send an official document expressing his concerns and doubts to the Ministry of the Navy. That evening there was a social meeting with civilians in the officer’s mess of O’Higgins ending at 21:00 while at almost the same time there was a boxing session on the deck of this flagship attended by crewmembers of different units. This activity and a hidden gathering of crewmembers in the other flagship [Latorre] enabled the spreading of the decision adopted by radicalized men to seize their vessels. At 04:00 on 1 September, the officers on duty and those who were asleep in their living quarters were surprised by armed mutineers who ordered them to hand over their personal weapons and to stay inside their cabins. The two flag officers awakened by the noise tried to dissuade the mutineers without success. The Commodore who made the above mentioned speech then tried to fire at the sailors who were menacing him without 13 success and he finally was imprisoned as the rest of the officers of both flagships. Some shots were also fired by the mutineers but only one of the officers on duty was slightly injured.