ANATOMY UNVEILING ESPIONAGE HOW THREE COUNTRIES BOTCHED THE FOILING OF THE MUMBAI TERROR PLOT A recent joint-investigation by ProPublica’s Sebastian Rotello, The New York Times’s James Glanz and David E. Singer, and a PBS Frontline series revealed that despite a trove of invaluable intelligence data, the United States, Britain, and India failed to unravel the plot that would lead to the deaths of 166 people in the Mumbai terror attacks of 2008, frequently referred to as “India’s 9/11.” In particular, intelligence gleaned from tracking DAVID COLEMAN HEADLEY Sends warnings to India’s Intelligence Bureau about the strong likelihood of an attack on Mumbai that are ultimately ignored due to their lacking specifi city. Tracks the exchange of incriminating emails with Lashkar and ex- Pakistani intelligence Headley’s Canadian ex-wife offi cials before and told U.S. intelligence offi cials after Mumbai attacks. that Headley was going back and forth from Pakistan to train in Lashkar terror camps. Moroccan ex-wife links Headley with three visits to embassy in Islamabad between December 2007 and April 2008. Compiled by FAILURES: THE FOLLOW UP Matthew DeMello and Jas Singh Sources: ProPublica, Despite reports from two ex-wives of cials long before the killings began that The New York Times, and PBS Headley was a Pakistani terrorist conducting mysterious missions in Mumbai, Designed by American of cials did not pursue the leads. Further, four FBI inquiries conducted Meehyun Nam-Thompson for other reasons failed to detect Headley’s involvement in the looming attacks. two major gures should have alerted the spy agencies to the impending attack. David Coleman Headley, a Pakistani-American—at one point an informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency—spent two years in Mumbai conducting reconnaissance on the targets of the assault. Zarrar Shah, the technology chief of Lashkar- e-Taiba, a terror group with ties to Inter-Services Intelligence, the Pakistani spy agency, was heavily dependent on the Internet for all operations planning of the attack. As the diagram below makes clear, had the intelligence agencies acted cooperatively, a clear trail of spy data would have revealed every phase of the terror attack. ZARRAR SHAH Records the following data-based activity employed by Shah: Receives numerous warnings Tracked from the CIA, including: Shah’s laptop communications, SEPTEMBER 2008: but did not share A warning against the Taj with the GCHQ. Mahal hotel and fi ve other Wikipedia searches for Mumbai-based targets, yet the timing and targets the evening before the attacks. method of the attacks were unspecifi ed. NOVEMBER 18, 2008: The location of a Pakistani vessel linked to Lashkar off the southern coast of Mumbai. Google Earth and MapsofIndia.com searches to chart routes in Mumbai. Online Surveillance One of David Headley’s ex-wives Employment of internet phone Human Intelligence Missed Opportunity system to disguise location. DRAGNET SURVEILLANCE VIGILANCE The spy agencies failed to detect the operational Despite several unspeci c CIA warnings about a terror planning of the terror attack in the bulk collection threat by Lashkar in Mumbai, the Indian intelligence of electronic communications until the attack was agency failed to effectively mobilize to thwart the already well underway. terror threat. .