INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS Elections and Conflict in Sudan ANJA DARGATZ August 2011 n The clear supremacy of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in North Sudan and of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the South pre-empted the occurrence of major violent incidents involving political forces during the national elec- tions in April 2010. n As part of the peace agreement, if the elections had failed the whole peace process would have been affected. Therefore, there was a strong readiness to accept the re- sults despite democratic flaws. n While the national elections were fairly peaceful, violence escalated after the (post- poned) elections in the state of South Kordofan in May 2011: the neck-and-neck race between the two parties stoked up the existing tensions in this border state. n However, the main reason for the escalation of violence was not a failure to accept the election results, but the high degree of military mobilisation and the failure to integrate fighters from the former Southern rebel army. ANJA DARGATZ | ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT IN SUDAN Contents 1. Current Situation .......................................................2 2. Context Analysis .......................................................3 2.1 Rules of the Game .....................................................3 2.1.1 History of Elections in Sudan .......................................3 2.1.2 Electoral, Political and Juridical System ................................6 2.1.3 Context of the 2010/11 Elections ....................................7 2.2 Key Players and their Interests ............................................9 2.2.1 Political Parties. .9 2.2.2 Armed Groups and Security Forces .................................10 2.2.3 Elites and Civil Society ...........................................11 2.2.4 Tribes and Ethnicity .............................................11 2.2.5 Alliances .....................................................11 2.2.6 National Institutions .............................................12 2.2.7 The Role of the Media ...........................................12 2.2.8 Main Defects of the Political System .................................13 2.3 Socio-Economic Reality ................................................13 2.4 External Influences ...................................................14 3. Conclusion: Elections and Violence in Sudan – Potential and Reality ...........15 1 ANJA DARGATZ | ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT IN SUDAN 1. Current Situation transformation foreseen by the CPA, the political elites in the North and, to a certain extent, also in the South The national elections which took place 11-15 April 2010 were less engaged, less willing or less able to implement in Sudan were part of the peace agreement (Compre- the requirements of the CPA. The same applies to the hensive Peace Agreement / CPA) which ended the civil overall-all clause »to make unity attractive«: None of the war that had been going on for 20 years between the signatory parties made a visible effort to make the unity government and rebel groups in the South. After being of the country an attractive option. Assuming that the postponed several times, the national elections in 2010 lack of political participation and fair economic inclusion finally put an end to the transitional government which were root causes of the civil war, the remaining high consisted of the two signatories of the CPA, the Govern- potential of violence becomes obvious. After the signing ment of Sudan (represented by the dominant National of the CPA, other conflicts broke out into open violence Congress Party / NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation which had been boiling under the surface: rebel groups Movement (SPLM). Government posts and parliamen- had been active since the late 1990s in the East and were tary seats were distributed according to fixed quotas. appeased in 2006. Fighting between army and rebel Elections were held at all levels: national presidency, state groups in Darfur started in 2003 and is ongoing. Over governors, national and state parliament, president and the past two years an increasing number of so-called parliament of South Sudan. The CPA set elections as tribal clashes have been witnessed in the South where a pre-condition for the referendum in January 2011 in existing tribal rivalries are being stirred up and misused which citizens of southern Sudan finally voted almost for political ends. There are now several thousand dead unanimously for an independent South Sudan with the and tens of thousands of displaced persons. In addition, borders of 1 January 1956 agreed upon in the CPA. For in the sensitive border areas SAF and SPLA were rather the citizens of Abyei, the CPA provided a referendum on confronting each other than serving jointly in the estab- the question of whether the area should remain with the lished Joint Integrated Units (JIU). Militarisation is high, north or become part of the (southern) state of Bahr El while demobilisation is slow. Ghazal. This vote was postponed for an indefinite time because of a disagreement between NCP and SPLM on The level of statehood differs considerably between who should be entitled to vote. In only vaguely defined North and South. In the North, the state can be de- »popular consultations«, the two border states South scribed as fragile with regard to social services and pro- Kordofan and Blue Nile were given the possibility to ex- tection of civilians. When it comes to control of terri- press their opinion on the CPA and the extent to which it tory, identification and elimination of assumed threats addresses the needs of the population. According to the to the regime and the control of protests and opposition CPA, a committee appointed by the elected state parlia- the different security organs work effectively, although ment is assigned to question the population on the (un) not always in a coordinated way. In the South, where successful implementation of the CPA and to collect re- a civil (semi)autonomous state structure was built only commendations which shall be transmitted to the pres- after 2005, it is mainly the state's lack of a monopoly idency. However, there is no clear definition on how to on force that makes it fragile. The government in Juba handle such recommendations. While Blue Nile started has not been able either to protect citizens on a broader the first phase (of three) in February 2011 (results not yet base, particularly in rural areas (for example, from tribal published), South Kordofan has not implemented the clashes or marauding SPLA), or to provide education, consultation due to the postponed elections (May 2011) health care or other services. However, when it comes to and the ensuing violence. particular threats like by some »renegade« generals, mil- itary structures are still effectively functioning to defeat Since the peace agreement was signed in Naivasha in alleged rebels. Despite the decentralized system which 2005, locally limited clashes between the Sudan Armed is foreseen in the CPA and INC, both governments still Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army operate in a centralised way, although decentralisation is (SPLA) have occurred in sensitive areas north and south ongoing. In the North violation of human rights is a tool (Abyei, Malakal). Both parties – genuinely or rhetorically used by the state to contain challenges. In the South – have adhered to the obligation to implement the CPA SPLA / M was in the past as well very efficient in using with regard to the ceasefire. Regarding the democratic human rights violations as a mean of war. In addition, 2 ANJA DARGATZ | ELECTIONS AND CONFLICT IN SUDAN certain traditional values and customs have a particu- following pattern: elected governments turn out to be larly negative effect on the respect for rights of women corrupt and / or inefficient and are then overthrown by and girls. The lack of state control and capacities in the military or oppositional groups; the latter in turn seek South prevents prosecution of any kind of human rights legitimisation by elections until the next coup d'état. violations, be it committed by authorities or by private Even president Gaafar Nimeiry (1969-85) – who rejected persons. The lack of respecting human rights is part of the multi-party system – conducted elections and even the described war mentality. referenda to legitimise and stabilise his power, as did the Islamist »Salvation« (Inghaz) regime after the coup in In the background but still relevant to Sudan's elections 1989. This political mindset was probably more harmful is the indictment of President Omar Bashir by the In- to the idea of elections as a source of legitimation than ternational Criminal Court (ICC). Legally, it does not any vote rigging or fraud. Probably the biggest step to- make any difference that the accused was democrati- wards democratic rule was taken with the first national cally elected after the indictment. Nevertheless, in the multi-party elections in Sudan in 1953, which formed perception of large parts of the political elite the issue the first Sudanese self-government after the withdrawal of the (international) legitimisation of the president by of the British colonial power (the first step towards in- democratic elections was a driving force to execute the dependence, which Sudan completed in 1956). One of elections. the major decisions taken by this government concerned whether to unite with Egypt or to establish an autono- mous Sudanese state. 2. Context Analysis