The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 2, Spring 2018 Print ISSN: 2252-347X Online ISSN: 2252-6959 https://doi.org/10.26351/JIMES2-11 The Failures of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Balance and Imbalance Uriya Shavit Abstract The article presents a thesis about the reasons for the repeated failures to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Drawing on a contextualized analysis of Palestinian and other reflections on the implications of demographics, it suggests that a unique situation of strategic imbalance and balance is the main reason for the continued impasse While the Palestinians are the weaker side in the conflict, the parity between the Jewish and Arab populations west of the Jordan River and a huge disparity between the Arab and Jewish populations in the broader Middle East, has led to a Palestinian belief that Israel’s strategic situation can only worsen and this consequently discourages the abandonment of dogmatic agendas. The article concludes with policy recommendations based on this analysis Keywords Hamas; Demographics in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; the Oslo Accords; the Palestinian Authority; Author’s contact: Prof. Uriya Shavit, Tel Aviv University; [email protected] 5 Uriya Shavit 6 Introduction Najib Razaq, the prime minister of Malaysia, in response to Donald Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, recently told the following to thousands of applauding Muslims who rallied outside a mosque in Putrajaya, the Malaysian seat of Government: There are 1.6 billion Muslims. There are only 13 million Jews. unite, we will be looked down upon. It does not make sense if 1.6 billion lose1 to the Jews. If we don’t Razaq did not specify what such a unity would look like, nor what Muslims across the world should do to reestablish Islamic sovereignty over Jerusalem, but his words did reveal a deeper truth about the reason why countless efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict have met with failure. Since the early 1990s American and other initiatives aimed at ending one of the most entrenched conflicts in the world have introduced variations of to achieve a lasting peace, security and prosperity for both Israelis and a similar formula to end the conflict. Championed as the only realistic path Palestinians, this formula calls for an Israeli withdrawal from the majority of Palestinian state with some form of sovereignty over East Jerusalem. In the territories it occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a demilitarized return, the Palestinian leadership will concede the “right of return” for some their relations with Israel. five million Palestinian refugees and Arab states, for their part, will normalize The repeated failures of these initiatives have done little to encourage revisionist approaches that challenge and reinterpret the widely accepted historical narratives that explain why some of the world’s brightest politicians and negotiators have been unable to bring the parties to an agreement. Some of those individuals who were involved in peace-making efforts have lamented “missed opportunities” and point to occasions where the parties actually established a mutually recognized framework for resolution and agreed to compromise on most of the issues. Unfortunately, however, political status agreement. This long accepted narrative is, however, blind to the circumstances or 2the lack of the necessary skills have prevented a final Hannah Beech, “Malaysian Leader Says Muslims Should Not ‘Lose to the Jews,’” New York Times 1 An example of this is the argument that the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Prime , December 22, 2017. 2 Oslo Process. See the analysis of Israeli Middle Eastern Studies scholar, former ambassador Minister, on November 4, 1995, was, largely - if not entirely - the reason for the failure of the The Failures of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 7 of negotiators operating under different political circumstances have ended repetitive character of the failures. Over a period of 25 years, different teams up in similar deadlocks, which suggests that the problem is not one involving personalities or circumstances. Another theory places the blame on “extremists on both sides.” In short, it suggests, that, on the on hand, the rise of Hamas, an Islamist movement that considers Palestine in its entirety to be a Muslim endowment (waqf) and openly declares its commitment to eliminate Israel, and, on the other hand, the rise of messianic views on the Israeli religious right, have made a compromise impossible. The argument is that people who believe that they speak in God’s name, act as His vessels and abide by His will are unlikely to make concessions. Brothers and their3 different offspring, including Hamas, do not preach an There are three flaws in this theory. First, the Muslim open-ended war against all non-Muslim “aggressors” who have occupied Muslim lands. If they did, they would also be calling for a holy war in Spain and Serbia. Second, Jewish messianic political views, while having gained the political fringe in terms of the number of Knesset members who embrace wider appeal and influence within Israeli society at large, have remained on such views. Even in the 20th (current) Knesset, arguably one the most hawkish the view that for theological reasons Israeli governments must never concede in Israel’s history, less than 10 percent of the members openly identify with any part of the lands occupied in 1967. Third, and most importantly, since 1993, it has not been the extremists who have repeatedly tried and failed to governments and the Palestinian mainstream national movement that have reach a final status agreement but centrist, center-left and center-right Israeli doneto the this. United Official States and chief non-official negotiator negotiationsItamar Rabinovich have in an demonstrated article by Aluf Ben, that “Arafat the Haaretz analysis of Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat in an opinion column in the Israeli media:is Guilty “If – Rabin But Only Had HeNot Can Been Do Assassinated, It”, EnglishThere Would Edition, Have March Already 30, Been2004. Peace,” See also, Walla the, president Mahmud Abbas, who said that, if Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert had stayed inOctober power 17, two 2002 more (In months, Hebrew). peace Another could examplehave been is achievedthe statement (Olmert’s of Palestinian corruption Authority scandal Away from Inking Peace Deal,” Haaretz reviewled to his of resignationthis argument: in September Elie Podeh, 2008): Chances “Abbas: for Palestinians, Peace: Missed Israel Opportunities Were Two Months in the Arab-Israeli Conflict English Edition, October 14, 2012. For a critical For example, the notion that the “extremists on both sides” have frustrated the hopes of the (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2015), p. 356. 3 Labor party and opposition leader Isaac Hertzog. Isaac Hertzog, “Only Separation Can Lead to“moderate a Two State majorities” Solution,” has New underpinned York Times the peace plan proposed in 2016 by Israel’s dovish , February 28, 2016. Uriya Shavit maximum8 that Israel’s center-left is willing to give the Palestinians is far less than the minimum that the PLO is willing to accept. One of the chief Israeli negotiators at the July 2000 Camp David Summit, where a final status agreement was still believed to be within reach, described of anonymity, the strategy of Ehud Barak’s dovish government was to trade why the talks collapsed. According to the official, who spoke on the condition most of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza for a Palestinian concession on the “right of return,” and to have the status of Jerusalem resolved as an independent issue. To their great shock, the Israeli negotiators learned that the Palestinians were insisting on the right of return in its fullest sense. A member of the Palestinian team, Hasan Asfur, argued in response that to concede the “right of return” under any circumstances, nor would they ever the above allegations were a fiction and that the Palestinians never intended concede it. 4 ambiguous approach to the refugee problem or repeated Asfur’s dogmatism.5 Indeed, over the past 25 years, PLO leaders have either presented an No democratically elected Israeli government is likely to ever agree to this demand or even to a more moderate demand that nevertheless facilitates any massive return of Palestinians to Israel that would threaten its Jewish majority. The impasse reached in the peace efforts has given rise not only to despair but also to characterizations of both sides, respectively, as war-mongering, clichés used in contemporary Israeli politics relating to what is interpreted sentimental, deceptive, and delusional. Specifically, one of the most popular as unrealistic dogmatic Palestinian demands, particularly regarding the “right of return,” is that the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. This statement, referencing a celebrated observation made by Abba Eban, a former Israeli foreign minister, reflects Israelis’ puzzlement demands that hinder any prospect for achieving Palestinian national over the fact that the clearly weaker side in the conflict has been presenting view about historical justice, political legitimacy and human rights but rather independence. The puzzlement is not necessarily related to specific points of Uriya Shavit and Jalal Banna, “Everything You Wanted to Know about the Right of Return and Were Afraid to Ask,” Haaretz Magazine 54 The ambiguous approach is committed to a “just and agreed upon solution based on United , July 6, 2001. position regards the “right of return” as an individual right of the refugees that their electedNations leadersResolution cannot 194,” concede. in line withMahmud the Arab Abbas, League President Peace of Plan the of Palestinian 2002. The Authority,dogmatic has articulated both views in recent years: Elhanan Miller, “Abbas Hardens His Stance on Palestinian ‘Right of Return,’” The Jerusalem Post , January 13, 2014.