Paul Robinson, Jay Dixon. Aiding Afghanistan: A History of Soviet Assistance to a Developing Country. London: Hurst & Co., 2013. XI, 226 S. ISBN 978-1-84904-239-0. Reviewed by Martin Deuerlein Published on H-Soz-u-Kult (November, 2014) The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in Decem‐ resources or creating dependence was not a con‐ ber 1979 marked the watershed between the “Era scious goal” (p. 156). To support their argument, of Détente” and the “Second Cold War”. Accord‐ the two authors set out to study the economic and ingly, it has received considerable scholarly atten‐ technical assistance programs run by the Soviet tion over the last three decades. For an overview Union in Afghanistan between the mid-1950s and of previous and ongoing research cf. Tanja Penter the early 1990s. Their aim is to understand why / Esther Meier (eds.), Sovietnam? Die UdSSR in “Soviet aid to Afghanistan was substantial, but ul‐ Afghanistan 1979–1989, Paderborn 2014 (forth‐ timately unsuccessful” (p. 11). coming). However, most of these works were em‐ “Aiding Afghanistan” is one of several new bedded into contemporary political debates and studies on the country that have appeared since mainly dealt with military and geopolitical ques‐ 2001, when new state-building efforts by the in‐ tions. The Soviet engagement in Afghanistan was ternational community triggered a renewed inter‐ often portrayed as driven by the goals of ideologi‐ est in their historical antecedents. For a direct cal infiltration, economical exploitation and the comparison of Soviet efforts in the 1980s and creation of quasi-colonial dependence. For exam‐ American projects in the 2000s see Martin Kip‐ ple Rosanne Klass, The Great Game Revisited, in: ping, State-Building: Erfolg und Scheitern in ibid. (ed.), Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited, Afghanistan, Baden-Baden 2011. See also Antonio New York 1987, pp. 1–29, especially p. 11. Giustozzi, Afghanistan: Transition without End: In “Aiding Afghanistan”, Paul Robinson and An Analytical Narrative on State-Making, LSE Cri‐ Jay Dixon have set out to refute this view, arguing sis States Working Paper Series No. 2, Nov. 2008; throughout the book that the Soviets “did gen‐ Anton Minkov / Gregory Smolynec, 4-D Soviet uinely intend their help to stimulate economic Style: Defence, Development, Diplomacy and Dis‐ growth” (p. 4) and that in contrast to “Western engagement in Afghanistan During the Soviet Pe‐ Cold War myths, exploiting the country’s national riod Part I: State Building, in: The Journal of Slavic H-Net Reviews Military Studies 23:2 (2010), S. 306–327. Like other play the two superpowers off against each other, authors, Robinson and Dixon study the Soviet ex‐ receiving aid from both Cold War camps. While perience to gain insights for current projects: “It is retrospective Soviet and Afghan accounts tend to a story which holds lessons both for current aid blame the other side’s shortcomings, the deficits programs in Afghanistan and for development of the Soviet system and Afghan nepotism cooper‐ programs elsewhere” (p. 2). ated splendidly and mutually reinforced each oth‐ After an introduction that summarizes the er. current state of research, the second chapter in‐ Recognizing many of these problems, Soviet troduces the reader to Western and Soviet devel‐ experts abandoned their fxation on heavy indus‐ opment theory from Malthus to the 1990s: Soviet trialization, nationalization and economic au‐ experts changed their opinion on development tarky during the 1970s. They now favored integra‐ policies earlier than their Western counterparts: tion into the “socialist division of labor” and a It was not the lack of capital that was preventing limited private enterprise. An essential precondi‐ progress; efforts to stimulate accumulation were tion for this approach was the transformation of doomed to fail. Instead, they came to the conclu‐ “institutions”. sion that it was mainly social and political “insti‐ After their coup in April 1978, the Afghan tutions” that determined a country’s prospects for communists took this advice very seriously: De‐ socio-economic development. spite repeated warnings, they embarked on a The next three chapters provide a chronologi‐ course of rapid transformation of the Afghan soci‐ cal overview of Soviet assistance to Afghanistan ety that triggered heavy resistance (Chapter 4). from the 1920s to 1991. With the renewed Soviet Despite serious reservations, the Soviet Union in‐ interest in the “Third World”, Afghanistan became creased its material and fnancial support and the third largest recipient of Soviet aid in the sent additional advisors. It was exactly this deter‐ 1950s. Following the Soviet model, the Afghans es‐ mination not to let the Afghan revolution fail that tablished a system of fve-year plans and state in‐ eliminated any incentives for the Afghan commu‐ tervention (Chapter 3). nists to moderate their policies and thus contrib‐ According to Robinson and Dixon, Western uted to the eventual Soviet invasion in December critics at the time were mostly right in claiming 1979. that Soviet assistance was of bad quality and not For about two years, Soviet aid continued adapted to local needs. But these problems were much as before. When the expected military suc‐ by no means unique to Socialist development cess did not materialize, the Soviets pursued a projects. On the contrary, Soviet and American aid more comprehensive approach: Deliveries of fer‐ was remarkably similar, focusing on large and tilizer to local farmers, educational exchanges visible projects that usually did not create signifi‐ and the training of Afghan experts gained impor‐ cant growth Cf. Nick Cullather, Damming tance as parts of a new “hearts and minds” cam‐ Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State, in: paign. However, the desolate security situation The Journal of American History 89:2 (2002), thwarted most of these projects and the Afghan S. 512–537. More specifically Soviet were the economy all but collapsed. Deliberate sabotage de‐ problems of the planned economy, which led to stroyed bridges, pipelines and other infrastruc‐ the same consequences of inefficiency and poor ture: “The Soviets were in a chicken-and-egg situ‐ quality as in the Soviet Union. However, Robinson ation. Improving the security situation relied on and Dixon insist that the Afghans had consider‐ economic development; but economic develop‐ able agency. For two decades, they managed to 2 H-Net Reviews ment proved impossible given the security situa‐ some criticism: Current development theory and tion.” (p. 123) the historical experience intermingle in several Only after Mikhail Gorbachev’s election in parts of the book, the perspectives of various ac‐ 1985 did the Soviet approach slowly change tors and different layers of time are not always (Chapter 5). The new General Secretary told the differentiated very thoroughly. When Robinson Afghan leadership to “forget about Socialism” (p. and Dixon analyze factors that inhibit economic 140) and urged them to seek national reconcilia‐ progress in Afghanistan (pp. 14–18), it is not al‐ tion. However, with the impending Soviet with‐ ways clear if these are contemporary assessments drawal, aid became even more important to pre‐ or a deduction from current development theory. pare the Afghan government to stand on its own While changing views on how to develop “back‐ feet; expenditures peaked in 1987. The modalities ward” countries are presented in much detail, the of aid were now fundamentally transformed: basic assumptions of “modernization“ and “devel‐ Funds were provided for the private sector and opment” and their heterogeneous meanings for short-term humanitarian relief gained impor‐ Soviet, American and Afghan actors are rarely put tance over long-term development projects. After into question. all troops and most civilian advisors had been But this is a task for future research. Despite withdrawn in February 1989, Soviet aid continued some reservations, “Aiding Afghanistan” is an im‐ (Conclusion). But as the security situation deterio‐ portant book. Robinson and Dixon break new rated, most Soviet-trained Afghan specialists fed ground with their comprehensive study of Soviet the country. When Boris Yeltsin ended all aid for civilian development efforts in Afghanistan. If the Afghanistan in 1992, the regime collapsed. available sources permit, their work will hopeful‐ In “Aiding Afghanistan”, Robinson and Dixon ly stimulate further studies on the perspective of have impressively assembled all currently avail‐ Afghan actors, on their interactions with Soviet able information on Soviet aid to Afghanistan. advisors and on the repercussions of the Soviet Linking theory and practice, they convincingly experience in Afghanistan for the course of the show how both mutually influenced each other. history of the two countries and international pol‐ Based on interviews and archival sources from itics in general. the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE), they provide an extensive summary of different forms of aid: Charts in the annex (pp. 157–177) list 142 completed projects, ranging from power plants and dams to bakeries and bicycle factories. Tens of thousands of Afghans were trained in the Soviet Union and the experience of Soviet advi‐ sors in Afghanistan is considered as well. Cf. Arte‐ my Kalinovsky, The Blind Leading the Blind: Sovi‐ et Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation- Building in Afghanistan, CWIHP Working Paper #60, January 2010, <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ sites/default/files/WP60_Web_Final.pdf> (13.10.2014). From a historian’s perspective, however, the study’s focus on current relevance is cause for 3 H-Net Reviews If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/ Citation: Martin Deuerlein. Review of Robinson, Paul; Dixon, Jay. Aiding Afghanistan: A History of Soviet Assistance to a Developing Country. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. November, 2014. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=42695 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.