IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL THE JCPOA ON GEOPOLITICAL CHESSBOARDS ALEXANDER WIELGOS newdirection.online @europeanreform @europeanreform NDeuropeanreform [email protected] Founded by Margaret Thatcher in 2009 as the intellectual hub of European Conservativism, New Direction has established academic networks across Europe and research partnerships throughout the world. New Direction is registered in Belgium as a not-for-profit organisation and is partly funded by the European Parliament. REGISTERED OFFICE: Rue du Trône, 4, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Naweed Khan. The European Parliament and New Direction assume no responsibility for the opinions expressed in this publication. Sole liability rests with the author. Iran Nuclear Deal: The JCPOA on Geopolitical Chessboards ABSTRACT hat comes next for the Joint remain today, others had been lifted with the JCPOA. Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), The post-withdrawal US sanctions that had been re- Wwill have very real consequences for the instated had also been expanded. Russia and China, global geopolitical status quo. meanwhile, have been opportunistic in their energy, infrastructure, and military hardware dealings with Part 1 covers the circularity within Iran’s autocratic Iran. As many EU firms withdrew business with Iran, governance system, and the key drivers of Iran’s the EU has made strides to give the JCPOA a lifeline foreign policy. Iran sees itself as a pillar of Shia Islam through the INSTEX Special Purpose Vehicle, as well in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, as beginning the tactfully delayable countdown in the the sentiment of pride and historical connection Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM) of the JCPOA. to the region from the Persian Empire, as well as being a revolutionary government which was able Part 4, explores the input from parties outside of the to overcome US puppeteering and manipulation. In JCPOA signatories, namely Oman and Switzerland this, Iran’s nuclear programme, the developing range as reliable interlocutors. However, in the current of ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as mobilising situation, a US-led Warsaw Process may provide the a network of ‘proxy’ paramilitary organisations additional help needed to bridge the missing gaps, as and militia in the MENA region, together with elaborated in the thematic Working Groups. disinformation tricks and clandestine operations are tactics for deterrence, to gain leverage in negotiation, Part 5 covers the ‘two-level game theory’ as a and project asymmetric influence. theoretical lens which can help conceptualise which ways forward make sense. A ‘chief negotiator’ Part 2, then, illustrates the historical background and negotiates with another, as inter-state negotiations on lead up to today’s conundrum. The CIA-orchestrated Level I, whilst simultaneously dealing with domestic 1953 coup set in motion dynamics that contributed to opposition on Level II. Both impact one another. the 1979 Islamic Revolution, after which, the Iranian government had become hostile to the US. As Iran’s Part 6, finally, explores and compares the next nuclear programme’s aggressiveness caused worry, possible scenarios for the JCPOA with regard to the UN Security Council’s sanctions from 2006 made how they might get there, and what such a scenario the international approach coherent. Following might look like. Firstly, the complete abandonment Omani-initiated and Swiss-facilitated backchannel of the JCPOA without anything in its stead may lead talks, negotiations surfaced from 2013, developing into to uncoordinated responses to hostilities. Secondly, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), and finally culminating a reparation could include in small ways tying the in the JCPOA in 2015, signed by the P5+1 and Iran. controversial proxies to the JCPOA. Thirdly, replacing However, Iran continued test firing ballistic missiles. the JCPOA with a new agreement has a long way After a change in Administration, the US withdrew to go, whether cosmetically or comprehensively. from the JCPOA in 2018, reinstating sanctions. Fourthly, finally, by concocting a mix, with a slightly repaired binding JCPOA and tying it to a non-binding Part 3, following on, elaborates more precisely the accompanying agreement, could bridge the gaps JCPOA’s situation on geopolitical chessboards. Iran’s albeit with many unstable pieces. breaches in the nuclear programme are more distinct and reversible, having increased uranium production There is a window of opportunity. Repercussions go and enrichment speed. Its missile programme is more beyond even the geopolitical status quo. At the end of controversial but definitely not quieter. Some EU and the day, the actions and inactions will convey human US sanctions have been beyond the JCPOA scope and capability and willingness in conflict resolution. 4 New Direction AUTHOR Alexander Wielgos Alexander Wielgos is the Advisor of the Polish quarterly The Warsaw Institute Review who specialises in geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and aspires to excel in conflict resolution. His previous experience includes the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, various Embassies, and extra-curricular research at Lancaster University, UK, from which he holds a Masters in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. March 2020 newdirection.online @europeanreform CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 7 1 IRAN AND DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 13 1.1 NUCLEAR PROGRAMME 15 1.2 MISSILE ARSENAL 16 1.3 PROXY NETWORKS AND CLANDESTINE OPERATIONALITY 17 2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEAD-UP 20 2.1 COUP 1953 21 2.2 REVOLUTION 1979 23 2.3 MORE SANCTIONS 2006 25 2.4 JPA 2013 28 2.5 JCPOA 2015 31 2.6 WITHDRAWAL AND ESCALATION 2018-TODAY 33 3 JCPOA ON GEOPOLITICAL CHESSBOARDS 37 3.1 IRAN’S BREACHES 37 3.2 US SANCTIONS AND WAIVERS 40 3.3 EU SANCTIONS AND REDUCED TRADE WITH IRAN 43 3.4 EU PUT FORWARD THE SPVS 45 3.5 CHINA AND RUSSIA CHOOSE OPPORTUNISM 46 3.6 E3 BEGIN THE DRM COUNTDOWN 47 4 HELP OF FRIENDS 49 4.1 PROTECTIVE POWER EMBASSIES 49 4.2 WARSAW PROCESS 50 5 TWO-LEVEL GAME THEORY 54 6 SCHRODINGER’S JCPOA 58 6.1 SCENARIO 1: ABANDONMENT 58 6.2 SCENARIO 2: REPAIRING 60 6.3 SCENARIO 3: REPLACEMENT 63 6.4 SCENARIO 4: COMBINING 65 CONCLUSION 69 New Direction Alexander Wielgos INTRODUCTION hat comes next for the Joint good enough. Action and inaction will reflect the Comprehensive Plan of Action1 (JCPOA), shift in the balance of power between the JCPOA’s Wor as colloquially referred to as the ‘Iran original signatories, as well as humanity’s ability and Nuclear Deal’, will have very real consequences for the willingness in conflict resolution for the future. global geopolitical status quo. Historical background and developments in the The JCPOA is an agreement originally signed between lead up to the JCPOA’s inception and subsequent Iran, the EU, and the Permanent 5 (P5) Members weakening, give insight to the ongoing conundrum. of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) In addition to the unravelling tensions between and Germany, referred to as the ‘P5+1’, in which the US and Iran, as the core parties to the JCPOA, Iran considerably but temporarily limits its nuclear the key turning points may hint towards potential programme in exchange for sanctions relief. As the steps forward. In 1953, the CIA led a coup2 in Iran potential loss of life is considerably higher amid contributing to effects which paved the way for possible pursuits of a militarised nuclear programme, the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Since the consequent it is difficult to overstate the importance of severance of diplomatic relations, the Swiss Embassy strategically sound but also coherent ways to ensure in Tehran serves as Protecting Powers and back- deterrence. In accompaniment of a ballistic missile channel intermediary points,3 as does the Pakistani programme and avid support of proxy armed groups Embassy in Washington DC. Even after the Iran- in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, the Contra episode and tensions peaking in 1988, there scope of geopolitical interests impacting the relations was a brief tilt in momentum towards de-escalation. between the JCPOA signatories has increased Yet, following the US embargo in 1995, in 2002, since the JCPOA’s inception. At its current state – previously undeclared nuclear facilities were exposed namely: with the withdrawal of the US from the deal; internationally, and Iran was frustrated with in its struggling attempts by the UK, France, and Germany, perspective insufficient recompensating from the referred to as the ‘E3’, to keep the JCPOA salvaged; then-EU3 states in the backdrop of antagonistic as well as opportunistic manoeuvres by China and US stances.4 The first UN sanctions from 2006 Russia – the JCPOA has reached its expiration in terms onwards were implemented after failing to meet of viability. As such, the JCPOA ought to be either IAEA requirements to lower enrichment. International abandoned, repaired, or replaced. In this, input from pressure was real, coherent, and increasing with other states, such as Poland and others in Central real consequence, in which each of the states were Eastern Europe (CEE), may be instrumental in filling dutifully adhering to the sanctions, and the approach in the missing pieces. The input need not be massive, was congruent with international law. it just needs to be clever. Other entities, such as think tanks, have a crucial role in increasing awareness Internal pressure within Iran largely tipped the and stimulating intellectual and technical debate. indecision