3 õt lfof THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES A THESIS PRESENTTD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE IN THE FACULTY OF ARTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSO PHY by BERNARD THOMAS TRAINOR, B.A. (Hon.), M"4., DiP. Ed. November 1979. A^o..ri¡o¡ ¡/i-[ fl¡c,,lr:: '-lS¡ CONTENTS Summary of Thesis. Part One: Introduction. Chapter One. The Laws of Nature. I (l ) Hobbes' dual concept'ion of the laws of nature. I (2) Scope and Method of Analysis 4 Chapter Two: A review and evaluatjon of interpretative standpoints. ll (l Interpretative Standpoints. ll (2 The Traditìonal ist case. l3 (3 The Individual ist case. 26 (q Ïhe Natural Law case. 34 Part Two: 'Isr andtOught l; Rights and Liberty. Chapter Three. Wants, Decisions and 0ught Statements. 44 (l ) Introduction; The is-ought debate. 44 (2) Practical Inferences. 5l (,¡ ) Is - Is sr Is - Ought? 63 (4) Is - Ought or 0ught - 0ught? 65 (5 ) Hare on Hypotheticals. 67 (6) Moral arguments: Deductive or Defective? 82 Chapter Four: 'Is' and 'Ought' in Hobbes' Political Theory. 88 (l ) Introduction. 88 (2) A lifeline. 91 (3) A solution. 93 (4) An objection. 97 Chapter Five: Understanding Rights. 106 (l ) Introduction. 106 (2) Permissive and Reciprocal Rights. 107 (3) The 'Dyadic' Right to Proper Treatment. 112 (4) Natural and Human Rights. 120 Chapter Six: Rights and Liberty in Hobbes. 132 (l ) Introduction: hlarrender's anaìysis. 132 (2) The Right to all things. 135 (3) Facts and Rights: an impropriety. l38 (4) Natural Right and Liberty. 144 (5) Corporal Liberty. 145 (6) Civil Liberty. 148 !Canr l0uEht'; Part Three: and Justice and Godrs Law, Chapter Seven: Hobbes and Justíce. (l ) Introduction. (2) Justice, Covenant - Keeping and Natural Law. Cha pter Eight: Virtue and A'lìegiance. 159 (t ) In troducti on . 159 (2) Vi rtue. 160 (3 ) Al I egi ance. 167 Chapter Nine: Obligation and Faith. 175 (f ) Hobbes' Material ism. 175 (2) 0b'ligation and Faith. 178 chapter Ten: conclusion and Fina] Appraisat; Hobbes today, 184 Appendi x. 194 B!bl'iography. T0 MY l,'ll FE , MAR I E . SUMMARY OF THESIS l^lhi I st i t 'is true that any social or pol iti cal theory worthy of the name and of its subject matter must be complex, at the same time there is often at the heart of such theories a sound and simple idea, though formidably complex in its full ramjfications. In the case of the po'litical philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, this idea is h'is dual conception of the laws of nature. At the end of .his exposition on the laws of nature, Hobbes points out that they are not 'in propriety of speech'laws at all. They are merely rational maxims; whereas law, strict'ly, is the word of him who has a right to command others, formerly ob'liged to obey. However, as they (tfre laws of nature) are delivered'in the Scriptures, which contaíns the word of God, they are properly termed laws. There are then two posslble ways of concefving of the laws of nature; naturalistically, in which case they are nerely rational maxims; and as God's 1aw, jn which case they are authoritative and obligatory because with- in this particular conceptual framework, they are seen as the commands of a SuperÌor Being. Primarily to accord with the distinction made by Hobbes with regard to the ways of regarding Natural Law, the thesis is diyided into two main parts. In the first part my primary concern is to demonstrate that Hobbes'main argument from the 'known, natural inclinatìons of mankind' to where rboth the duty and liberty of subiects'are made manifest, is sound and logically proper. In this section we are concerned only r,lith the laws of nature as maxims of prudence as d'istinct from the authoritative commands of God, In order to properly eyaluate Hobbesrargument, it is important not only to Jook closely at what Hobbes actual'ly says but we must also be familian with contemporary trends Ín modern moral philosophJ, for Hobbes is constantly being criticized from different perspectives within that 1ive1y discjp'line. Simp'le eguÍty regu'ires that we examine such trends thoroughly. Hobbes must be fuìly acguainted with the reasoning of his judges before he can be either condemned by them or acguitted of the major charges. Hence I have outlined my position on the controversal is-ought debate in Chapter Three, paying particular attention to 'hypothetical oughts'or, as Hobbes would call them, maxims of prudence. Having done so, I then proceed to look at the specific argument advanced by Hobbes and conclude that it is perfectly sound as it stands. A simi'lar procedure is followed in the next two chapters" Chapter Fjve presents a novel way of understanding rights and in Chapter Six we turn to see what kind of l'ight the ana'lysis sheds on Hobbesr account of rights. t¡le find, in my view, that Hobbes! account meets the test of intelljgibi'lity out- lined in Chapter Five. However, the further quest'ion of how the right to self- preservation tjes in wíth Hobbes!main argument from therknown, natural, inclinations of mankindr to where 'both the duty and liberty of subjects' are made manifest cannot, in my view, be answered in Hobbes'favour, The second pant of the thesis'is concerned with straightforward Hobbesian exegesis. There we consider the second of the two great tributaries that unite' to form the mainstream of Hobbes' thought. i.e. the laws of nature conceived of as the author'itative commands of God. However, not only wi'll we be concerned with what men ought to do, but also with what they are actually capable of doing, and this leads us to consider Hobbesrdifferential theory of human nature, j.e. his divisjon of mankind'into a iust minority and an unjust majority. It is not until Chapter Nine that we are finally in a pos'ition to grasp the full ramifìcations of Hobbesrdual concept'ion of the laws of nature for his political theory as a who'le. In general , I hope to show that the alleged incompatibi'lity between different interpretations of Hobbesowork has been exaggerated and that Hobbes'work is indeed remarkable for the degree of complementarity ìt exhibits. ACKNOhJLEDGEMENTS I wish to thank the following people for the assistance they have given me during my research:- Professors Graeme Duncan and Hugh Stretton who encouraged me to undertake this work. Dr. Paul Corcoran, who by hís excellent criticÍsm and advice enabled me to bring thfs thesis to completion and John Chandler, Stanley Benn, Paul Nursey-Bray and Pat Flanagan who, at various key poínts in the development of this thesis, provÍded very useful and incisf ve criticisms. PART ONE I NTRODUCT ION CHAPTER ONE THE LAWS OF NATURE (l ) Hobbes' dual conce tion of the Laws of Nature. lrlhilst any social or political theory worthy of the name and of its subject matter must be complex, at the same time there is often at the heart of such theories a sound and simpìe idea, though formidab'ly complex in its full ramifications. In the case of Hobbes, I would say that it is his dual conception of the laws of nature. It is appropriate therefore to beg'in with a brief description of what Hobbes has to say about the latter. Hobbes' understand'ing of the laws of nature is broadly consjstent throughout his varjous works. His account of natural law is always preceded by a description of the conditions prevailing in the state of nature, where, in the absence of any common power, every man is the enemy of every other man, and there is a constant state of war. The term war here denotes not so much actual physical struggle, as a willingness or preparedness for such struggle just as, to use Hobbes'ovvn analogy, 'the nature of Foule weather lyeth not in a shoure or two of rain; but an inclination thereto of many days together'.1 One might be tempted to deduce from this that men are intrinsically evil, naturally d'isposed to injure and oppress one another. Yet Hobbes vigorously denies that this is the case. He points out that the war of all against alì is not to be understood in terms of the innate wickedness of man's nature but is rather the unfortunate consequence of the absence of any reliable means of different'iation between the wicked and the ri gh teous . I . Levi athan In W. Mol esurorth , Ed . f he ¡ngl i sh l^Jorks of (London 1839-1845) Vol. III P. ll3. All subsequent references to Hobbes ' work are to thi s Ed'i ti on . 2 For though the w'i cked were fewer than the righteous, yêt because we cannot distinguish them there 'is a necessity of suspect'ing, heeding, anticipatìng, self-defending, ever-'incident to the most hoñest and fairest conditioned. 2 He denies that those who are wicked are so by nature, insisting that a distinction should be made between the passions and actions proceeding from them. The former in themselves are not wicked or sinful, but the latter may be Íf'they are offensive or aga'inst duty'.3 Man's conditìon in the state of nature'is wretched and full of incommodities, verging at times on the 'intolerable. The chief concern of those who find themselves in such an unenviable position is to discover a means of escape from ít. Hobbes looks to rational fear to provide a solution.