THE DEFENCE OF LONDON 1915—1918 HMod. THE DEFENCE of LONDON 1915-1918 BY A. RAWLINSON, CMC, C.B.E., D.S.O. COMMANDER R.N.V.R. AND LT.-COL. R.G.A. " AUTHOR OF "ADVENTURES IN THE NEAR EAST, IQl8-ig22 WITH INTRODUCTION BY ADMIRAL SIR PERCY SCOTT, BART., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., LL.D. SECOND EDITION First edition published October, 1923 Second edition {revised), November, 1923 PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN INTRODUCTION By ADMIRAL SIR PERCY SCOTT, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., LL.D. Colonel Rawlinson has written this book on our defence of London against attacks from the air by Germany. He has to admit that we had no defence. He explains that a defence was, although late, gradually worked up, and that after 524 people had been killed, 1,264 injured (non-combatant men, women, and children), and ^2,042, 000 worth of property destroyed, we had taken reasonable precautions and the Germans did not enjoy visiting us any more. He explains how blind men were used to locate airships or 'planes; it sounds strange, but it is true. Colonel Rawlinson in the last chapter of his work points out— 1. The present state of inefficiency of our air defence. 2. He states that our Navy is no longer our first line of defence, which, of course, is quite correct. 3. As in the Navy a two-power standard is con- sidered necessary for our defence, obviously the same standard should now be adopted for the Air. This principle has not been adopted, and, until it is, we shall remain in a dangerous position, into which our Government should never have allowed us to fall. vi DEFENCE OF LONDON, 1915—1918 So much for the material. Colonel Rawlinson then deals with the fallacy of divided control, and the absurdity of not establishing unity of control over all the forces of the Crown. Thrilling as the story is, and disturbing to the peace of mind of the Londoner, it contains no exaggeration, but is, in fact, rather a restrained narrative of sober fact. As Colonel Rawlinson's Chief, I am acquainted with all the details of the raids during the period when he was my Executive Officer read the I ; and, having book, am prepared to guarantee it as absolute history, and, in the matter of the defence policy which he outlines so eloquently, I unreservedly endorse the policy he advocates. It must be obvious to everyone that unity of control is the only solution by which it is possible to ensure the future safety of the nation. PERCY SCOTT. 1923. PREFACE The particulars of the various air raids made by the Germans on England and especially upon London during the Great War were, very naturally at that time, kept profoundly secret by the authorities. For this there were two excellent reasons. First, it was of the greatest importance to keep the enemy in ignorance of any damage he might have suc- in the raids it was ceeded effecting by ; and, second, equally desirable to encourage by every possible means the admirably courageous spirit in which those dastardly attacks were from the first endured by the population of this country. During the first year of the war no efficient defence against the German air raids existed. Heroic efforts were, however, subsequently made to create an adequate defence organization under conditions of the greatest difficulty, and at a time when all our resources were strained to the utmost by the demands of our armies in the field. The later raids were carried out entirely by aero- " " plane squadrons consisting of bombing planes, specially constructed for the purpose, under the charge of pilots and navigators carefully trained for that particular duty. These machines invariably operated in concert with each other, working in "formations," each under its own leader. The vii viii DEFENCE OF LONDON, 1915—1918 various aeroplane squadrons left their starting- points in Belgium at regular intervals, and their attacks were in consequence delivered in succession. By this means, not only had they each a better chance of identifying and reaching their objectives, but at the same time the problem of effective defence was rendered very much more difficult for us owing to the continuous nature of their attack. Prior to these more elaborate operations, how- ever, many raids were carried out which were of necessity very much in the nature of experiments, the possibilities of such long-distance attacks, delivered through the air, being questions with respect to which no precedents then existed. Each step therefore called for proof, both of its practic- ability and also of the value of any results which it might be possible to achieve by such means, before any considerable force was specially reserved or trained by the enemy for such an obviously hazardous purpose, the advantages of which were at that time more than doubtful. " Under these circumstances, what was sauce for " the goose" was mercifully also sauce for the gander." For whilst our enemies were acquiring the experience necessary for the effective organiza- tion of their attacks, we on our side were afforded a lamentably brief and entirely undeserved oppor- tunity of retrieving our position from the state of abject impotence in which our country found itself, owing to the culpable lack of prevision and initia- tive which had been displayed by our rulers. It is only fair to state that when once the country became PREFACE ix alive to its imminent danger and an overwhelming pressure of exasperated public opinion was brought to bear on the Government, every advantage was taken of this short respite to improvise a scheme of defence—no even elementary preparations for any organized air defence having been made before the war. The danger to which the Metropolis was exposed was imminent, and the importance of preventing any disorganization of the great Government departments was vital. The control of all these departments was centralized in London, and one and all were striving their utmost to equip, main- tain, and increase our forces in the field. This position produced a most merciful change in the attitude previously adopted towards the defences of London on the part of the nation in general and of the Government in particular. In fact, the stress of war brought about a feverish activity and a most commendable, if somewhat tardy, desire for efficiency in defence such as could have been pro- duced by no other means. The shackles of red tape, by which our officials are traditionally incapacitated, were for once dis- carded. Orders were given, expenses incurred, and responsibility accepted, in the urgency of the moment, which would have caused universal heart failure amongst our pre-war officials, only slightly more extensive, perhaps, than a similar state of affairs would probably produce amongst their post- war successors to-day. It is of this period of stress, of the many shifts x DEFENCE OF LONDON, 1915— 1918 and improvisations to which we were driven, of the lessons so quickly learned, and of the effective defence which was ultimately "put up," that I shall endeavour to give my readers some idea. I have every confidence that such matters will be found of interest and that Englishmen will experience a certain satisfaction in the knowledge that if our enemies quickly learned how to attack us, we on our side were in no way behind them in intelligence and initiative. This was conclusively proved by the fact that the organization of our defence was able to keep pace with the development " of the attack, in spite of the state of absolute un- " preparedness in which the war found us, and which is so chronically and so lamentably charac- teristic of the attitude of our Governments towards " the vital menace of attacks by air." If, therefore, by emphasizing the lessons of the past, this account of the early difficulties of our air defence can in any way strengthen the hands of those who, appreciating to the full the even more tragic vulnerability of our position to-day, are now so ceaselessly and loyally striving for the adequate increase of our air forces, it will have well served the main purpose for which it is written. A. RAWLINSON. London, July 13th, 1923. CONTENTS PART I THE DEFENCE AGAINST ZEPPELINS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE LONDON ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCES, 191 5 : THEIR FIRST ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT 3 II. THE FORMATION OF THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE FORCE, R.N.V.R.—THE FIRST FRENCH GUN IN ACTION IN LONDON - 20 III. IMPROVEMENTS IN ARMAMENT : HIGH EX- PLOSIVES AND TIME-FUSES - - 33 IV. THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT MOBILE BRIGADE, R.N.V.R. : THEIR ARMAMENT AND TRAINING - - - 44 V. THE ARMY TAKES OVER CHARGE OF THE LONDON DEFENCES : EARLY RAIDS BY ZEPPELINS - - - 57 VI. THE SUMMER RAIDS, I916 : HEADQUARTERS OF ROYAL NAVAL MOBILE BRIGADE AT KENWOOD BARRACKS, HAMPSTEAD— DETACHMENTS ON THE EAST COAST - 74 VII. THE MOBILE BRIGADE ON THE COAST : THE RAID OF SEPTEMBER 2ND-3RD, I916 - 90 VIII. MORE RAIDS ON THE COAST : THE IM- PROVEMENT OF THE ATTACK AND NEW DEVICES FOR DEFENCE - - 105 xi xii DEFENCE OF LONDON, 1915— 1918 CHAPTER PAGE IX. WINTER ON THE COAST : THE DEFENCE DEVELOPS—FALL OF A ZEPPELIN INTO THE NORTH SEA - - - 121 X. THE MOBILE BRIGADE AT THE MOUTH OF THE THAMES, I917 : FOULNESS ISLAND 1 36 PART II THE DEFENCE AGAINST AEROPLANES I. THE FIXED MILITARY DEFENCES : THEIR ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT - 1 55 II. THE WEST SUB-COMMAND : TRAINING DIFFICULTIES - - - - 1 67 III. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF DEFENCE AGAINST AEROPLANES : PROCEDURE DURING A RAID - - - - - l80 IV.