Peacebuilding, Political Order, and Post-War Risks By George Frederick Willcoxon A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee-in-Charge: Professor Steven Weber, Chair Professor Ron E. Hassner Professor Leonardo R. Arriola Professor Michael J. Watts Summer 2015 © by George Frederick Willcoxon 2015 All Rights Reserved Abstract Peacebuilding, Political Order, and Post-War Risks by George Frederick Willcoxon Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Steven Weber, Chair Since 1945, violent conflict has occurred primarily within sovereign states rather than among them. These internal conflicts have far surpassed international conflicts in lethality, economic destruction, and social upheaval. This phenomenon is diverse: no region has avoided civil wars, while the stated aims of rebel groups have ranged widely. Prominent examples include anti-colonial nationalists in Algeria, Mozambique, and Kenya; ethnic separatists in Eritrea and Bosnia; leftists in Latin America and Southeastern Asia; Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria; and income seeking warlords in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Internal conflicts have emerged in rich European countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain, and in the context of state collapse and extreme poverty in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia. Some civil wars have lasted only weeks, while the longest-- in Sudan-- lasted over 40 years. Intense violent conflicts often leave core state institutions debilitated, fragmented, or, in some cases, totally destroyed. For these societies, the central tasks for ending conflict and beginning post-war recovery involve reinvigorating -1- or reestablishing legitimate state authority. These post-war states must both win the acquiescence of the governed and develop the infrastructural power to implement state policy. The risks of conflict relapse are significant: since 1970, 44 of 111 post-war cases (40 percent) relapse into a full-fledged civil war, while 68 of 111 (61 percent) experience at least a low- level conflict. The time for policymakers to mitigate this risk is short: of post-war countries that fall back into civil war, the median time to relapse is just 35.5 months. The immediate post-war environment is therefore particularly critical for determining the political, economic, and social trajectories of conflict-affected countries. The right combination of policies can help determine whether a country recovers quickly and secures any available peace dividend, or whether it relapses and slides into a conflict trap. This dissertation explains how societies that have managed to end their civil wars are able or unable to rebuild political order in the their post-war period. This dissertation focuses on one key policy arena-- perhaps the most critical policy arena-- for post-war societies to address: the security sector. It may sound simplistic or even tautological to claim that the organization, disposition, control, and reform of armed groups are the most important task for a post-war society to undertake. It may seem obvious to stress the importance of the size, competencies, oversight, social embeddedness, and other qualities of the military, the police, the intelligence services, and any remaining armed non- state actors. But such qualities resist easy quantification, and most scholars and practitioners over the past decade have focused on economic performance, political democratization, communal reconciliation, post-conflict justice, and other “soft- power” variables to explain patterns of post-war successes and failures. The following chapters attempt to shift the -2- conversation back to the formation and reformation of security sector actors in war-affected countries. -3- Dedication This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Nicole, my son Theodore, my parents Michael and Anne, and my sister Katharine. -i- Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................. VI CIVIL WARS AND MODERN STATES ................................... 1 PEACEBUILDING SINCE 1970: A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS .. 6 THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF PEACEBUILDING ............................ 10 International Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Approaches .... 10 Democratic Approaches to Peacebuilding ..................... 14 Power Sharing Approaches ................................... 16 Security-Related Approaches to Peacebuilding ............... 18 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration ................................ 19 Security Sector Reform ........................................................ 20 Military Power Sharing ........................................................ 22 Economic Recovery, Liberalization, and Privatization ....... 23 Reconciliation and Post-Conflict Justice ................... 25 Rule of Law ................................................ 26 Public Order .................................................................. 26 Police, Judicial, and Penal Reforms ........................................... 27 Transparency, Bureaucracy, and Anti-Corruption ................................ 27 Patronage-Based, Illiberal, and Authoritarian Approaches to Peacebuilding .............................................. 28 Patronage and Civil War Recovery .............................................. 28 Illiberal Peacebuilding ....................................................... 30 Coercive Approaches to Establishing Order after Civil War Ends ................ 31 Other Approaches ........................................... 32 QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS .................................. 34 DATA ......................................................... 44 POLICY COMBINATIONS ............................................. 48 Peacekeeping Forces and Early Elections .................... 50 Local Politics and Patronage Strategy ...................... 53 Domination Strategy ........................................ 55 Durable Stalemates and Suppressing Political Opposition .... 56 Other Findings ............................................. 60 CONCLUSION .................................................... 61 -ii- POST-WAR RISKS ................................................ 64 ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ............................................. 68 REGIME FEATURES AND INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURES ...................... 69 POLITICAL TERROR ............................................... 70 MILITARY INFLUENCES ............................................. 71 POWER SHARING AND DECENTRALIZATION ................................. 72 ELECTIONS ..................................................... 73 OTHER FINDINGS ................................................. 73 CONCLUSION .................................................... 74 POST-WAR LIBYA: STALEMATES AND PEACEBUILDING AS SOURCES OF POLITICAL ORDER AND DISORDER .................................. 75 PEACE AS STRATEGIC STALEMATE ..................................... 82 POWER AND PATRIMONIALISM IN QADDAFI’S LIBYA ......................... 87 Security Sector Fragmentation and Politicization ........... 88 Force Structure and Arms Acquisitions ...................... 90 The Security and Justice Sectors as an Instrument of Oppression ................................................. 92 Abu Salim Prison Massacre ..................................................... 93 Late Attempts at Legal Reforms ................................................ 94 Impact on Post-War Libya ................................... 94 THE CIVIL WAR ................................................. 96 Regime Fragmentation ....................................... 96 From Popular Uprising to Rebel Movement ................... 100 Enter NATO and the Libya Contact Group .................... 103 Battlefield Stalemate and Post-War Planning ............... 106 NATO Tips the Balance Toward the Rebels ................... 108 Rebels Contest Control of Tripoli ......................... 110 Qaddafi Killed and the NTC Enters Tripoli ................. 112 POLICY CONFIGURATIONS IN POST-WAR LIBYA ........................... 114 Political and Institutional Origins of the Stalemate ...... 116 Local Elections and Local Political Monopolies ............................... 120 Legislative Momentum and Executive Paralysis ................................. 120 -iii- Military Origins of the Stalemate ......................... 122 Local Military and Civilian Councils ......................................... 123 The Supreme Security Committees and The Libya Shield Forces .................. 125 Contracting with New Militias ................................................ 127 Holding the Transition Hostage ............................................... 128 The Federalist Gambit ..................................... 129 Khalifa Hifter and Operation Dignity ...................... 131 2014 Parliamentary Elections .............................. 134 Libya Dawn ................................................ 134 New Stalemates ............................................ 135 DISCUSSION ................................................... 137 The Political Independence of Factions .................... 140 A Weak Formal Security Sector ............................. 144 Secure Government Revenues ................................ 147 Legal Impunity and No Post-Conflict Justice ............... 150 Pillars of Stalemates are the Flashpoints