George Washington University The Shakespeare Association of America, Inc. Slaves and Subjects in Othello Author(s): Camille Wells Slights Source: Shakespeare Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Winter, 1997), pp. 377-390 Published by: Folger Shakespeare Library in association with George Washington University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2871250 Accessed: 03-11-2015 15:28 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. George Washington University, The Shakespeare Association of America, Inc., Johns Hopkins University Press and Folger Shakespeare Library are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Shakespeare Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 130.225.27.190 on Tue, 03 Nov 2015 15:28:27 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Slaves and Subjects in Othello CAMILLE WELLS SLIGHTS ... Shall I say to you, "Let thembe free. "? You will answer, "The slavesare ours."' IN THE LATE-SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES, England became increasinglyinvolved in the slave trade.During the same period,as numer- ous scholarshave argued,a new formof personal identitydeveloped. I want to suggestthat the representationof these phenomena on the earlymodern English stage shows that theyare interconnected.By attendingto these in- terconnections,we can learn a good deal not only about earlymodern sub- jectivitybut also about our own understandingsof libertyand coercion. Using Othelloas an example, I willargue thatemerging understandings of selfhood help to explain ideas and attitudesabout slaveryand that theyin turnillu- minate emergingunderstandings of self. THE DISENGAGED SELF In Sourcesof theSelf: The Making of theModern Identity Charles Taylorargues that the formof consciousnessemergent in earlymodern Europe, what he calls the "disengaged self," was bound up with an ideal of freedom and independence and with a vision of instrumentalcontrol of an objectified world and an objectifiedself. In the traditionalview derived from Plato, Taylorexplains, "reason can be understoodas the perceptionof the natural or rightorder, and to be ruled by reason is to be ruled by a vision of this order"; "gaining masteryof oneself,shifting the hegemonyfrom the senses to reason, was a matterof changing the directionof our soul's vision." In contrast,the disengagedsubject no longerlocates the selfas an inherentpart of a meaningfullyordered cosmos. This subject does not find order in the neutralizeduniverse but constructsit internally:"The new model of rational mastery... presentsit as a masterof instrumentalcontrol.... The hegemony of reason is definedno longeras thatof a dominantvision but ratherin terms This essay originatedwith work done for a seminar titled "Slaves and Slaveryin English Renaissance Drama," chaired byJudithWeil at the annual meetingof the ShakespeareAssocia- tion of Americain Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 1994. I am gratefulto Geraldo U. de Sousa, Michael Keefer,Roslyn L. Knutson,JosephA. Porter,Carolyn Prager,Julie R. Solomon,Alden T. Vaughan, VirginiaMason Vaughan, and JudithWeil for theirgenerous and stimulatingsharing of ideas and information. 1 The Merchantof Venice,4.1.93-94, 97-98. Shakespeare quotations followthe RiversideShake- speare,ed. G. BlakemoreEvans et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1974). This content downloaded from 130.225.27.190 on Tue, 03 Nov 2015 15:28:27 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 378 SHAKESPEARE QUARTERLY of a directingagency subordinatinga functionaldomain."2 In this ethic, rational control means the power to objectifythe body and the passions; a sense of self-worthdepends on the subject's statusas a rationalbeing. The disengaged self fostereda sense of responsibilityand developed a concept of moral and politicallaw which establishedpersonal freedomand rights.This selfalso fostereda feltneed to controlthe experience of the self and the worldexternal to the self.3The new individualismof the seventeenth century,Taylor argues, replaced an older political concept, in which social communitieswere takenas givens,with a new concept of politicalatomism, in whichthe basic social unitis the individual,whose membershipin community must be created. From thisconcept developed what C. B. Macpherson calls possessiveindividualism, "a conception of the mostbasic immunitieswe en- joy-life, liberty-on the model of the ownershipof property."4Indeed, as Seyla Benhabib has pointed out, the rightof propertyand a man's authority overhis household ofwife, children, and servantscame to be included among those basic rights.5The autonomous self "generatesand ... reflectsan ideal of independence and self-responsibility."Being "on his own," he mustfind paradigmsof orderwithin himself.6 Individual autonomy, then, was bound up withan ideal of freedomand withindividual isolation. The idea of the au- tonomous self,Benhabib suggests,was most clearlyformulated by Thomas Hobbes: "Let us ... considermen as ifbut even now sprungout of the earth, and suddenly,like mushrooms,come to full maturity,without all kind of engagementto each other."7 In earlyseventeenth-century England, the concept of unique, autonomous selves-of men as mushrooms-supported the developingvalues of privacy and individualliberty; it also created fear of social fragmentationand indi- vidual isolation.For example,John Donne's anxietyabout the "new philoso- phy" takes the formof dismayat a world thathas lost "all Relation": Prince,Subject, Father, Sonne, are thingsforgot, For everyman alone thinkeshe hathgot To be a Phoenix,and thatthere can bee None of thatkinde, of which he is,but hee.8 Donne's theorizingof social structuregrounds hierarchyin the necessityof social relations. His personal letterstestify to his own terrorof isolation. Writingto a friendabout his failureto finda place in the courthierarchy, he insiststhat failure to "contributesomething to the sustentationof thewhole" is social death: "to be no part of any body, is to be nothing."9 There is 2 Charles Taylor,Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989), 121, 143, and 149. 3 See Taylor,143-76. 4 Macpherson,quoted here fromTaylor, 196. 5 See Seyla Benhabib, Situatingthe Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernismin Contemporary Ethics(New York: Routledge, 1992), 155. 6 Taylor,167 and 193. 7 Thomas Hobbes, TheEnglish Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. W. Molesworth,11 vols. (London:John Bohn, 1839-45), 2:109. 8JohnDonne, "The FirstAnniversarie: An Anatomyof theWorld" in TheComplete Poetry ofJohn Donne,ed. John T. Shawcross(New York: New York UP, 1968), 270-86, esp. 278 (11.214-17). 9JohnDonne, Lettersto Severall Persons of Honour (1651), intro.M. Thomas Hester (New York: Scholars' Facsimilesand Reprints,1977), 51. This content downloaded from 130.225.27.190 on Tue, 03 Nov 2015 15:28:27 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions SLAVES AND SUBJECTS IN OTHELLO 379 another expression of recoil from self-creating individualism in Milton's por- trait of originary evil in a figure who denies divine creation and fantasizes limitless autonomy, claiming to be "self-begot, self-rais'd."'" Othello,too, explores the autonomous, atomistic identityemerging in early modern Europe. Roderigo's description of "an extravagant and wheeling stranger / Of here and every where" (1.1.136-37) is a hostile version of Othello's self-description of his "unhoused free condition" (1.2.26). Valuing personal freedom more than family lineage and inherited loyalties, Othello assumes that his position in society derives from conscious choice and service to the state. Unlike such protagonists as Hamlet, Lear, or Macbeth, who are tightly embedded in networks of kinship and feudal allegiance, Othello's sense of personal and social identityis based on individual achievement and merit. He owes his position in Venetian society to personal ability and the chances of war. Though he proudly claims descent from "men of royal siege" (1. 22), he sees no disjunction between his origins and his current position; his sense of social identity derives from "My services which I have done the signiory" (1. 18). Venice, famous in Renaissance Europe not only as a cosmopolitan trading center but as a flourishing independent republic, is the appropriate home for a militaryhero participating in a civic community characterized by values of justice, public service, and individual merit.11For example, Lewes Lewkenor, on whose translation of Gasparo Contarini's De Magistratibuset Republica Venet- orum Shakespeare drew for some details of his representation of Venice, has only praise for things Venetian: their iustice is pure and vncorrupted:their penall Lawes most vnpardonably executed: theirencouragements to vertueinfinite: especially by their distribution of offices& dignities,which is ordered ... [so that] it vtterlyouerreacheth the subtiltieof all ambitiouspractises, neuer fallingvpon anybut vpon such as are by the whole assemblyallowed formen of greatestwisedome, vertue and integritie of life... 12 Contarini attributes the Venetian Republic's freedom and stabilityto its tra- dition of devotion to the common