Controversial Concordats Controversial Concordats The Vatican’s Relations with Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler edited by frank j. coppa w The Catholic University of America Press Washington, D.C. Copyright © 1999 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984. ∞ Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Controversial concordats : the Vatican’s relations with Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler / edited by Frank J. Coppa. p. cm. Expanded versions of papers presented at the Twenty-seventh Annual Meeting of the Duquesne University Forum, held in Oct. 1993, in Pittsburgh. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Concordats—History—Congresses. 2. Catholic Church. Treaties, etc. France, 1801 July 15—Congresses. 3. Catholic Church. Treaties, etc. Italy, 1929 Feb. 11—Congresses 4. Catholic Church. Treaties, etc. Germany, 1933 July 20—Congresses. 5. Catholic Church—Foreign relations—France—History—19th century—Congresses. 6. Catholic Church and fascism— congresses. i. Coppa, Frank J. ii. Catholic Church. Treaties, etc. France, 1801 July 15. iii. Catholic Church. Treaties, etc. Italy, 1929 Feb. 11 iv. Catholic Church. Treaties, etc. Germany, 1933 July 20. v. Duquesne History Forum (27th : 1993 : Pittsburgh, Pa.) bx1791.C65 1998 261.8'7—dc21 98-23276 isbn 0-8132-0920-x (alk. paper).—isbn 0-8132-0908-0 (cl : alk. paper) Contents w Preface vii Introduction 1 john k. zeender Napoleon, the Concordat of 1801, and Its Consequences 34 william roberts Mussolini and the Concordat of 1929 81 frank j. coppa The Reich Concordat of 1933 The Church Struggle Against Nazi Germany 120 joseph a. biesinger Three Controversial Concordats A Commentary 182 stewart a. stehlin Appendix 191 Texts of the Concordats Bibliography 215 Index 245 Preface w The origin of this short volume was a panel the authors presented for the twenty-seventh annual meeting of the Duquesne University Forum in Pittsburgh, in October 1993. Entitled “Controversial Concordats: The Vatican and the Dictators,” the panel attracted one of the largest audiences of the conference, and the papers were very well received. Indeed, the audience continued to pose questions and make comments long after the close of the session, until we had to evacuate the hall for the next scheduled presentation. The feedback we received afterward, and the numerous requests for papers that followed, encouraged us to present our papers in book form. The three essays and the commentary included in the present vol- ume represent expanded versions of the original papers, which we sub- sequently modified for presentation before such forums as the Ameri- can Catholic Historical Association and St. John’s University Vatican Symposium. As revised they examine the factors that led to the concor- dats, the agreements themselves, and finally the long-range conse- quences. In all, five individuals have contributed to this collaborative project: John K. Zeender, Professor Emeritus of The Catholic Univer- sity of America, provides an Introduction that places the three concor- dats in historical perspective; William Roberts of Fairleigh Dickinson University writes on Napoleon and the Concordat of 1801; Frank J. Coppa of St. John’s University focuses on Mussolini and the Concordat of 1929, while Joseph Biesinger of Eastern Kentucky University, dis- cusses Hitler and the Concordat of 1933. A Commentary and Conclu- sion by Stewart Stehlin of New York University rounds out the presen- tation. We have included a bibliography, divided into three sections, vii viii preface which examines the origins, negotiation, and impact of each concordat. At the suggestion of the editor of The Catholic University of America Press we have added English translations of the three agreements, which are not collected in any other single volume. Frank J. Coppa Introduction john k. zeender, The Catholic University of America w The enormous power of the state over the church [after the Protes- tant Reformation] of the sixteenth century was suddenly there in reality. It is the greatest step toward omnipotence which the state has taken in past times. Then there followed on the Catholic side Louis XIV. The subsequent completion of state omnipotence through the theories of the Revolution could not have taken place so easily without this preceding Caesaro-papalism.1 —Jacob Burckhardt, 1860 Your Majesty lays claim to be Emperor of Rome. To this we answer with Papal frankness that the Supreme Head of the Church can boast, as no other ruler for centuries has been able to do, that he has never now or in the past recognized in his States the existence of another power than his own, and that no Emperor possesses the smallest jurisdiction over Rome.2 —Pope Pius VII to Napoleon, March 1806 1. Jacob Burckhardt, Judgments on History and Historians, trans. Harry Zahn. (Boston, 1952), 111. 2. F.M. Kircheisen, Napoleon, trans. Henry St. Lawrence (New York, 1932), 416– 417. 1 2 john k. zeender The conclusion of such a work of peace with a self-conscious and difficult treaty partner like the Fascist State was a model of such importance its psychological effect on other states was not to be un- der-estimated.3 —Ludwig Kaas, 1932 he three studies that constitute the core of this volume deal T with the concordats that the papacy concluded with Napoleon, Mussolini, and Hitler. Each of these pacts was the subject of criticism, sometimes quite severe, from persons or groups on the side of the church or the state. The agreements even caused distress to many Cath- olics, and the pact between the Vatican and the Nazi government has been for years the cause of a bitter controversy between the critics and the defenders of Pope Pius XII. The Vatican had hoped to ne gotiate a similar agreement with Joseph Stalin’s Soviet regime, but those talks 4 collapsed by 1928. The papacy’s fear of Communism and the Soviet Union explains in part why it did not boldly confront the Hitler regime after it began to consistently violate its concordat obligations. The concordat has been a favorite instrument in papal diplomacy since its inception in the early twelfth century. Prior to that time most monarchs had harnessed the Church to their service when they under- took the difficult task of establishing order in their domains. Even de- vout rulers like the German Holy Roman Emperor Henry III (d. 1056) and William the Conqueror of England (d. 1082) thought of them- selves as the heads of the Church in their lands. But to Pope Gregory VII, the noted leader of the eleventh-century ecclesiastical reform movement, the appointment of bishops and even lesser church officials by rulers, pious or not, bordered on sacrilege. That pontiff and his im- mediate successors engaged in a bitter and prolonged conflict with the Holy Roman Emperors Henry IV (d. 1106) and his son Henry V (d. 3. Professor Ludwig Kaas, “Der Konkordatstyp der faschischten Italien,” in the Zeitschrift fur auslandische offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht (Berlin, 1933), 494. 4. Hans-Jacob Stehle, Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917–1979, trans. Sandra Smith (Athens, Ohio, 1981). Introduction 3 1125), and Pope Paschal II (d. 1118) waged a similar struggle with King 5 Henry I of England (d. 1135) over the same issue. These investiture conflicts proved costly to both sides and finally ended in compromise agreements, the Concordat of London or West- minster of 1107 and the German Concordat of Worms in 1122. They stipulated that only the Pope could invest the episcopal nominee with the symbols of his spiritual office but only the ruler could bestow those of the bishop’s temporal power.6 A later Holy Roman Emperor and subsequent Popes would find, however, that they could not agree on just what powers the emperor might legitimately exercise in Italy. Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (1194–1250), a brilliant monarch, thought it not worthwhile to try to build a strong centralized government in a Germany that was still pop- ulated by a people with firm tribal loyalties. He preferred to focus his ambitions and energies on making Italy the seat of his imperial rule. But Frederick II ran into opposition from the papacy, an urban league, and the French monarchy. Following Frederick II’s demise in 1250, the French army seized his heirs and put them to death. After Frederick II’s death, first Italy and then, more slowly, Ger- many became power vacuums. The papacy tended to fall into the hands of the old Italian nobility and occasionally into those of the newer urban elite. Some of the later medieval and Renaissance Popes were 5. Most textbooks in medieval history treat in some detail the conflict between the Popes and the emperors in this period and then in the thirteenth century. On the less widely treated subject of differences between the heads of the Church and the Eng- lish monarchs, see: David L. Douglas, William the Conqueror, the Norman Impact on England (Berkeley, 1964), 343–344, and William L. Warren, Henry II (Berkeley, 1973), 403–407. 6. The Concordat of Worms did not become the norm with respect to the agreed- upon mode of appointing bishops in the High Middle Ages because it permitted the emperor to preside when a cathedral chapter in Germany held an episcopal election. He could thus decide who the successful candidate would be. Calixtus II apparently made this concession to Henry V so that episcopal elections could be carried out in Italy in accordance with canonical norms. However, the Worms concordat became void in the later thirteenth century after the emperors lost all real power, not only in Italy but in Germany itself.