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Ann Arbor, MI 48106 SCIENTISTS AND STATESMEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER’S SCIENCE ADVISERS AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, 1953-1961 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Richard V. Damms, B.A. Hons, M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 1993 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Michael J. Hogan William R. Childs Peter L. Hahn Department of History Copyright by Richard Vernon Damms 1993 To Jennifer i i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank several people who made significant contributions to this dissertation. Jim Leyerzapf and Kathy Struss of the Eisenhower Presidential Library, Marjorie Ciarlante at the Civil Reference Branch of the National Archives, and Helen Samuels at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology greatly facilitated my research. Linda Glasser of Lakeland Community College library efficiently processed numerous interlibrary loan requests. A grant from the National Science Foundation, DIR-8911702, provided research assistance. My greatest intellectual debt is to my adviser, Professor Michael J. Hogan, who supplied constructive criticism and moral support at all stages of this dissertation. Thanks also to Drs. William R. Childs and K. Austin Kerr, in whose seminars this project began to take shape, and to Peter L. Hahn, all of whom provided helpful suggestions and comments. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Jennifer, for her love, patience, and support throughout what sometimes seemed to be an interminable process. VITA September, 1962 .............. Born - Rotherham, England 1984 ....................... B.A. Hons., University of Durham, England 1986 ....................... M.A. , The Ohio State University 1985-1990 ................... Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University 1990-1991 ................... Visiting Instructor in History, University of Akron 1991-present .............. Instructor In History, Lakeland Community College Mentor, Ohio FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................iii VITA................................................... iv INTRODUCTION.......................................... 1 CHAPTER I: FROM THE OLD CONSENSUS TO THE NEW: THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION AND WAR ON GOVERNMENT-SCIENCE RELATIONS................. 12 CHAPTER II: THE POSTWAR STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT-SCIENCE RELATIONS.................... 66 CHAPTER III: SCIENCE, SECRECY, AND SECURITY: THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE ADVICE IN THE EARLY EISENHOWER YEARS.................... 165 CHAPTER IV: THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES PANEL AND THE EMERGENCE OF EISENHOWER’S SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL ELITE................... 227 CHAPTER V: THE SPUTNIK CRISIS AND THE FORMALIZATION OF SCIENCE ADVICE AT THE WHITE HOUSE ......................................274 CHAPTER VI: SCIENTISTS AND POLICY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLE OF SCIENCE ADVISERS IN THE LATER EISENHOWER YEARS.................... 310 CONCLUSION ............................................ 355 BIBLIOGRAPHY...........................................363 v INTRODUCTION On the evening of January 17, 1961, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a televised speech to the nation, delivered one of the best known farewell addresses of any American president. Displaying his customary awkwardness before the television camera, the president issued two warnings to the American people. First, noting that the threat of instant nuclear war had required the nation to build "an immense military establishment" and a "permanent arms industry of vast proportions," he warned against "the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex." Later, in a somewhat less well-known phrase, Eisenhower warned that public policy might become "the captive of a scientific-technological elite.As the president surely realized, his speech contained a powerful note of irony. Eisenhower did more than any previous peacetime president to foster the growth of the military-industrial complex and the scientific- technological elite against which he railed. As Eisenhower noted in his Farewell Address, the "technological revolution" of the 1950s seemed to give a sense of inevitability to these developments. During his two terms in office, military technology underwent rapid advances. The piston-engined heavy bomber employed as recently as the Korean War gave way to a new generation of jet-propelled aircraft with greater payload, longer range, and superior performance. The American stockpile of fission weapons steadily grew in number and diversity, and by the middle of the decade thermonuclear weapons a thousand times more powerful than the bombs exploded at Hiroshima and Nagasaki supplemented them. Primitive reconnaissance techniques utilizing limited overflights and high-flying balloons gave way to the more sophisticated jet-powered U-2 spyplane employing advanced aerial photography and capable of penetrating deep inside the Soviet Union with virtual immunity. In his last months in office, Eisenhower authorized the first operational use of reconnaissance satellites. His administration also oversaw the birth of the missile age. Miniaturization of thermonuclear warheads coupled with improvements in rocketry and guidance systems paved the way for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Perhaps the most sophisticated weapon system of the decade, the Polaris submarine, combined small, solid-fueled missiles with a nuclear-powered vessel of almost indefinite endurance and limited vulnerability. All of these developments gave the impression of an impersonal technological imperative driving American defense policy. To ascribe the rise of the military-industrial complex and the emergence of a scientific-technological elite simpl to technological determinism, however, is to ignore the rol of Eisenhower's own concrete policy decisions and actions i fostering these developments. Eisenhower entered office convinced that the Soviet Union and worldwide communism posed two long-term threats to the United States: Soviet military forces physically threatened the United States and its allies; but a prolonged arms race also threatened the American way of life. Eisenhower therefore fashioned a defense policy that would meet long-term security needs while preserving liberal-democratic institutions and the free enterprise economy in the United States. The result was the New Look, a defense policy designed to provide "maximum security at minimum cost," or "more bang for the buck." The New Look advocated increased reliance on high- tech, capital-intensive strategic delivery systems coupled with a reduction in more costly conventional forces. Hopefully "massive retaliatory striking power" would deter general war with the Soviet Union. In any future limited war, like the one in Korea, America’s allies would be expected to provide the bulk of the manpower, while the United States would provide air and naval support. This emphasis on the most advanced weaponry and technological superiority provoked keen competition among defense-related corporations, research institutions, and even universities for lucrative government contracts. It 4 also stimulated increased interservice rivalry over roles and missions, with each service agitating for a larger share in the favored strategic mission. In many instances, the individual services allied with defense contractors and local congressmen to promote weapons systems that would simultaneously enhance the service’s mission, generate corporate profits, and provide constituent jobs. This was precisely the sort of alliance that so concerned Eisenhower and prompted his warning about the military-industrial complex. Eisenhower's