Democratization without a State: Democratic Regime-building in Kosovo OISI´N TANSEY This article examines the relationship between democratization and the state with reference to recent political developments in the non-state entity of Kosovo. Existing analyses of the role of the state in democratic transitions provide critical insights into the politics of democratization, but have suffered from a lack of consensus regarding the concept of the state itself. This study distinguishes three separate dimensions of statehood – recognition, capacity and cohesion – and argues that each has separate implications for transition politics. Analysis of democratic political development in Kosovo suggests two conclusions: first, that international recognition of statehood should not be viewed as a prerequisite for democratization, and second, that pro- blems of state capacity or state cohesion present far more fundamental challenges to successful democratic regime change. Key words: democratization; state; stateness; Kosovo Introduction After over six years of United Nations governance, Kosovo recently entered into a new political era. In October 2005, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced what had long been eagerly anticipated in Pristina: internationally brokered talks on the entity’s final status. With independence one of the options on the table, the initiation of status talks raised the possibility that Kosovo may soon make claim to replace East Timor as the world’s youngest democratic state. Yet Kosovo’s political development to date, along with its current status, raises significant questions not only about the challenges facing democratization efforts in Kosovo, but also about the very legitimacy of analysing a non-state entity from the perspective of the existing transitions literature. Some of the firmest generalizations that exist within the comparative democratization literature concern the relationship between democracy and statehood, and Kosovo’s situation throws into sharp relief a number of the core debates that revolve around this issue. As it currently stands, Kosovo lacks official statehood, and is subject to extensive levels of international gov- ernance that prevent the exercise of fully democratic politics by domestic actors. Optimism about democratic potential in the entity is also undercut by the realities of Kosovo’s troubled political existence, as its weak institutions, divided population and contested status serve as obstacles to any easy political transition. Yet it is also the Oisı´n Tansey is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UK. Democratization, Vol.14, No.1, February 2007, pp.129–150 ISSN 1351-0347 print=1743-890X online DOI: 10.1080=13510340601024355 # 2007 Taylor & Francis 130 DEMOCRATIZATION case that over recent years the entity has enjoyed increasing levels of democratic self- governance, and that the foundations of a democratic political regime have been established and have enabled the direct election of two successive domestic governments. Kosovo’s experience thus highlights a range of state-related issues that have implications for democratic transition, including levels of state capacity and state cohesion, and the role of international recognition of statehood. In doing so, it brings to the fore debates within the transitions literature on the divisions between the state and regime, and also highlights the connections that exist, and that should be explored further, between separate approaches within comparative politics and international relations to issues of the state and statehood. Insights from comparative politics shed light on the domestic aspects of the state, while international relations approaches often highlight how cross-border dynamics can determine political status and shape and constrain the nature of domestic governance. A central aim of this article is to highlight these different dynamics of the state, both domestic and international, and explore their implications for democracy and democratization. Analysis of Kosovo’s political development suggests two principal conclusions: one, that the lack of official statehood does not, and should not, preclude analysis of democratization in non-state entities, and two, that other state-related issues, especially limitations on central capacity and a lack of state cohesion, present far more fundamental challenges to successful democratic regime change. The following sections explore these issues in more detail with reference to recent events in Kosovo, and discuss the implications of both domestic and international dimensions of the state for democracy and democratization. Democracy and the Three Dimensions of Statehood The concept of the state itself is both complex and contested. The classic definition of a state is that provided by Max Weber, who holds that a state exists ‘insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’.1 Yet this is by no means the only definition in the literature, and other contributions have identified a wider range of attributes and characteristics of the state, including an identifiable territory, a body of citizens, and internal and external sovereignty, meaning that there is a single source of authority within the state, and none beyond it.2 Within the transitions literature to democracy literature, there is a small but rich strand of writing that deals directly with the relationship between the state and demo- cratization.3 Given the complexity of the concept of the state, this work covers a wide range of issues concerning the role that the state plays in both facilitating and imped- ing democratic transitions. While this has meant that a range of state-related impli- cations have been discussed, at times it has led also to conceptual ambiguity, as similar terms are used to refer to different aspects of the state and its relationship with democracy.4 One strategy for overcoming this problem is to disaggregate the concept of the state, and identify how separate elements of the state have separate implications for democracy and democratization.5 In the existing range of writings DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 131 that deal with these questions, it is possible to identify three separate dimensions of the state, each of which poses separate challenges to democratization and each of which can be viewed in conceptually distinct terms. The first dimension concerns the issue of state recognition, and relates to the per- ceived requirement that a political entity be a recognized state in the international community before it can be said to be a democracy. Linz and Stepan, for example, clearly argue that a sovereign state is a ‘prerequisite to democracy’, and that the challenges of achieving democracy cannot be overcome ‘unless the territorial entity is recognized as a sovereign state’.6 Although rarely acknowledged explicitly, to some extent this view is taken for granted in the literature and is reinforced by the almost uniform scholarly attention to democratization processes in recognized states only. This article seeks to question this restrictive approach, however, and to argue that in certain circumstances analysis of democratization can, and should, be carried out in relation to non-state entities. As Laurence Whitehead has recently argued in a critical re-evaluation of the state-centred focus of the field, ‘not all “states” are ready made prior to transition’ and ‘therefore a major empirical theme for the comparative study of democratizations should be poss- ible transition paths and the quality of democracy that is possible in the absence of full state-ness’. 7 The second dimension in the relationship between statehood and democracy con- cerns the issue of state capacity, and particularly the extent to which the existing state apparatus has the resources and presence within a territory to maintain authority over, and protect, the political community. In this context, the importance of statehood relates to the ability, and willingness, of the state to uphold and enforce political rights and the rule of law throughout a territory. According to O’Donnell, there are three elements of the state that are required in order for democracy to be supported: a legal system that supports the rights and freedoms entailed by a democratic regime, a bureaucracy that can enforce such rights throughout the territory, and official state ideological discourses and practices that ensure state capacity is used to reinforce rather than undermine democratic values.8 Levels of jurisdiction, presence and auth- ority of the state thus present particular political constraints and opportunities for democratization that vary from context to context.9 The third dimension relates to the issue of state cohesion, and has been dealt with most extensively in the work of Linz and Stepan and their discussion of what they term ‘stateness’ problems. These emerge when a lack of congruence between the polity and demos raises questions over the boundaries of the territory itself and the appropriate membership of the political community. Specifically, Linz and Stepan argue that the greater the percentage of people in a territory that do not wish to be members of the state as it exists in its current form, the harder it will be to consolidate democracy. If the population within a territory is divided along national, linguistic, religious or cultural cleavages, the challenge