UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RIVERSIDE Agent-Relative Knowledge in Heidegger A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy by Kevin Allen Gin September 2017 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Mark Wrathall, Chairperson Dr. John Perry Dr. Pierre Keller Dr. Michael Nelson Copyright by Kevin Allen Gin 2017 The Dissertation of Kevin Allen Gin is approved: Committee Chairperson University of California, Riverside ACKNOWLEGEMENTS I owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to Mark Wrathall for offering guidance and mentorship over the last seven years. I’ve never had a conversation with Mark that didn’t result in both inspiration and insight. I am also deeply indebted to John Perry, Pierre Keller, and Michael Nelson for both supporting and challenging me while at UCR, and for serving on what I consider to be my “dream” committee. Special thanks are due to John, who spent many selfless hours digging into Heidegger during what eventually turned into the “CSLI / Heidegger” reading group that we sustained for almost two years. It would be difficult to overstate the influence this had on my dissertation. Thanks to Dave Millar, Sam Richards, Josu Acosta, and Dikran Karagueuzian for wrestling through difficult texts during our meetings, and for providing a welcoming place for me to present each chapter of my dissertation. There are countless others from whom I’ve benefited over the years, including Bill Bracken, who allowed me to sit in his Heidegger courses at UCR, and my professors at Messiah College, who first introduced to me the world of philosophy. I’m especially grateful for my wife, Elizabeth, and her immeasurable and unwavering support in all aspects of life. And also for Coach Brunk, who taught me to finish what I start. iv ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Agent-Relative Knowledge in Heidegger by Kevin Allen Gin Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Philosophy University of California, Riverside, September 2017 Dr. Mark Wrathall, Chairperson When an agent “loses herself” in a project, or becomes completely absorbed in an activity, she has what Heidegger calls “reflected self-understanding”. This kind of reflected understanding allows the agent to find herself out in the world, “in things”, without ever holding any reflexive attitudes about herself. In my dissertation, I develop and defend Heidegger’s account of reflected self-understanding, which constitutes – for Heidegger – the most basic grip an agent has on who she is. I suggest that Heidegger’s account of reflected self-understanding is not only a significant contribution to the history of philosophy, but also the central kernel that structures Heidegger’s thought on the topics of understanding, interpretation, truth, and authenticity in Being and Time. v CONTENTS List of Figures ........................................................................................................... ix Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 A. Overview of Project ....................................................................................................... 1 B. Outline of Chapters ........................................................................................................ 3 C. The Project of Being and Time ...................................................................................... 4 D. Heidegger’s Existential Analytic: Three Themes ........................................................ 10 E. The Metaphor of Vision ............................................................................................... 19 Chapter 1: Heidegger on Non-Reflexive Self-Knowledge ........................................ 24 1.0 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 24 1.1 Taxonomy of Agent Relative Knowledge .............................................................. 25 A. First-personal vs perspectival knowledge .................................................................... 29 B. Knowledge about the practical vs knowledge from a practical perspective ................. 36 1.2 Heidegger on Circumspection ............................................................................... 43 1.3 Circumspection as Self-Knowledge ...................................................................... 49 Chapter 2: Understanding and Interpretation ........................................................ 53 2.0 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 53 2.1 Two Claims in Being and Time ............................................................................. 57 A. Primacy of Practice ...................................................................................................... 57 B. Grounding Claim ......................................................................................................... 59 2.2 Understanding and Interpretation: An Overview ................................................ 62 A. Understanding .............................................................................................................. 62 vi B. Interpretation ................................................................................................................ 71 2.3 Dreyfus on Heidegger’s Two Claims .................................................................... 77 A. Motivation from the nature of human agency .............................................................. 82 B. Motivation from the nature of intentionality ................................................................ 94 2.4 McManus on the Primacy of Practice ................................................................... 97 A. McManus’s Philosophical Challenge to Dreyfus ......................................................... 97 B. McManus’s Alternative ............................................................................................. 100 2.5 Wrathall on the Grounding Claim ..................................................................... 104 A. Wrathall’s Textual Challenge to Dreyfus ................................................................... 104 B. Wrathall’s Alternative (Structural-functional account of understanding) .................. 106 2.6 Understanding Reconsidered: Self-Projection as Adopting a Perspective ......... 110 2.7 The Primacy of Practice (motivated by the nature of human agency) ............... 116 Chapter 3: Understanding and Truth .................................................................... 123 3.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 123 3.1 The Problem of Judgment .................................................................................. 130 A. Heidegger on The Problem of Judgment .................................................................... 130 B. Theories of Judgment and Theories of Truth ............................................................. 134 C. From the Act of Judging to its Content ...................................................................... 136 D. Russell on Propositional Unity .................................................................................. 140 3.2 Heidegger on the Problem of Unity .................................................................... 152 A. From the Content of Judgment back to the Act .......................................................... 153 B. The Act of Judging as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation ....................................... 163 vii C. From the Act of Judging back to the Agent ............................................................... 168 D. Predication and the Problem of Unity ........................................................................ 174 3.3 Heidegger’s Conception of Truth ....................................................................... 176 A. Correspondence, Discovery, and the Truth of Assertions .......................................... 179 B. Discovery and the Truth of Entities ........................................................................... 189 C. Disclosure and the Truth of Being ............................................................................. 196 D. Response to the “Rights” Objection ........................................................................... 205 Chapter 4: Understanding and Authenticity ......................................................... 209 4.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 209 4.2 What makes Reflected Self-Knowledge Inauthentic? ......................................... 217 4.3 What makes Reflected Self-Knowledge Authentic? ............................................ 224 Works by Heidegger .............................................................................................. 230 Works Cited ........................................................................................................... 232 viii List of Figures Figure 1………………………………………………….……………………………….55 Figure 2………………………………………………….……………………………….56 Figure 3………………………………………………….…………………...…………..80 ix Introduction A. Overview of Project The topic of my dissertation is self-knowledge, and in particular, the kind of self- knowledge had by an agent when she “loses herself” in an activity (GA 2: 76), becoming