From the Bay of Pigs to Laos Operation MILLPOND: The Beginning of a Distant Covert War Timothy N. Castle Much has been written about the Thailand-based B-26 bombers flown CIA-led Bay of Pigs operation in by CIA contractors.4 As the CIA’s top mid-April 1961, the failed covert representative to President Kennedy’s paramilitary operation intended to Laos Task Force, Bissell was concur- overthrow Fidel Castro.1 When it rently responsible for two military became public, the botched operation operations with profound Cold War Operation MILLPOND became a deep personal embarrass- implications.5 ment for President John F. Kennedy became the taproot and set off considerable domestic Ultimately, as the assault on Cuba for what eventually and international debate regarding faltered, the Laos airstrikes were emerged...as the “larg- the credibility and competence of the abruptly canceled. Nonetheless, and new administration. perhaps unintentionally, the pres- est, most innovative identially-authorized preparations program of irregular Responsibility for the overall Cu- for Operation MILLPOND became a warfare ever conducted ban program, then known as JMATE, the taproot for what eventually lay with CIA Deputy Director for emerged, in one veteran’s words, as by CIA.” Plans Richard M. Bissell Jr. With the the “largest, most innovative program failure and exposure of the Bay of of irregular warfare ever conducted Pigs landing, Bissell, who was said by CIA.”6 to be in line to replace long-time Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles,2 quickly found himself a major target of Kennedy’s support- Introduction ers who sought to shift blame from questionable presidential decisions Watching President Kennedy play on to faulty intelligence and poor mil- golf on Sunday afternoon with his itary advice.3 sister and brother-in-law, an unin- formed observer could reasonably Scant scholarship, however, has conclude the new leader of the United focused on another risky covert States harbored not a care in the operation scheduled to begin the world. In fact, on 16 April 1961 Ken- same week as the Cuba landing, nedy had plenty on his mind. US-di- Operation MILLPOND, which was rected forces were about to launch a joint CIA-Pentagon plan to attack nearly simultaneous covert airstrikes Soviet-supplied military stores and on two sovereign countries.7 antigovernment forces in neutral Laos. The plan included the use of Inheriting from the Eisenhower administration serious foreign policy challenges in Laos and Cuba, Kenne- a. The plan’s original cryptonym was dy had agreed in both cases to allow JMARC. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. © Timothy N. Castle Studies in Intelligence Vol 59, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2015) 1 From the Bay of Pigs to Laos But, there was another covert action to account for, Oper- ation MILLPOND in Laos. proceed with the Bay of Pigs land- ings both men were fully aware that the MILLPOND pilots and their load- 12 Bissell and his covert action spe- stupid?” The president’s poor, most- ed bombers were less than four hours cialists to continue planning begun ly CIA-influenced, decisionmaking from a scheduled 17 April takeoff. A during the Eisenhower administration on Cuba had resulted in a monumen- few hours later, in a decision that has 8 for significant military interventions. tal foreign policy nightmare. remained obscured for more than 50 While ordering movement toward years, Kennedy suddenly canceled the brink of employing “deniable” the MILLPOND strikes. The debate armed action, the president remained Meanwhile, Across the Pacific continues as to the circumstances, but cautious and insisted that the military sometime around 9 p.m., Kennedy and intelligence operators be kept on But, there was another covert also called off the next day’s JMATE a short leash—the final OK to launch airstrikes.15 To date, very little atten- the strikes would be his.9 action to account for, Operation MILLPOND in Laos. Kennedy had tion has been focused on the nexus Just before his departure to also ordered the CIA and Pentagon to of these simultaneous events in Cuba Virginia, Kennedy had markedly arrange other covert airstrikes on the and Southeast Asia. other side of the globe. A full exam- changed the CIA-developed and Piecing together declassified DoD ination of Kennedy’s post-Bay of Pentagon-reviewed plan for an air and Department of State records and Pigs mindset must, therefore, include attack on Cuba at the 15 April onset the recollections of MILLPOND a thoughtful consideration of concur- of JMATE. Bissell and his staff had participants, however, this article rent events in Southeast Asia. decided to use 16 readily available details this key chapter of US Cold WW II B-26 bombers in a pre-in- War involvement in Laos. Moreover, vasion attack on key communica- Nearly 9,000 miles away at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base (and 11 an examination of the Thailand-based tions facilities and airfields. The B-26 scheme provides a fuller under- destruction of Castro’s offensive air time zones ahead of Washington, DC), a mix of pilots including those standing of America’s artfully hidden capability was judged a key element foreign policy goals in Laos. Flagrant in protecting the mostly defenseless flying for CIA’s proprietary Air America and “sheep-dipped”a US communist breaches of Laotian terri- rebel air attacks and amphibious tory brought about equally prohibited landings.10 military pilots were asleep in their bunks. They had been recruited to US contraventions of the 1954—and Kennedy, however, had concluded fly 16 unmarked B-26 aircraft in later the 1962—Geneva agreements. that the CIA air plan was “too noisy” a daring move to deliver decisive Searching for a politically tenable and wanted Bissell to tone down the bombing support for a Royal Lao strategy to oppose further commu- strikes. There was no further discus- military ground offensive.13 A few nist expansion in Southeast Asia, the sion as Bissell slashed the force in hours earlier, they had received their Kennedy administration ultimately half. With grave consequences for the final instructions to make a surrepti- chose to secretly employ CIA and overall JMATE operation, the eight tious crossing of the Thai-Lao border DoD resources. These US policies bombers were only partially success- to bomb an airfield and attack other continued until 1973, when the White ful in destroying Castro’s air force.11 communist positions on a strategical- House ended CIA paramilitary pro- 16 The disastrous outcome of the land- ly located area in central Laos known grams in Laos. as the Plain of Jars.14 (See map on ing on the beach in the Bay of Pigs is The president’s cancellation of the facing page.) well known and has been the subject MILLPOND airstrikes, however, left of numerous histories When Kennedy gave Bissell the in force plans to greatly expanded In the wake of the operation that order on the afternoon of the 16th to the covert action he had approved in was publicly tagged “a perfect fail- Laos. The authorization paved the ure,” a humiliated and angry Kenne- way for CIA’s decade-long para- a. US military personnel who assume ci- dy exclaimed to Advisor Theodore military programs in Thailand and vilian status in order to support specialized Laos. Most importantly, MILLPOND Sorensen, “How could I have been so CIA missions. 2 Studies in Intelligence Vol 59, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2015) From the Bay of Pigs to Laos “An American invasion, a Communist victory or what- generated a surge in the growth of the ever, I wish it would happen before we take over and get Taipei-headquartered Civil Air Trans- blamed for it.” port (CAT)/Air America (AAM) air support complex known within CIA we seek in all Asia, and, indeed, resisting Communist aggression 17 by the cryptonym HBILKA. in all of the world—freedom for and subversion. Additionally, I will address the the people and independence for the government. And this The president went on to affirm US important support links between the responsibilities under the Southeast JMATE and MILLPOND operations. Nation shall persevere in our pursuit of these objectives. Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Veteran CAT and AAM employees “We shall fully honor our obligation were deeply involved in training the Kennedy then chose to end his to Thailand as an ally and friend.”20 Cuban exile transport pilots and two foreign policy section by placing of these HBILKA fliers ultimately tiny, and virtually unknown, Laos in Laos was not a new presidential joined their trainees and flew combat particular (if hyperbolic) prominence. headache. By late 1960, according to missions over Cuba. So, too, volun- Theodore Sorensen, who has provid- teers from the Alabama Air National The hopes of all mankind rest ed an early insider’s description of Guard (AANG) secretly provided upon us—not simply upon those the new administration, Kennedy was maintenance and flight training for of us in this chamber, but upon well aware of the Laotian “mess” he the attacking Cuban force. As the the peasant in Laos, the fisher- would inherit. “The president-elect rebel air missions were battered over man in Nigeria, the exile from said to me, ‘An American invasion, well defended Cuban positions, the Cuba, the spirit that moves ev- a Communist victory or whatever, I guardsmen bravely entered the fray ery man and Nation who shares wish it would happen before we take and American blood was spilled.18 our hopes for freedom and the over and get blamed for it.’”21 future.”19 v v v In the final months of the Eisen- With Kennedy just into the second hower administration the political week of his presidency, few could and military danger to the Royal Lao have imagined the imminent and government consisted of a mix of for- Handed a Mess stunning impact of his ongoing secret mer army paratroopers led by Cap- decisions related to Laos and Cuba.