MILITARIZING MEXICO WHERE IS THE OFFICER CORPS GOING? Roderic Ai Camp January 15, 1999 Policy Paper on the Americas MILITARIZING MEXICO Where is the Officer Corps Going? Roderic Ai Camp Policy Papers on the Americas Volume X Study 1 January 15, 1999 CSIS Americas Program The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), established in 1962, is a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS is dedicated to policy analysis and impact. It seeks to inform and shape selected policy decisions in government and the private sector to meet the increasingly complex and difficult global challenges that leaders will confront in the next century. It achieves this mission in three ways: by generating strategic analysis that is anticipatory and interdisciplinary, by convening policymakers and other influential parties to assess key issues, and by building structures for policy action. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author. CSIS Mexico Project Leadership Georges Fauriol, Director, Americas Program M. Delal Baer, Deputy Director, Americas Program and Director, Mexico Project Armand Peschard-Sverdrup, Assistant Director, Mexico Project Kristopher Bengtson, Research Assistant Editors Joyce Hoebing, Adjunct Fellow Kristopher Bengtson, Research Assistant © 1999 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This report was prepared under the aegis of the CSIS Policy Papers on the Americas series. Comments are welcome and should be directed to: CSIS Americas Program 1800 K Street, NW Washington, D.C. 20006 Phone: (202) 775-3150 Fax: (202) 466-4739 E-mail: [email protected] Contents Introduction 1 The Document 1 Training: Pursuing a Fresh Tact 2 Operations: Efficiency and Technical Modernization 3 Administrative Simplification: Decentralizing the Command Hierarchy 4 Unit Reorganization and Creation: Special Units Take Precedence 5 Logistics: Renovating the Military Distribution System 6 Military Education: Achieving Parity with Civilians 6 Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence: Upgrading Military Capabilities 9 Social Communication: A New Public Relations Image 9 Assisting Social Development: Image-Building and Social Engineering 10 Social Security and Loans: Eliminating Bureaucratic Obstacles and Achieving Effective Social Benefits 11 Personnel Management: Introducing Civilians and Revamping the Promotion Process 12 Strategic Deployment and Military Doctrine: Changing the Geographic and Security Focus 13 Anti-Drug Trafficking Campaign: A Permanent Military Mission 13 Conclusion 14 About the Author 17 Endnotes 18 i Introduction In the first two years of President Ernesto Zedillo’s administration, the Mexican armed forces has seemingly taken on new missions and achieved a higher level of visibility in the eyes of the public as well as among informed observers.1 Is Mexico’s military really charting new directions and, if so, will those tasks alter its long-standing relationship with civilian political leaders? Such changes are typically judged by visible missions and by measurable data on force size and budget. But given the difficulty of obtaining accurate information about the military in Mexico, judgements often are tenuous at best. The military’s caste mentality is extreme, reflected in its unwillingness to share basic “public” data.2 In June 1995, a year and a half after the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación (EZLN) uprising in the state of Chiapas, in southern Mexico, and six months into the Zedillo administration, a Mexican reporter for El Financiero obtained a classified, internal army document of extraordinary significance.3 This document, entitled Mexican Army and Air Force Development Program, suggests the first in- depth insights into the thinking of the Mexican military about its institution, reveals numerous problems and weakness as perceived by the high command, and provides interesting food for thought on the military’s future direction through the end of this century. Civil-military relations can be assessed from three broad perspectives. Most important, and the source about which we have the least information for Mexico and Latin America, is a societal perspective. In other words, what do the Mexican people think about the armed forces? How do they rate it as an institution? What type of legitimacy do they give the army, air force, and navy? How do they define the military’s missions?4 The second source which is crucial to a complete understanding of these issues is the perspective of leading politicians. Again, the same sorts of questions need to be posed to this influential group. Finally, scholars need to evaluate how the officer corps in Mexico perceives its own role and how that role might be changing. Since Mexican officers rarely make their opinions public, the Mexican Army and Air Force Development Program is of particular value in drawing such an assessment. The Document In this report, I examine Mexico’s unique internal document in detail, identifying the most significant features that indicate changing attitudes or frustration with the military’s current mission or structure. The document’s authors divided it into 15 sections, and many of these sections are further subdivided into short- and medium-term recommendations. I have combined two of the sections together, Strategic Development and Military Doctrine, and therefore will analyze the document in its 14 original sections, in the order they appear in the document itself. 1 2 Militarizing Mexico: Where is the Officer Corps Going? Training: Pursuing a Fresh Tact One of the concerns that receives the most attention in the report’s recommendations is training deficiencies. In its short-term requests the document implies that various units require training directives and that the defense secretariat’s general staff (estado mayor) should administer the program. The most important recommended change in training per se is that regional commanders (Mexico is divided into 40 military [army] zones and 22 naval zones) should be in charge of the actual programs.5 This recommendation suggests a significant administrative change from the past: the decentralization of decision-making authority. This change is bolstered by other recommendations in the document. The Mexican military is noted for its extreme level of superior-subordinate obedience and centralization of command in the hands of the defense secretariat, allowing little decision-making responsibility among high-ranking subordinates. Recommendations designed to shift responsibility to regional and lower-ranking commanders suggest an attack on excessive concentration of authority in the office of the defense secretary. Given the rise of the EZLN in the south and anticipating more guerrilla activity elsewhere in Mexico, especially in Guerrero and other poor states such as Hidalgo and Oaxaca, the authors requested the immediate establishment of special forces units and a command structure to administer them, to be trained in Temamatla, Mexico. Specifically, the report urged training in urban and suburban operations and establishing operations’ schools by topographic/climatic regions: two in the desert and one each in the jungles and mountains. The document also requests the creation of a permanent rapid reaction force in Chiapas, which would analyze solutions to the problems the EZLN poses for the region. It is clear from the authors’ brief description that they are not just thinking of tactical military forces, but of new units with adequate staff to examine the broader social, economic, political, and ethnic issues that are producing guerrilla movements in Mexico. They specifically identified Guerrero as an additional regional site for special forces training and command facilities. This is not surprising given Guerrero’s past history as a major locus of guerrilla activity, and the fact that the secretary of national defense, General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre, served as the assistant executive officer in the Guerrero military zone (27th) in Chilpancingo during the highpoint of Lucio Cabañas’ guerrilla movement in the 1970s.6 The authors of this document also are concerned with the military’s changing mission. They either view President Zedillo’s own emphasis on domestic national security issues as a priority task, replacing the traditional emphasis on national defense, or they view themselves as essential to performing such a task.7 In light of the domestic security concerns produced by guerrilla groups, they have requested the formation of an organization to supervise, train, and lead integrated military and civilian units whose primary task would be to provide security to vital national installations. Roderic Ai Camp 3 The medium-term training recommendations focus largely on technical requests, that is, providing detailed forms of training for special operations and improving the quality of training through simulated exercises. More important in terms of the military hierarchy, the report recommends that all existing units establish their own internal special operations training, selecting the most outstanding personnel for participation. It especially wants these units developed in three major regions: the southwest (Chiapas and Guerrero), the center (Jalisco and the Gulf), and the northeast (Sinaloa, Sonora, and Chihuahua). It also recommends integrated joint operations