The future of Europe in the world, from a Portuguese perspective Augusto Santos Silva Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal Intervention at the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), Dublin 9th of April 2018 EU’s external action has been - since 1993, when the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was launched - one of the most important dimensions of the project of political union that is at the foundation of the European Union's (EU). Two decisions reflect this well. On the one hand, the EU decided to conceive a global strategy; first, in 2003, with the adoption of the European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better World (revised in 2008); and most recently, in 2016, with the Global Strategy for the EU's foreign and security policy - Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty operated, in 2007, a significant organizational change, creating the European External Action Service and consolidating the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is, at the same time, Vice-President of the European Commission. Consequently, and now that we are discussing the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the period 2021-2027, there is no shortage of voices to claim that external 1 action, for which the current MFF channels 6% of the Union resources, has to be worth much more. However, what do we really mean and want to put into practice with a Common Foreign and Security Policy? How can it be built out of the soon-to-be 27 member states, where we potentially find stark differences in geo-strategic positions, historical traditions and national or regional interests? What degrees of freedom do you leave to each national foreign policy? And how can Europe benefit from a well-woven combination between the Common Foreign Policy and the various foreign policies of its Members? The 2016 Global Strategy is an obvious departure for answering the first questions. It outlines the interests shared by Europeans: peace and security; prosperity; democracy; and a rules-based international order. It expounds the principles of action: unity, commitment, responsibility and cooperation. And it sets out five main priorities: guaranteeing the security of the Union; promoting the State and societal resilience to the East ("as far as to Central Asia") and to the South ("as far as to Central Africa") of Europe; implementing an integrated approach to conflicts and crises; investing in regional cooperation, intra-European cooperation, Mediterranean cooperation, Middle East and Africa cooperation and Atlantic cooperation, as well as cooperation with Asia and on the Arctic; and it aims at making a contribution to global governance in the 21st century. Taking into account the developments that we have already witnessed in the implementation of the Strategy, we can go further. Especially with regards to the current international context and to the role Europe can play. This is what I would propose to do here, considering the five areas I believe will shape the near future of the Common Foreign Policy. The first is EU's security and defence. The second is the relationship with its neighbourhood. The third is development and cooperation policy. Fourth, the participation in multilateral fora, particularly within the United Nations system, and the leading role in the implementation of traditional multilateral agendas, such as the Sustainable Development Agenda and the Climate Agenda. And the fifth area, which somehow systematizes and summarizes all previous ones, is the geopolitics of the EU, the way it defines its place in the globalized world of today. 2 Henceforth, I will try to show, with examples from Portugal and also from Ireland, how this 27-country common framework can and should be enriched with the specific contributions of each Member State, by harmoniously coupling what is common and what is individual. This is how our core objective is pursued: to respect the sovereignty and autonomy of each State and to build a policy undertaken by all. 2. If there is a clear fact in European discussions of the recent years, it is the awareness that the EU must take seriously the area of security and defence. First, we have had the events of 2014, with the annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war in the Dombass, which forced the redefinition of the relationship with Russia. Then, the – continued - pressure from the United States so that European allies reinforce their contribution to the Atlantic Alliance has taken on a new and strange tone with the Trump Administration. With the contradictory signs of Washington's belief in NATO's value, Europeans not only had to show they were prepared for greater defence investments but they had to re-equate EU’s own and, at least partially, autonomous capabilities. Finally, the emergence of cybersecurity as one of the most strategic issues of our time requires the readjustment of guidelines and planning. The creation of the European Defence Fund, the adoption of the European Defence Action Plan and, above all, the launching, in December 2017, of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) demonstrate that the EU is taking the challenges and the additional responsibilities that lie ahead very seriously. The EU is not to be seen as a mere holder of soft power, limited to normative leadership and to leadership by example. But consequences have to be drawn, by increasing its capacity in defence and in projecting security. Surely, we face a significantly complex matter, where ambiguity should not prevail. From the Portuguese perspective, the clear enunciation of a number of principles may help. The Permanent Structured Cooperation is to be understood in its meaning: the increase in cooperation regarding equipment, capabilities and operations between independent States. It means, for the 22 countries that are simultaneously members of the EU and NATO, to strengthen NATO’s European pillar. The two organizations, 3 although of a different nature, are complementary. Their efforts must be articulated, not on the basis of divisions that have long lost any meaning (such as between soft and hard power, or perceived areas of influence), but rather for cost efficiency and converging action. Thirdly, the Permanent Structured Cooperation must be launched on a solid basis, particularly in the economic and financial field. Then, one must understand “security” in its accurate and broad sense. Today, the security of critical infrastructures, energy supply, communications networks, and large shipping areas are absolutely crucial. It would be a mistake to counteract new threats with conventional, including military, responses. Finally, the so-called Defence Union cannot exacerbate the existing asymmetries in the technological and industrial capabilities of Member States. On the contrary, European funds must be allocated with discretion, in order to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base as a whole and that of each of its Members. For that reason, it is indispensable to take into account the projects and the potential that small and medium enterprises hold in this regard. It is obvious the correlation between security issues and neighbourhood issues. Our security border lies in the great arch that runs from the Sahel (or even from Central Africa) to Central Asia. Any instability along that arch has a direct impact on European security. Terrorist networks, human and drug trafficking, organized crime, or social turmoil that lead to the collapse of institutions and states, but also the systematic denial, by governments, territorial barons and militia, of the dignity, rights and minimum security requirements of their populations, constitute direct threats to Europe. It is clear, however, that we must not reduce the neighbourhood to security concerns. Our strategic interest in the neighbourhood relies, more broadly, on political and economic relations with regions that are geographically close to the Union, as well as on possibilities and paths for partnership. Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are, like Turkey, EU candidates. And the EU must treat them only according to the criteria it defined in 1993 at the Copenhagen Council: the democratic nature of the State and the compliance with the rule of law; the existence of a market economy; and the acquis communautaire. In my view, no other question can explicitly or implicitly be added to this set of criteria, least of all to introduce virtual “problems” relating to religious or civilizational "disconformity": Europe is plural and is not constrained by ethnic, 4 religious or cultural requirements. The Copenhagen criteria are enough and, yes, we must be intransigent about them. In our institutional terminology, what we call the Neighbourhood Policy has to do with relations with the countries of the two regional areas that border the EU: in the East, with countries that have left the former Soviet universe, such as Ukraine and Belarus or several Caucasus States; to the South, with all the North African nations and several of the Middle East, including Israel and Palestine. On this double front, the role of the EU should not be underestimated. To this purpose, I would provide only three examples: a EU strategic dialogue with the Maghreb will be a significantly favourable element to regional integration of the Maghreb countries, which is practically non-existent; the combination of incentives and disincentives is essential for the advancement of the rule of law and the fight against corruption in Eastern and Caucasian Europe; and, thirdly, the EU continues to be the clearest voice in favour of the only peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, two states coexisting side by side, respecting each other's security and having their respective capitals in Jerusalem. I do not ignore the urgency of the issue of refugees in the southern neighbourhood, such as those fleeing the war in Syria, and the pressure they put on various countries that are EU partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy, such as Jordan and Lebanon, or are EU candidates, like Turkey.