A. N. Wilson. Hitler. New York: Basic Books, 2012. 215 pp. $24.99, cloth, ISBN 978-0-465-03128-3. Reviewed by Nicholas J. Schlosser Published on H-Empire (September, 2012) Commissioned by Charles V. Reed (Elizabeth City State University) Is there room in the already crowded feld of much that has not been written about before. In literature on the history of Nazi Germany for yet this brief, highly interpretive account of Hitler’s another biography of Adolf Hitler? With excellent life, Wilson asks questions that have been asked biographies already written on this subject by Ian before and examines sources that have been ex‐ Kershaw (Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris [1998] and amined before, and ultimately presents conclu‐ Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis [2000]) and Alan Bul‐ sions that are highly conjectural, speculative, and lock (A Study in Tyranny [1962]), not to mention unsubstantiated by a careful reading of the avail‐ the vast corpus of works examining specific ele‐ able evidence and historical literature. ments of Hitler’s ideology, the Third Reich, and Much ink has already been spilled over this their place within the broader context of German work.[1] After its publication, British historian history, do we need yet another book on this par‐ Richard J. Evans wrote a critical review of it for ticular topic? New Statesman in which he pointed out numer‐ The answer, of course, is yes. There is always ous factual errors, criticized the work’s broad gen‐ room for new works on any historical topic, pro‐ eralities, and noted that the author made little ef‐ vided they bring something new to the table. fort to examine and consider the majority of There are always new documents to uncover, new works that have already been written on this par‐ interpretative approaches to take, and ultimately ticular subject.[2] Wilson’s response focused on new conclusions to be made by specialists and the supposed defensiveness of academic histori‐ nonspecialists alike. Therefore, the question we ans and specialists when nonspecialists write must ask with regard to newly published works, about their subjects of expertise. Evans was clear such as A. N. Wilson’s biography, Hitler, is to note that this was not the case, writing that “I whether those books achieve any of these goals? am cross with him not because I think only spe‐ Unfortunately, Wilson’s work does not provide cialists should write about Hitler--I explicitly not‐ H-Net Reviews ed the contributions made by novelists and liter‐ Theater of Operations, and was consequently not ary scholars--but because he has simply ignored the overall commander of all U.S. forces as Wilson 99.9 per cent of the work on the subject done by claims (pp. 169, 174). Winston Churchill also did historians, and as a result has written a book that not introduce the strategy of bombing civilian tar‐ is absolutely valueless as well as full of errors, gets in August 1940 when he ordered the Royal many of them not minor at all.”[3] Air Force to target Berlin (p. 137). The Luftwaffe On the whole, this reviewer has found Evans’s had already leveled Warsaw and Rotterdam be‐ assessment to be correct. Wilson’s work is flled fore then, and Luftwaffe units helped level the with inaccuracies. As Evans notes in his initial re‐ town of Guernica during the Spanish civil war in view, Bavaria was not an independent state sepa‐ 1937. rate from the rest of Germany in 1918 (as Wilson The book is plagued by broad generalities. Far writes on page 17) and Heinrich Brüning was not too often readers are expected to accept Wilson’s the leader of the Catholic Center Party (p. 67). word with regard to what historians have de‐ There were only two German parliamentary elec‐ clared in the past about Hitler. For example, he tions in 1932, not fve (p. 80). The Molotov-Ribben‐ writes that “much is sometimes made of the Ro‐ trop Pact did not divide Poland along ethnic lines, man Catholic upbringing of both Hitler and granting the Nazis only the German-speaking re‐ Goebbels,” but does not cite, either in text or in an gions and Joseph Stalin the Slavic-speaking ones endnote, just who has been making so much of (p. 119). Indeed, Nazi Gauleiters carried out brutal this issue (p. 71). He declares that “it is a baffling campaigns of ethnic cleansing as they sought to fact that so many historians of Hitler continue to Germanize those areas of Poland annexed directly speak belittlingly of My Struggle as a key text ex‐ to the Reich in 1939.[4] plaining his later intentions” (p. 48). Unfortunate‐ We can add to these errors that the Catholic ly, the author does not indicate who all these his‐ Center Party was not outlawed in 1933, but in fact torians are. Kershaw in his two biographies of dissolved itself (p. 91). Hitler’s frst reaction to the Hitler; Karl Dietrich Bracher (The German Dicta‐ burning of the Reichstag was not to glibly declare torship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of Na‐ “Good riddance to that trashy old shack” (p. 93). In tional Socialism [1970]); Eberhard Jäckel (Hitler’s fact, as historian Ian Kershaw recounts, he be‐ Worldview: A Blueprint for Power [1981]); Ger‐ came gripped by the fear that the Communists hard Weinberg (Germany, Hitler, and World War were attempting to launch a revolution against II [1995]); and Jeffrey Herf (The Jewish Enemy: his regime, and subsequently ordered a violent Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the crackdown to insure that a repeat of the Novem‐ Holocaust [2006]) are just a few of the many histo‐ ber 1918 revolution could not occur.[5] The book’s rians who have all stressed the fundamental place account of World War II is further riddled with Mein Kampf holds as the key explanatory text of mistakes. Denmark did not fall two months after National Socialist ideology. As the historian Fran‐ Norway fell in April 1940 (p. 133). Erwin Rommel cois Furet noted, “it is obvious that from the frst was not the primary innovator of Blitzkrieg and it two years--between the terrorized parliament’s is certainly problematic to claim that he was “the vote to endow him with total power and the Night most esteemed general, of whatever country, dur‐ of Long Knives--the Hitler in power was the same ing the entire war” (p. 158). It would have been Hitler who had written Mein Kampf.”[6] remarkable if he was, considering he never won a The book also often argues that surface simi‐ campaign. George S. Patton commanded only one larities between National Socialism and other po‐ of fve U.S. feld armies fghting in the European litical and religious institutions are far deeper 2 H-Net Reviews and more fundamental than they really are. For liberalism, and modernity as a whole. As histori‐ example, Wilson argues that Hitler was appointed ans George L. Mosse and Fritz R. Stern respective‐ chancellor by a normal and democratic process. ly argued in The Crisis of German Ideology: Intel‐ Hitler “became the Chancellor of Germany just as lectual Origins of the Third Reich (1964) and The many others have done since in milder and more Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of democratic times, by a series of telephone calls the German Ideology (1961), the basic building and a succession of compromises” (p. 82). Certain‐ blocks of National Socialism can be traced back to ly, on frst glance, the assembly of the Conserva‐ conservative völkish intellectuals writing during tive-National Socialist cabinet by Paul von Hin‐ the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. denburg and Franz von Papen in 1933 had the These völkish ideologues condemned the Enlight‐ veil of a democratic process. But is it accurate to enment for its overarching stress on reason over call the creation of a coalition of minority parties, emotion, zivilization over kultur, rationality over by a president who was contemptuous of the spiritualism, and individual human rights over Weimar constitution and had been governing for the national, organic will. three years using emergency decrees, as demo‐ Indeed, these right-wing intellectuals soon de‐ cratic? The appointment of Hitler as chancellor, veloped a “reactionary modernism” that em‐ the fnal death knell of Weimar democracy, was braced technology and science but condemned rung by men dedicated to seeing that republic de‐ and eschewed the political and social principles of stroyed.[7] In another example, the author argues the Enlightenment and political liberalism.[9] This that Hitler’s reliance on spectacle and grandiose reactionary iteration of modernity was fully em‐ speeches demonstrates that he “belonged to the braced by Hitler and the National Socialists, and oral future, the future which contained Walt Dis‐ their ideological worldview thus constituted a ney, television and cinema” (p. 26). Wilson’s asser‐ fundamental rejection of the Enlightenment and tion that Hitler broke with the “world of the text” political and economic modernity. The Nazis cer‐ ignores National Socialism’s heavy reliance on tainly embraced modern technology, utilizing textual material for its propaganda, such as its means of mass communication to spread their use of highly detailed (and verbose) “Wall News‐ message and building highways to better unify papers” to transmit its propaganda.[8] the German nation. But this was not done to make The book’s treatment of the Enlightenment men more reasonable, as Wilson’s book contends, and the issue of modernity is a good example of but to create a stronger, more organic racial state. how Wilson’s focus on only the most basic similar‐ Similar means do not mean similar objectives.