Past and future justifications for Functional Constituencies – An Analysis through the Performance of Functional Constituencies Legislators (2004-2006) Marcos Van Rafelghem and P Anson Lau Past and Future Justifications for Functional Constituencies – An analysis through the performance of functional constituency legislators in 2004-2006 Marcos Van Rafelghem and P Anson Lau November 2006 www.civic-exchange.org Civic Exchange Room 701, Hoseinee House, 69 Wyndham Street, Central, Hong Kong. Tel: (852) 2893 0213 Fax: (852) 3105 9713 Civic Exchange is a non-profit organisation that helps to improve policy and decision-making through research and analysis. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Civic Exchange. Preface This research paper seeks to continue our work in understanding the Functional Constituencies as an important feature of Hong Kong’s political system. As a result of our extensive research on the subject from 2004, the issues and problems surrounding the election system that generates functional representation in the Hong Kong Legislative Council, the performance of functional legislators, and the impacts they and the election system have on Hong Kong’s development as a whole are becoming clear. The challenge facing Hong Kong today is what to do with the Functional Constituencies as the political system continues to evolve towards universal suffrage. This paper concludes that by developing political parties in Hong Kong the various political and ideological differences would ensure the various interests are still represented in the legislature without recourse to the problematic Functional Constituencies. The conclusion points to the need for work on alternative solutions to the Functional Constituencies. In this regard, Civic Exchange has recently published a paper on bicameralism as another way for Hong Kong to deal with the Functional Constituencies. For this research paper, we are delighted to have the chance to provide a platform to two young researchers. Marcos Van Rafelghem and P Anson Lau spent many hours reading and following the two case studies they selected to use as a reflection tool for how Functional Constituencies work during the first half (2004-2006) of the current legislative term (2004-2008). We are grateful for the time they devoted to the project. This study was funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, and the project was managed by Yan-yan Yip. We also wish to acknowledge Allan Man for his translation of this report into Chinese, and to Ken Li for the design of this paper. Christine Loh Civic Exchange November 2006 Table of Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Structure of Study 3 3. Background 3 (a) The functional election system 3 (b) Historical evolution of Functional Constituencies 4 (c) Performance and behaviour of functional legislators 4 (d) Some of the criticisms of the functional constituency system 5 Part I 4. Quantitative Performance 6 (a) Measuring participation 6 (b) Overall Performance 6 (c) Questions 7 (d) Motions and Amendments 7 (e) Council Meeting Attendance 8 (f) Bills Committee Meetings Attendance 9 (g) Panel Meeting Attendance 10 (h) Individual Performance 11 (i) Findings and Conclusions 14 Part II 5. Specialist Knowledge 16 (a) The Rationale of Functional Constituencies 16 (b) Case Study: Smoking (Public Health) (Amendment) Bill 2005 17 Part III 6. Political Parties and Party Politics 25 (a) Parties vs. Functional Interests 25 (b) The Tamar Case Study 25 Part IV 7. Integration of Findings 31 (a) Quantitative Performance 31 (b) Specialist Knowledge 31 (c) Political Parties and Party Politics 31 (d) Continuing Trends 31 (f) The Way Forward 32 Annex I Composition of the Participation Index 33 Annex II Detailed Participation Measurements 34 List of Tables Table 1 FC-GC overall average participation level Table 2 Cumulative averages for Questions Table 3 Five most and least participative legislators by number of Questions Table 4 Cumulative averages for Motions and Amendments Table 5 Five most and least participative legislators by number of Motions and Amendments Table 6 Cumulative averages for Council Meeting Attendance Table 7 Five most and least participative legislators by Council Meeting Attendance Table 8 Cumulative averages for Bill Committee Meeting Attendance Table 9 Five most and least participative legislators by Bill Committee Meeting Attendance Table 10 Cumulative averages for Panel Meeting Attendance Table 11 Five most and least participative legislators by Panel Meeting Attendance Table 12 Rankings of FC legislators by level of participation Table 13 Ranking of FC and GC legislators by level of participation Annex Past and Future Justifications for Functional Constituencies – An analysis through the performance of functional constituency legislators in 2004-2006 1. Introduction In 1984, the Hong Kong’s colonial administration examined the future trajectory of representative government in a Green Paper. 1 At that time, the authorities ruled out the possibility of direct elections for fear of time-consuming and manipulation-prone “adversarial politics” that might “introduce an element of instability at a crucial time.”2 For a city renowned for its capitalist ideals, direct election was feared by the governing elites as a seed of populist welfarism, which would lead to high taxes and a large and expensive bureaucracy. In place of universal suffrage, the authorities offered “balanced participation”. The result was a dual system of representation in the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) through Geographical and Functional Constituencies. The official rationale behind this system rested upon the premise that realising the best interests of the territory depended not only on assisting the masses but also enfranchising other sectors of society. Functional Constituencies would safeguard the interests of these other sectors, especially business and professional interests believed by the elites to be critical to maintaining Hong Kong’s economic vibrancy. The official rationale also stressed Functional Constituencies could inform the policymaking process with specialised knowledge, which otherwise might be lacking in a popularly-elected legislature. Denied a directly elected government, Hong Kong people were promised they would enjoy “stability and prosperity”. The fact that there are only about 200,000 voters in the functional election system to return the same number of representatives into LegCo as 3 million registered general voters has always been hard to explain away. Moreover, some of the voters are in fact corporations, which enable those who control companies to have a disproportionate influence over the election of legislators.3 Research studies show Functional Constituencies often pursue their respective narrow sectoral interests at the expense or neglect of the public interest.4 As a whole, in the absence of particular sectoral interests, functional legislators tend to vote along pro-government lines, raising concerns that perhaps functional representatives are generally pro-government because they have more to gain for their sector by being on friendly terms with those who wield executive power.5 Despite these and other concerns, public support for the functional election system remains considerable, as shown by a recent survey.6 Proponents of the functional election system 1 Hong Kong Government (1984). Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong. Government Printer, p.13; (hereinafter “the 1984 Green Paper”). 2 Ibid. The reference to “crucial time” was related to the ongoing the Sino-British negotiations over the handover of Hong Kong to Mainland China which was formally accomplished on 1 July 1997. A recent release from the UK National Archives shows that the colonial administration had given up the idea of full democracy for Hong Kong since the late 1960s in order to “avoid triggering resentment from Beijing.” See Gary Cheung (2006). “Why UK held back on HK democracy,” South China Morning Post, 20 November. 3 For example, studies show Hutchison Whampoa Ltd may control as many as 37 votes, see Appendix 13, Christine Loh and Civic Exchange (eds.) (2006). Functional Constituencies – A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Hong Kong University Press. 4 Leo F. Goodstadt (2006). “Business friendly and politically convenient – the historical role of functional constituencies”, Chapter 2 in Christine Loh and Civic Exchange (eds.), Functional Constituencies – A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Hong Kong University Press. 5 Jake van der Kamp and Carine Lai (2006). “Non-positive interventionism: How functional constituencies distort free market”, Chapter 9 in Christine Loh and Civic Exchange (eds.), Functional Constituencies – A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Hong Kong University Press. 6 Michael E. DeGolyer (2006). “Comparative profiles and attitudes of FC voters versus GC voters in the 2004 LegCo campaign”, Chapter 6 in Christine Loh and Civic Exchange (eds.), Functional Constituencies – A Unique Feature of the Hong Kong Legislative Council. Hong Kong University Press, p. 184. 1 Past and Future Justifications for Functional Constituencies – An analysis through the performance of functional constituency legislators in 2004-2006 contend that functional legislators are critical for their injection of technical expertise to complex debates; expression of sectoral voices that might otherwise be drowned