General Cass on the Wilmot Proviso. READ AND CIRCULATE.] [PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMITTEE. GENERAL CASS ON THE WILMOT PROVISO. The position of General Cass on the slavery question, as upon all other questions which have come before the country, is consistent, well-defined, and in accordance with the doctrines of the constitution. While General Taylor is quoted at the north as in favor of the “Wilmot Proviso,” and at the south as the champion of the slaveholding interest, General Cass, regarding the question in the light of the constitution, is disposed to leave the institution of slavery where that instrument has left it, in the hands of the people who are affected by it, to regulate it among themselves upon their own responsibility, and in their own manner. The following pages will show the course pursued by General Cass on this question. On the 1st day of March, 1847, the “Wilmot Proviso” was introduced into the Senate by a federal member from New England, as an amendment to the three-million bill. In the course of an eloquent speech, deprecating the introduction of the proviso, end giving his reasons for voting against it, General Cass said: All the apprehensions expressed here will psss away, leaving us and our institutions unscathed. I have an abiding confidence in the rectitude and energy of puplic opinion in this country, as well as of its mighty effects. It has spoken many a time in my day, and spoken in tones that were feared and obeyed; ay, and it will so speak many a time to come. Thank God, we are not the people; we are but their temporary servants. There is a power above us, and beyond us, which says, thus far may you go, but no farther; and there we stop. We introduce subjects here, and discuss them, and discuss them, till mutual contact excites us; and we fancy that everybody is everywhere just as much excited as we are, and that the end of all things, at least all political things—union, government, liberty—is approaching, if not upon us. And all this, while the bounties of Heaven, both physical and moral, are descending upon us, not like the silent dew, but in one unbroken stream of unmerited kindness. Our country is without want; our government without oppression; our people without fear, and without danger; and yet, we are everlastingly talking about a crisis, as though we had nothing to do but to raise one, and to discuss it. We may have one, sir; but it may come in a way and in an hour we know not of. It may be a crisis, not of our making or seeking, but of God's wrath for our ingratitude. As to General Cass on the Wilmot Proviso. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbaapc.04500 a political crisis, all will come right, Mr. President. That word has got to be quite a common one in our national vocabulary. It frightened me once; but I have seen it so often, that its face has become quite 2 familiar, and does not inspire the least dread. I recognise it as an old acquaintance, changing from time to time its drapery, but still preserving its identity. Our constituents, the American people, will take care of us, and of the crisis, too, as they took care of the crisis of independence, of the confederation, of the revolutionary war, of the constitution, of the non-intercourse, of the embargo, of the bank, of the deposites, of the tariff, and of the late war, and as they are taking into their own mighty keeping the present war; and they will still take care of their Union, and guard it from any unholy touch, as the ark of God was guarded of old by God's holy people. I shall vote against this proviso, because: 1st. The present is no proper time for the introduction into the country, and into Congress, of an exciting topic, tending to divide us, when our united exertions are necessary to prosecute the existing war. 2d. It will be quite in season to provide for the government of territory not yet acquired from foreign countries, after we shall have obtained it. 3d. The proviso can only apply to the British and Mexican territories, as there are no others coterminous to us. Its phraseology would reach either, though its application is pointed to Mexico. It seems to me that to express so much confidence in the successful result of this war, as to legislate at this time, if not over this anticipated acquisition, at least for it, and to lay down a partial basis for its government, would do us no good in the eyes of the world, and would irritate still more the Mexican people. 4th. Legislation now would be wholly inoperative, because no territory hereafter to be acquired can be governed without an act of Congress, providing for its government. And such an act, on its passage, would open the whole subject, and would leave the Congress, called upon to pass it, free to exercise its own discretion, entirely uncontrolled by any declaration found on the statute book. 5th. There is great reason to think that the adoption of this proviso would, in all probability, bring the war to an untimely issue, by the effect it would have on future operations. 6th. Its passage would certainly prevent the acquisition of one foot of territory; thus defeating a measure called for by a vast majority of the American people, and defeating it, too, by the very act purporting to establish a partial basis for its government. General Cass on the Wilmot Proviso. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbaapc.04500 The progress of public opinion upon the question of the adoption of this proviso, as the circumstances of the country have become more and more difficult, seems to me to indicate very clearly, that since its introduction at the past session of Congress, the conviction has been gaining ground that the present is no time for the agitation of this subject; and as the foreign war becomes more embarrassing, in a greater degree, than many anticipated, it is best to avoid a domestic dispute, which would raise bitter questions at home, and add confidence to the motives for resistance abroad. And certainly the fact now ascertained, that the war would be put to hazard, and the acquisition of territory defeated, by the adoption of this proviso, renders it impossible for me to vote for it, connected, as I deem both of these objects, with the dearest rights and honor of the country. The question on the additional section (the proviso) was then taken by yeas and nays, as follows: YEAS—Messrs. Alien, Atherton, Cameron, Cilley, John M. Clayton, Corwin, Davis, Dayton, Dix, Evans, Fairfield, Greene, Huntington, Miller, Niles, Phelps, Simmons, Sturgeon, Upham, Webster, and Woodbridge—21. NAYS—Messrs. Archer, Ashley, Atchison, Badger, Bagby, Benton, Berrien, Breese, Bright, Butler, Calhoun, CASS, Chalmers, Colquitt, Crittenden, Dickinson, Hannegan, Houston, Jarnagin, Johnson of Maryland, Johnson of Louisiana, Lewis, Mangum, Mason, Morehead, Pearce, Rusk, Sevier, Soule, Turney, and Westcott—31. So the amendment was not agreed to. 3 In December, 1847, Gen. Cass, in reply to a communication upon the subject, wrote the following letter to Mr. Nicholson, of Tennessee: Washington, December 24, 1547. Dear Sir: I have received your letter, and shall answer it as frankly as it is written. You ask me whether I am in favor of the acquisition of Mexican territory, and what are my sentiments with regard to the Wilmot Proviso? I have so often and so explicitly stated my views of the first question, in the Senate, that it seems almost unnecessary to repeat them here. As you request it, however, I shall briefly give them. General Cass on the Wilmot Proviso. http://www.loc.gov/resource/rbaapc.04500 I think, then, that no peace should be granted to Mexico, till a reasonable indemnity is obtained for the injuries which she has done us. The territorial extent of this indemnity is, in the first instance, a subject of Executive consideration. There the constitution has placed it, and there I am willing to leave it; not only because I have full confidence in its judicious exercise, but because, in the ever- varying circumstances of a war, it would be indiscreet, by a public declaration, to commit the country to any line of indemnity, which might otherwise be enlarged, as the obstinate injustice of the enemy prolongs the contest with its loss of blood and treasure. It appears to me that the kind of metaphysical magnanimity which would reject all indemnity at the close of a bloody and expensive war, brought on by a direct attack upon our troops by the enemy, and preceded by a succession of unjust acts for a series of years, is as unworthy of the age in which we live, as it is revolting to the common sense and practice of mankind. It would conduce but little to our future security, or indeed to our present reputation, to declare that we repudiate all expectation of compensation from the Mexican government, and are fighting, not for any practical result, but for some vague, perhaps philanthropic object, which escapes my penetration, and must be defined by those who assume this new principle of national intercommunication. All wars are to be deprecated, as well by the statesman as by the philanthropist. They are great evils; but there are greater evils than these, and submission to injustice is among them. The nation which should refuse to defend its rights and its honor when assailed, would soon have neither to defend; and when driven to war, it is not by professions of disinterestedness and declarations of magnanimity, that its rational objects can be best obtained, or other nations taught a lesson of forbearance—the strongest security for permanent peace.