SOMALIA: TO MOVE BEYOND THE FAILED STATE Africa Report N°147 – 23 December 2008 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. ANOTHER FAILED TRANSITION............................................................................ 1 A. THE ETHIOPIAN GAMBIT...........................................................................................................1 B. THE TFG’S FLAWS ...................................................................................................................2 1. Structural flaws...................................................................................................................3 2. Clan dynamics ....................................................................................................................3 C. THE POWER CENTRES AND THEIR INTERNAL STRUGGLES ........................................................4 1. The presidency....................................................................................................................4 2. The prime minister..............................................................................................................5 D. THE TFG’S RECORD .................................................................................................................7 1. Reconciliation.....................................................................................................................8 2. Establishing security...........................................................................................................8 3. Failure to build functioning state institutions and prepare for elections.............................9 III. THE ISLAMIST OPPOSITION AND THE INSURGENCY................................... 10 A. THE ISLAMIST OPPOSITION .....................................................................................................10 B. THE INSURGENCY ...................................................................................................................11 1. Insurgent groups ...............................................................................................................11 2. The military campaign......................................................................................................12 3. Internal fights....................................................................................................................13 4. Popularity..........................................................................................................................14 5. Arms, foreign jihadists and al-Qaeda ...............................................................................14 C. COUNTER-INSURGENCY ..........................................................................................................16 IV. THE HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC CRISIS............................................... 18 A. FOOD CRISIS, COUNTERFEIT BANKNOTES, HYPERINFLATION..................................................18 B. SHRINKING HUMANITARIAN SPACE ........................................................................................19 V. THE PEACEKEEPING RESPONSE......................................................................... 20 A. AMISOM...............................................................................................................................20 B. THE UNITED NATIONS ............................................................................................................20 C. FIGHTING PIRACY ...................................................................................................................21 VI. THE DJIBOUTI NEGOTIATIONS............................................................................ 23 A. THE GENESIS OF THE DJIBOUTI TALKS....................................................................................23 B. THE EFFORTS OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ....................................................................24 C. OUTSIDE PARTIES ...................................................................................................................25 1. Ethiopia.............................................................................................................................25 2. The U.S. and the war on terror .........................................................................................26 3. The European Union.........................................................................................................27 4. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf ................................................................................................28 VII. SALVAGING DJIBOUTI............................................................................................. 29 VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 31 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SOMALIA .........................................................................................................................32 B. PRELUDE TO THE CRISIS................................................................................................................33 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................35 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2005...................................................36 E. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................38 Africa Report N°147 23 December 2008 SOMALIA: TO MOVE BEYOND THE FAILED STATE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Since 1991 Somalia has been the archetypal failed For now, however, the Islamist fighters are gaining state. Several attempts to create a transitional set-up ever more ground. All major towns in south-central have failed, and the current one is on the brink of col- Somalia have been captured by one faction or another lapse, overtaken yet again by an Islamist insurgency, except for Mogadishu, where TFG control is ever more despite the support of an Ethiopian military interven- contested, and Baidoa. The Islamists already dominate tion since December 2006. Over the last two years the nearly as much territory as they did before the Ethio- situation has deteriorated into one of the world’s worst pian invasion, and a takeover of the entire south seems humanitarian and security crises. The international almost inevitable. community is preoccupied with a symptom – the piracy phenomenon – instead of concentrating on the core of While the Djibouti peace process did initiate new dia- the crisis, the need for a political settlement. The an- logue, it has accomplished little in its eight months, nounced Ethiopian withdrawal, if it occurs, will open not least because the parts of the Islamist insurgency up a new period of uncertainty and risk. It could also that have the most guns and territory are not partici- provide a window of opportunity to relaunch a credi- pants. The key aim of its architects was to create a ble political process, however, if additional parties powerful political alliance, capable of stabilising the can be persuaded to join the Djibouti reconciliation country, marginalising the radicals and stemming the talks, and local and international actors – including tide of Islamist militancy. This was quickly made un- the U.S. and Ethiopia – accept that room must be found achievable by splits within the insurgent Alliance for for much of the Islamist insurgency in that process the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) as well as the TFG, and ultimately in a new government dispensation. and the rapid advance by the parts of the opposition, in particular radical militias like Al-Shabaab, that re- The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has failed ject the process. The ARS faction located in Asmara in four years to create a broad-based government and (ARS-A) and its controversial leader, Hassan Dahir now is non-functional, existing almost only in name. Aweys, also have stayed away from Djibouti. Those President Abdillahi Yusuf has marginalised large parts around the table – the ARS faction based in Djibouti of the population and exacerbated divisions. The latest (ARS-D) and the TFG – control very little territory. In confrontation with parliament and the prime minister addition, Yusuf has continuously undermined the has underlined that Yusuf hampers any progress on process, as he believes Djibouti is ultimately a strat- peace, has become a liability for the country’s survival egy to oust him. and should be encouraged to resign. Despite the reluctance of the international community Ethiopia’s attitude has hardened over the last few to engage with the Islamist opposition, there is no other months, and the mood in certain circles in Addis Ababa practical course than to reach out to its leaders in an has become almost hostile to the TFG leaders, in par- effort to stabilise the security situation with a cease- ticular Yusuf. The intention to withdraw reflects this fire and then move on with a process that addresses frustration, as well as unwillingness to continue to ac- the root causes of the conflict. Support for the process cept considerable losses in a war against the insurgency from countries with moral authority or influence on that is going badly. Opposition to the Ethiopian occu- the militias,