Chapter VIII. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY AND VIOLENCE, EARLY WARNING AND CONFLICT PREVENTION – IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE Marc Chernick The six chapters presented here each provide a different optic from which to view the functioning of democratic governance, violent conflict, and the relationships among the various components of each. Four of the chapters address political processes (García Villegas and Uprimny on the legal state, Martínez on state capacity, García and Hoskin on democracy and Chernick on social protest) while the two other chapters directly examine the multi-dimensional phenomena of violent conflict (Segura and Camacho on social violence and Reyes on political violence). Each chapter focuses on one or more of the eight quadrants of polyarchy and conflict outlined in the Georgetown-United Nations methodology. Individually, they probe and examine the core issues of how Colombia’s democratic regime functions, how the capacity and territorial presence of the Colombian state can be measured, how social/criminal violence has interacted with other forms of violence as well as impacted on democracy and the rule of law, and how political violence has affected democratic governance and legitimate state authority. In Chapter I, we outlined five phases of escalating conflict delineated by the International Peace Academy (IPA): • Potential Conflict • Gestation of Conflict • Trigger/Mobilization of Conflict • Conflict Escalation • Post-Conflict 406 The multi-dimensional nature of the Colombian violence does not fit neatly into this typology. Yet if we focus exclusively on the armed conflict, it is evident that Colombia –alone in Latin America -- is somewhere beyond the Trigger/Mobilization and well into the Conflict Escalation phase. The IPA characterizes this phase as: “Significant armed violence or its spread, which may lead to human rights abuses, humanitarian crises, refugees and IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons).”1 For Colombia, it is too late to speak of either “Conflict Prevention” or “Early Warning” in the traditional manner in which these concepts are normally applied. The armed conflict is fully developed and, in this case, deeply protracted. As such, as will be argued later in this chapter, the international community, Colombian government and civil society need to bring to bear the tools at their disposal to attempt to resolve the armed conflict. However, this case study, following the Georgetown-United Nations methodology, presents a broader framework that looks not just at the armed conflict but also other forms of violence as well as the functioning of the state and the democratic regime. The concept of early warning, too, has been broadened to include the types of political, economic and social crises that are likely to occur elsewhere in Latin America. In Colombia, even amid the armed conflict, these “early warning” signs are equally relevant. Indeed they are potentially more explosive because of the country’s endemic violence. This study helps identify these early warning indicators. The Colombian case study examined a political regime and state that are under severe strains from decades of violent warfare as well as from a substantial upsurge in criminal and social violence throughout the 1990s and the early years of the new century. The Uribe government (2002- ) reached office following more than three years of a frustrating and 407 ultimately failed peace process. It won with a mandate to strengthen and improve national and citizen security through increased spending on police, military, civilian intelligence and civil cooperation. The Uribe administration was also faced with confronting the consequences of the precipitous decline in economic and human development indicators that began with the economic crisis of the 1990s that wiped out almost two decades of social progress. Politically, the post-National Front democratic regime, established with the 1991 Constitution, is best viewed as a regime undergoing a prolonged transition from the earlier bi- partisan hegemony to a more participatory democracy. Thus far, a coherent national political alternative has not emerged and the traditional parties remain fragmented and atomized. The initial experiences at developing a third force in the nation’s politics -- most notably by the UP and the M-19 -- were overwhelmed by the political violence, reigning impunity and entrenched opposition from political and economic interests at the regional and national levels. The successes of the Polo Democrático in the mayoral race of Bogotá, the governor’s race in the Department (State) of Valle and in local and national races across the country in 2002 and 2003 are too early to evaluate. Other forces such as the civic candidates and small independent parties that have proliferated at every level have so far failed to win successive elections, except in a few exceptional regional and local cases. Civil society, too, has witnessed the diminution of traditional forms of social protest such as peasant marches, land invasions and labor strikes as violence has increased against journalists, labor leaders, teachers, human rights workers and social movement leaders. This more targeted violence against specific categories of individuals has in many cases drawn greater international scrutiny than national debate. In recent years, Colombia has consistently ranked number one or two in the world in assassinations of members of each of these groups – even considering the 408 declines in extra-judicial killings experienced since 2003. Colombia also leads the world – by far-- in kidnappings. Even with the decline in kidnappings since 2003 (see graph below) 2 almost 50% of all the world’s kidnapping occur in Colombia. Similarly, homicides in 2003 and 2004 declined more than 55% from their peak in 1991 (see Graph below). Yet here too caution is in order and success is relative. Colombia at 44 homicides per hundred thousand inhabitants in 2004 still ranks among the most violent country’s in the world, only superceded by post-conflict El Salvador and South Africa.3 By comparison, the United States –far and away the most violent country in the developed world – had a per-capita homicide rate of less than 5 per 100,000 down from 9.8 in 1991. State, regime and civil society leaders have not been passive in the face of such multifaceted violence nor do they view themselves as victims. Leaders in each realm have responded with a high degree of courage and often great perspicacity to the challenges facing the country. The result has been a dynamic political process, that, despite the violence and impunity, has witnessed new social organizations and largescale mobilizations in support of peace and against violence, kidnapping, and violations of human rights. The 1991 Constitution gave rise to a new generation of candidates and political parties, and, in some cases, broader electoral participation, though voting turnout remains relatively low in comparative regional terms. Moreover, the state has created certain institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Defensoría del Pueblo (Human Rights Ombudsmans Office), and the Fiscalía General (Investigating Attorney General’s Office) -- all outgrowths of the 1991 Constitution -- that have increased the defense of basic constitutional rights. The constitution also promoted new institutions of participatory democracy and decentralized government that have, in many cases, 409 facilitated greater democracy at the national and local levels, despite the serious challenges confronting the country. 8.1 KIDNAPPINGS IN COLOMBIA 2002-20041 Number of Total Kidnappings 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2,000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Source: Fondelibertad, País Libre 2005. 8.2 HOMICIDES PER 100,000 IN COLOMBIA 1990-2004 1 I want to thank Margarita García for research on 2004 and 2005 data. 410 The research presented in this case study underscores the great complexity found in Colombian politics. It recognizes the significant strengths as well as the multiple shortcomings and failures of the many institutions, actors and political processes. Each chapter focuses on a different aspect of state capacity, regime functioning, civil society and different forms of political violence. The main arguments, conclusions and general recommendations of each chapter are presented below. We then return to the methodology on conflict prevention and early warning to synthesize the findings and draw a broader set of recommendations. THE RULE OF LAW AND VIOLENCE The rule of law undergirds all aspects of the state. In the case study, García Villegas and Uprimny review the recent evolution of the legal system and delineate the great tensions that exist between concept and practice. On the one hand, the legal system has demonstrated a great capacity for reform and institution building, has carved out a degree of independence from the political system, and has developed a jurisprudence designed to safeguard human rights and expand access to justice. On the other hand, the judicial system remains ineffective, inaccessible, and rife with authoritarian and anti-democratic instruments, such as the “state of exception” authority given to the executive and a separate military system of justice that often shields human rights violations. García and Uprimny denominate this dichotomy the “hybrid state”. In Colombia, they argue, a constitutionalist and democratic tradition coexists with authoritarian functions. Guillermo O’Donnell, too, noted that