The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy is a division of Kasturi & Sons Ltd., publishers of The Hindu and group newspapers. It was inaugurated by the President of India, Pranab Mukherjee on January 31, 2013. The aim of The Hindu Centre is to promote research, dialogue and discussion to enable the creation of informed public opinion on key issues facing India to safeguard, strengthen and nourish parliamentary democracy and pluralism, and to contribute to the nation’s economic, social and political betterment. In accordance with this mission, The Hindu Centre publishes Policy Reports drawing upon the research of its scholars, to explain and highlight issues and themes relating to political affairs and public policy. These are intended to aid the public in making informed judgments on issues of public importance. The Hindu Centre publishes the Policy Reports online, and can be accessed at www.thehinducentre.com/publications/policy-report/ Published by: The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy, 859&860, Anna Salai, Chennai 600002, [email protected] All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher. The Phenomenon of Political Dynasties Among the Muslim Legislators of Uttar Pradesh Mohd Osama Public Policy Scholar, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy (February – May, 2018) --- ABSTRACT his report on the phenomenon of political dynasties among Muslims in Uttar Pradesh is an empirical enquiry into the extent it has impacted the legislature. The report bases T its findings in the fieldwork conducted in Uttar Pradesh to determine the dynastic credentials of Muslim legislators over the last two decades, and finds that the more marginalised a community, the larger the number of political dynasties it will have in the Legislature. Muslim political representation in the State legislature is just 6 per cent in the current assembly, while Muslim dynast MLAs account for 60 per cent. Most Muslim political dynasts are relatively young and politically inexperienced, but that hasn't prevented them from being re-nominated. If family connections have helped them to secure party tickets, they have also changed their party allegiances more often than their non-dynast counterparts. In Uttar Pradesh, both dynast and non- dynast Muslim legislators tend not only to be wealthy but also have a large number of serious criminal cases against them. To study this subject, I assembled the profiles of these dynastic candidates including details such as age, education, the process by which they were nominated and re-nominated, whether they switched political parties, and whether they have a criminal background: all this has been recorded in the primary dataset created for this report. TABLE OF CONTENTS I Introduction and context of the study 1 II Methodology 13 III Quantitative findings of the Research 17 IV Qualitative findings: Interviews of the dynasts 28 V Summary of the findings and limitations of the study 31 VI Tables 33 VII Bibliography 45 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS am grateful to The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public Policy for their immense help in the completion of this research. The intellectual interest of N. Ram in the topic was very I motivating. The discussions with V.S. Sambandan, Saptarshi Bhattacharya and Vidya Subrahmaniam were very fruitful. The logistical support by P.V. Lakshminarasimhan and C. Ranganathan was prompt and helpful. The Hindu Centre’s mehmaan nawazi (hospitality), from helping me with information not just about transport routes and means, but also Chennai’s best eating places, was very welcome for an ignorant North Indian like me. I would like to thank all my fellow Scholars who are not just good researchers but great people. Without Kanika’s interest in going to new places; Alamu’s conversations; Mudasir’s cooking; Grace’s light-hearted engagements; Girija’s stories about his hostel life; and Swapna’s interesting insights on the city, my stay in Chennai would not have been so memorable. I deeply thank Smita Gupta for her painstaking editing of the report; without her modification and simplification of the arguments, the report would have read differently. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my Ph.D. supervisor, Adnan Farooqui, with whom I first shared my intent to research the question of political dynasties. His strong emphasis on the research design which is based on a sound empirical understanding of Indian politics, solved half the task at hand; it is as much his report as mine. All the errors in the report are mine. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS B.J.P. : Bhartiya Janata Party B.S.P. : Bahujan Samaj Party E.C.I. : Election Commission of India I.A.S. : Indian Administrative Services I.N.C. : Indian National Congress M.L.A. : Member of the Legislative Assembly M.P. : Member of the Parliament O.B.C. : Other Backward Castes R.L.D. : Rashtriya Lok Dal S.P. : Samajwadi Party U.P. : Uttar Pradesh THE PHENOMENON OF POLITICAL DYNASTIES AMONG THE MUSLIM LEGISLATORS OF UTTAR PRADESH I. INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT OF THE STUDY he youngest M.L.A. elected to the 17th Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, who is the son of a well-known Muslim politician from Rampur, disagreed with my line of T questioning when I interviewed him about the advantage a candidate has, when he/she is the political heir of an established politician. He said, “When a doctor’s son becomes a doctor, nobody questions that; when an I.A.S. [officer]’s son prepares to become [an] I.A.S. [officer] or becomes an I.A.S. [officer], nobody ponders on it. Then, why should a politician’s son be asked about it?” He further added, “I am elected, not selected…a politician is just exposed to questioning”. Such responses are not unique to this young dynast, but can be heard among others of his tribe, as I discovered during my research for this report. In the introduction to her book Democratic Dynasties, Kanchan Chandra argues that the primary difference between the erstwhile traditional aristocratic dynasties and modern elected dynasts is that they are elected, and not selected (Chandra 2016). Being voted by the people is one of the greatest normative qualifiers for these political ‘heirs’. Hence, whether it is a notorious Muslim criminal-turned-politician M.L.A. from eastern U.P. or a Muslim representative from western U.P., they both argue in a very similar fashion about what they owe to their family members for ease of entry into the political arena and acceptance by the people. Broadly, a dynastic M.P. or M.L.A. is an elected candidate, who has a family member related by blood or marriage, preceding him or her in politics (Chandra 2016; Smith 2012; Querubin 2010; Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Synder 2009). In Parliament, 20 per cent, 30 per cent, and 22 per cent of the M.P.s who were elected in 2004, 2009, and 2014, respectively, were dynasts. If we consider only the Muslim M.P.s, 26 per cent, 36 per cent, and 32 per cent among them were dynasts in the 14th, 15th, and 16th Lok Sabha, respectively (Chandra 2016). The percentage of dynasts increases, when we look at only Muslim M.P.s from U.P. — 55 per cent, 43 per cent, and 100 per cent (only one Muslim M.P. from the State) respectively in the 14th, 15th, and 16th Lok Sabha.1 1 On the basis of the fieldwork undertaken as part of this project. 1 POLICY REPORT NO. 25 In the U.P. Legislative Assembly, the percentage of dynasts among Muslim M.L.A.s is even larger — 60 per cent, 53 per cent, and 60 per cent for the 15th (2007), 16th (2012), and 17th (2017, current assembly) assemblies, respectively.2 This phenomenon is not unique to India; it has been empirically found so in Nicaragua3, and Colombia4, where the elites and dynasties control most political parties, thanks to their weak organisational structures. In Japan, the hereditary system of elite recruitment is very high: in the 1990 general elections in Japan, around 170 nisei (second generation dynasts) contested the elections, and around 125 were elected. This was around a quarter of the 512 Diet (lower house) members.5 Daniel M. Smith, in his new book, argues that, since the 1996 general elections, more than a quarter of all M.P.s in the Japanese House of Representatives have been members of a democratic dynasty. 6 In Philippines, around 70 per cent of the 15th Philippine Congress representatives are dynasts 7 , and in the 2010 elections, roughly 50 per cent of the elected Congressmen and Governors had a relative who had previously held office. Moreover, in 35 of the 80 provinces in the Philippines, the Governor and Congressman are related.8 The question that comes to mind is: why does the phenomenon of dynasties occur in the first place? Kanchan Chandra argues that in the case of India, the returns, associated with a political career, financial or otherwise, associated with the State, and weak organisational political party structures, ensures that dynasties prosper in the political sphere. These ‘democratic dynasties’ are a result of modern political Indian institutions, not because of any pre-disposed or any other essential characteristics of Indian politics (Chandra 2016). 2 Ibid. 3 Vilas, C. M. 1992. “Family Affairs: Class, Lineage and Politics in Contemporary Nicaragua”, Journal of Latin American Studies, May, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 309-341. 4 Martz, J. D. 1992. “Party Elites and Leadership in Colombia and Venezuela”, Journal of Latin American Studies, February, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 87-121.