From Kuchma to Yushchenko Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution Taras Kuzio The elections of 2004 KRAINE’S presidential election on October 31, U2004, had far greater political significance than completed Ukraine’s transition merely selecting the country’s third post-communist president. The election also represented a de facto ref- from a post-Soviet state to a erendum on President Leonid Kuchma’s ten years in European state. office, which were marred by political crisis and scan- dal throughout most of his second term. The principal scandal—Kuchma’s complicity in the murder of an op- position journalist, Heorhiy Gongadze—began in Novem- ber 2000 and has come to be known as “Kuchmagate.”1 Hostility to Kuchma helped to revive and bolster civil society and opposition groups, giving them four years to organize and prepare for the 2004 elections. Much of this groundwork became apparent during the Orange Revolution—named for Yushchenko’s campaign color—that followed the November 21 runoff between Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. In April 2001, after parliament voted no confidence in Yushchenko’s government, the locus of opposition to Kuchma shifted from the Communist Party (KPU) to Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party and the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc. The KPU and its Socialist Party (SPU) allies had been the main source of opposition to Kuchma from 1993, when the KPU was again legal- ized as a political party, until 2000–2001, when national democrats and centrists joined forces under the Yushchenko government. Yushchenko’s shift to opposition against Kuchma and his oligarchic allies set the stage for the electoral TARAS KUZIO is a visiting professor at the Institute for European, Rus- struggles in 2002 and 2004. Our Ukraine won the pro- sian, and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University. His most re- portional half of the March 2002 parliamentary elec- cent work is as coeditor of Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives (Praeger, 2002). tions, marking the first time the KPU was knocked out Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 52, no. 2, March/April 2005, pp. 29–44. © 2005 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2005 $9.50 + 0.00. Kuzio From Kuchma to Yushchenko 29 As early as December 2003 Kuchma warned that the October 2004 elections would be Ukraine’s dirtiest,3 a prophecy that proved to be accurate. The attempted poi- soning of Yushchenko during the campaign shows how far his opponents were willing to go to stop his election.4 Western medical tests concluded that Yushchenko’s blood-dioxin level was more than 6,000 times higher than normal.5 It’s Time for a Change For Yushchenko’s supporters, the attempted poisoning confirmed that the election posed a simple choice be- In September 2002, Socialist Oleksandr Moroz, Yulia Tymoshenko, and tween good and evil. As a student member of the tent Communist leader Petro Symonenko (left to right) combined forces to city at the forefront of the Orange Revolution explained, stage large-scale protests demanding the ouster of President Leonid Kuchma. (AP Photo/Viktor Pobedinsky) “We should never let such a person as Yanukovych be in power because God knows what he can do to us— knowing what he did to Yushchenko.”6 The poisoning of its usual lead position. The main contest in the 2004 was subconsciously seen as a reprise of the assassina- presidential election was never in doubt—the race would tion of four émigré nationalist leaders by the Soviet se- be fought by Yushchenko and any candidate chosen by cret services between 1926 and 1959. For those who Kuchma. In April 2004, after parliament failed to vote supported Yushchenko, the attempt proved that Ukraine’s for constitutional reforms that would have kept him in ruling elite had not changed since the Soviet era. office, Kuchma designated the leader of the Regions of This fostered and strengthened the feeling that it was Ukraine party, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, as time for a change, a sentiment reflected in the name of his heir apparent. the radical youth organization PORA! (It’s Time!). The 2004 election season dealt a further blow to the Yushchenko portrayed the election as a choice between communists. The leader of the KPU, Petro Symonenko, change (represented by himself) and a continuation of finished fourth in the October 31 vote, behind the status quo (Yanukovych). Opinion polls showed that Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and the leader of the SPU, upwards of 70 percent of Ukrainians favored a change Oleksandr Moroz. During the second round, Moroz in course. backed Yushchenko, while the KPU marginalized itself The high stakes made it impossible for the elites that by refusing to back either Yanukovych or Yushchenko. supported Yanukovych to even contemplate holding free The KPU is set to cooperate with the Social Democratic and fair elections, for they knew they would lose.7 As a Party of Ukraine–United (SDPUo) and Regions of senior presidential adviser, Mikhail Pogrebynsky, ad- Ukraine in parliament after Yushchenko’s victory. mitted, “Many people in power think they can only win The 2004 election marked the end of Kuchma’s sec- unfairly.”8 Although both President Kuchma and Prime ond term in office and therefore represented a succes- Minister Yanukovych stated on countless occasions that sion crisis.2 Kuchma and his oligarchic allies saw the they “guaranteed” free and fair elections, in reality the election as an opportunity to consolidate autocratic rule centrist camp never contemplated this option.9 and thereby safeguard their personal and clan interests. Naturally, however, Yanukovych and his backers did From their standpoint, the ascent of any non-centrist not disclose their real intentions. The prime minister candidate, whether from the left or the right, would be told the Washington Times, “Ukraine is building a state a disaster because it might lead to a redistribution or that is based on European values and will ensure it con- confiscation of the assets they had accumulated under ducts its life and laws in line with Europe.”10 Serhiy Kuchma and even to imprisonment or exile. In addition Tyhipko, head of Yanukovych’s campaign, similarly to the Gongadze murder, Kuchma himself was impli- claimed, “I will do everything so that the campaign goes cated in a host of other illegal acts, such as ordering publicly, openly, maximum democratically, without violence against journalists and politicians, election quarrels and administrative resources.”11 In reality, the fraud, corruption, and arms trafficking. Yanukovych campaign abused the state’s administra- Thus the stakes in the 2004 election were always high. tive resources to an extent unheard of in any previous 30 Problems of Post-Communism March/April 2005 Ukrainian election. The chair of the Central Election Commission, Sergei Kivalov, had promised to deal se- verely with “transgressions” and to prohibit people from lobbying their interests with him,12 but he was directly involved in election fraud and knew of the “transit server” used to manipulate the vote. Kivalov was dis- missed after round two and is now the subject of a crimi- nal investigation of election fraud. Ukrainian voters tend not to trust state institutions and so were always pessimistic about the chance for free elections. As early as April 2004 only 15.8 percent of Ukrainians believed that a free election was possible, with 70.4 percent believing the opposite.13 Little won- der that Ukrainians poured onto the streets after round two. Only 13 percent believed the official result—a Yanukovych victory—proclaimed by the Central Elec- tion Commission. A staggering 64 percent believed that any official results would be falsified.14 As Ukrayina moloda concluded in July, “It is plain from the very first day that the guarantee of Prime Minister Yanukovych to hold free elections is a farce.”15 Out for Blood Viktor Yushchenko, right, and socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz smile af- How could Kuchma have known ahead of time that the ter signing an agreement on a fair presidential election, in Kiev, August 2, elections would be “the dirtiest”? Although he and 2004. Moroz’s agreement to support Yushchenko in a runoff was a con- siderable blow to their opponent, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. (AP Yanukovych both denied any responsibility for the con- Photo/Anatoly Medzyk). duct of the elections, neither Ukrainian voters nor out- side observers believed their declarations of innocence. In a poll after round two, 44.9 percent of the respondents the origin of the infamous transit server, came from the believed that Kuchma had ended his term in office with presidential administration, implicating both its head, “shame,” and another 35.5 percent believed he had shown Viktor Medvedchuk, and Kuchma. How could himself to be an “indecisive politician.”16 Only 8 per- Yanukovych not know that his trusted allies from the cent of Ukrainians held that Kuchma left office with Regions of Ukraine party in his own government were more authority and “greater respect in society.” A stag- running a shadow election campaign headquarters? gering 75.9 percent believed that his actions during the That there was such a setup becomes evident if one second round were intended solely to defend his own looks at the amount of planning needed to organize interests and those of his allies—only 11.5 percent Ukraine’s dirtiest election, the involvement of Russian thought that Kuchma had acted “in defense of national political “advisers,” and the massive use of slush funds.17 interests.” The financial and logistical complexity of supporting As president, Kuchma was the guarantor of the con- the sixteen “technical candidates” (Potemkin candidates stitution. As prime minister, Yanukovych was head of used to divert votes from Yushchenko),18 the massive the government.