SCIENCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY JAMES A. SHANNON Editm P u a L I s HE D BY ?lie RocKefelIcllcr Uniwmsi&Press NEW YORK CITY 1973 SCIENCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY SCIENCE AND THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY JAMES A. SHANNON Editm P u a L I s HE D BY ?lie RocKefelIcllcr Uniwmsi&Press NEW YORK CITY 1973 COPYRIGHT© 197 3 BY THE ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY PRESS L I B R A R Y 0 F C 0 N G R E S S C A T A L 0 G U E C A R D N 0. 7 3 · 7 6 3 9 8 S T A N D A R D B 0 0 K N 0. 8 7 4 7 0 - 0 1 7 · 5 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SEC 0 N D PRINTING 1975 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION JAMES A. SHANNON vii THE PURPOSE AND UTILITY OF SCIENCE I. Science and Social Purpose CARYL P. HASKINS 1 II. The Utility of Science WILLIAM D. McELROY 19 DEVELOPMENT AND GOALS III. Organization and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge HAROLD HIMSWORTH 31 IV. Problems of Science, Goals and Priorities RoBERTS. MoRISON 47 THE UNIVERSITY V. Science, Technology, and The University WALTER A. RosENBLITH 67 VI. Support of Research and Graduate Education in the United States IvAN L. BENNETT, JR. 87 THE FEDERAL SUPPORT OF SCIENCE VII. The Physical Sciences: Bellwether of Science Policy HARVEY BROOKS I 05 VIII. Social Change and Social Science HENRY w. RIECKEN 135 IX. Biomedical Sciences JosEPHS. MuRTAUGH 157 X. Industrial Research and Development PATRICK E. HAGGERTY 189 SUPPORT OF SCIENCE XI. Federal Science and Its Prospects EDWARD E. DAVID, JR. 217 XII. The Role of Graduate Education GERARD PIEL 227 CONTRIBUTORS 239 INDEX 247 INTRODUCTION The science enterprises of the nation • are vigorous, diversified, and gen­ erally characterized by excellence. But, looking to the future, there are uncertainties which may limit their effectiveness. The recent erosion of federal support for science may be less a factor in this than the lack of suitable mechanisms to guide the further evolution of science programs and adjust their goals to the needs of society. Federal actions are par­ ticularly important, because of the dominant role of federal agencies in these regards. The profound influence of science and its derived technologies on contemporary society is obvious. But the reverse-i.e., the pervasive in­ fluence of societal need and its attitude on the magnitude and substan­ tive content of contemporary science-is less evident, even though a mix of domestic and international forces are common determinants in the definition of both the character and the scope of the nation's scientific inquiries. In this view, scientists should have a sensitive and clear under­ standing of the needs of society and the role science can play in their satisfaction. But also, in these complex interactions, society would do well to understand its own obligations. It must recognize that demands are imposed on scientists by the internal dynamics of their fields, com­ pliance to which directly determines the effectiveness of their enterprises. THE SOCIAL BACKDROP 1945-1970 The last quarter of a century was a period of dramatic change in the lives of all nations and the relations of many to one another. 1945-1955: The United States was clearly a superpower of great affluence, and there seemed to be few limitations on its domestic or inter­ national capabilities. Concurrently, there was a progressive decay in colonialism and many new nations emerged, each with a limited modern capability. In consequence, the world influence of some Western Euro­ pean nations lessened, despite the rapid restoration of their industrial *Science is used here as a general term to encompass research, development, and their associated educational enterprises. The term covers both academic and industrial ac­ tivities that are supported by official and private agencies alike. vii plants, and that of the U.S.S.R. increased as it developed a substantial technological competence. These happenings were accompanied by open conflict in the Far East, continuing unease in the Middle East, and in­ creasing tension between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The overall influence of these occurrences on U.S. science was mixed, but throughout the decade there was a general expansion in the federal support of academic science, somewhat hampered in the latter years as national resources were expended during the terminal phases of the Korean conflict. Cutbacks in the support of science as a result of the Korean conflict were less evident than a slowing of the anticipated growth. 1955-1960: The United States during this mid-period had many costly international commitments. But by compromising one conflict (Korea) and taking initial steps in another (Vietnam), there was a firming of the polarization between the United States and the Communist na­ tions. Then, there was a progressive disillusionment of many dependent nations in the benevolence of the great powers and the emergence of "third world" nations, poor as well as uncommitted. The U.S.S.R., with nuclear weapons available, put both missiles and man in orbit, thus challenging the technical preeminence of the United States. This period was particularly important to scientific research and de­ velopment in the United States. The superiority of U.S. science seemed secure during the early years of the fifties. While early-warning systems (for aircraft) and the propulsion and guidance of rockets were trouble­ some, the defense agencies selected short-range targets for emphasis, ac­ companied by a beginning withdrawal of its support for academic sci­ ence. Although NIH programs burgeoned beginning in 1956, modest increases were given to the newly developed National Science Foundation, and the Atomic Energy Commission embarked on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, some academic programs in the physical sciences were in jeopardy. Academic programs supported by the Air Force were in the process of substantial reduction when the Russian challenge of Sputnik I and II sharply reversed the downward trend and signalized a sharp change in national priorities. Preeminence was given to space and de­ fense-related science and technology, and to associated educational activi­ ties. The growth of biomedical programs continued and were not par­ ticularly affected. 1960-1970: The past decade has seen the United States disturbed by events surrounding the firm establishment of a Communist nation in the Western Hemisphere, its resources drained by an increasingly unpopular war in Southeast Asia, and other costly international commitments. Then there was a flare-up of open hostility in the Middle East, with the viii Introduction U.S.S.R. committed to support what it viewed to be its own interests in both Southeast Asia and the Near East. The period also covered the open break between the U.S.S.R. and mainland China. The latter, with great hostility to the western world and a beginning competence in modern weaponry, was viewed as a threat to peace in its own right. Then there was a break in the solid front of the NATO nations, a deterioration in the industrial capability of some member nations, and an increased capability of others. The counterpart took place to a lesser extent within the U.S.S.R. and some of its satellite nations. Political instability became a way of life for a number of nations, but there was increasing disillusion­ ment of an increasing number of nations with war as an instrument of national policy. Also, the costly arms race between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and some appreciation of their inability to continue in their present operational modes, led to beginning attempts to find areas of mutual accommodation. It is not surprising that increasing social unrest was more common during this period than social tranquility and that rational guidelines for the future development of many nations were less than clear. The United States entered the decade an arrogantly affluent nation with the appearance of having unlimited resources. It ends the decade with many uncertain purposes, but with a profound appreciation of unmet social needs. There are two coupled imperatives, as we now view our national life. First, our priorities do not seem to reflect our national needs, and the extent of the shift that will be required is now only dimly apparent. Second, the nation's ability to satisfy its internal needs has as one essen­ tial a continuing healthy economy. Science and technology must find their place within the framework of these coupled imperatives. This will be a complicated undertaking and will impose strains on our national purposes and the vigor with which they are pursued. The undertaking will be made more difficult or more simple, depending on the correctness of our estimates of: the resources that are expended for defense; the consensus we reach on the priority given to competing social objectives and on the rate of progress we deem to be reasonable; the resulting balance that obtains in the allocation of resources for social and all other purposes. All this is complicated by the increasing development of humanistic life styles of large segments of the population, by public disenchantment with the power of science and technology to solve complex problems, by the impatience of some groups to share in the fruits of affluence, and Introduction ix the unwillingness of others to place their recent economic gains in jeopardy. THE SCIENCE SCENE With this pot pourri of domestic and international problems, it is not surprising that fundamental trends relating to science were perturbed by transients. The important trends include a progressive increase in all science and technology and a general increase in the educational level of the nation.