T O EN F J TM U R ST U.S. Department of Justice A I P C E E D B O J C S F A V Office of Justice Programs M F O I N A C I J S R E BJ G O OJJ DP O F PR National Institute of Justice JUSTICE National Institute of Justice R e s e a r c h i n A c t i o n Jeremy Travis, Director January 1997 Highlights Key Legislative Issues in Criminal Justice: Mandatory sentencing enhance- ments, including the widely dis- Mandatory Sentencing cussed three-strikes laws enacted in a number of jurisdictions, are by Dale Parent, Terence Dunworth, Douglas McDonald, and William Rhodes aimed at deterring known and po- tentially violent offenders and inca- By 1994 all 50 States had enacted one or A second frequently mentioned mandatory pacitating convicted criminals 1 through long-term incarceration. more mandatory sentencing laws, and sentencing enhancement is “truth-in-sen- Congress had enacted numerous manda- tencing,” provisions for which are in the Studies have described a number tory sentencing laws for Federal offend- Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce- of consequences of earlier manda- ers. Furthermore, many State officials ment Act of 1994. States that wish to tory sentencing laws, including the have recently considered proposals to qualify for Federal aid under the Act are following: enhance sentencing for adults and juve- required to amend their laws so that im- ● Arrest rates, indictments, plea niles convicted of violent crimes, usually prisoned offenders serve at least 85 per- bargains, and convictions decline by mandating longer prison terms for cent of their sentences. after mandatory sentencing laws violent offenders who have a record of go into effect, while early dismiss- serious crimes. Three-strikes laws (and, Rationale for mandatory als, early diversions, trial rates, and in some jurisdictions, two-strikes laws) sentencing sentencing delays increase. are the most prominent examples of such Mandatory sentences are based on two ● sentencing enhancements. The net probability that offend- goals—deterrence and incapacitation. The ers will be imprisoned is unaffected Three-strikes laws impose longer prison primary purposes of modest mandatory (after all variables are taken into ac- count). terms than earlier mandatory minimum prison terms (e.g., 3 years for armed rob- sentencing laws. For example, Cali- bery) are specific deterrence, which applies ● For those imprisoned, the length fornia’s three-strikes law requires that to already sanctioned offenders, and gen- of sentence increases. offenders who are convicted of a violent eral deterrence, which aims to deter pro- crime, and who have had two prior con- spective offenders. If the law successfully ● Studies of sentencing practices in the Federal courts find no com- victions, serve a minimum of 25 years; increases the imprisonment rate, the ef- pelling evidence that judges are the law also doubles prison terms for of- fects of incapacitation also will grow be- unfairly applying mandatory mini- fenders convicted of a second violent cause fewer offenders will be free to mum sentences to racial and ethnic felony.2 Three-strikes laws vary in victimize the population at large. The in- minorities. However, African breadth. For example, some stipulate tent of three-strikes (and even two-strikes) Americans receive longer sentences that both of the prior convictions and the is to incapacitate selected violent offenders than whites in the Federal courts, current offense be violent felonies; oth- for very long terms—25 years or even life. according to one study, because ers require only that the prior felonies be They have no specific deterrent effect if they constitute the majority of violent. Some three-strikes laws count those confined will never be released, but those convicted of trafficking in only prior adult violent felony convic- their general deterrent effect could, in tions, while others permit consideration theory, be substantial. continued . of juvenile adjudications for violent crimes. R e s e a r c h i n A c t i o n Highlights By passing mandatory sentencing laws, a deterrent to drug crime in New York 7 continued . legislators convey the message that cer- City. None of the studies examined the tain crimes are deemed especially grave incapacitation effects of these laws. and that people who commit them de- crack cocaine, a crime Congress serve, and may expect, harsh sanctions. The criminal justice system. The chose to punish severely. criminal courts rely on a high rate of These laws are a rapid and visible re- guilty pleas to speed case processing Three-strikes laws are costly. A study sponse to public outcries following hei- and thus avoid logjams. Officials can of- of California’s statute projected that nous or well-publicized crimes. The high fer inducements to defendants to obtain the law would: long-term costs of mandatory sentencing these pleas. If only in the short term, are deferred because the difficult fund- ● Increase the prison population in mandatory sentencing laws may disrupt ing choices implicit in this policy can be California over the next quarter-cen- established plea-bargaining patterns by delayed or even avoided. tury by a factor of three. preventing a prosecutor from offering a ● Increase costs during the same short prison term (less than the new Impact of mandatory sentencing minimum) in exchange for a guilty plea. period by $5.5 billion per year, on laws average, for a cumulative additional However, unless policymakers enact cost of $137.5 billion. Mandatory sentencing has had signifi- long-term mandatory sentences that ap- cant consequences that deserve close at- ply to many related categories of crimes, ● Reduce serious crimes by 28 per- tention, among them its impact on crime prosecutors usually can shift strategies cent, at a total correctional cost of and bargain on charges rather than on approximately $16,300 per crime and the operations of the criminal justice averted. system. The possible differential conse- sentences. quences for certain groups of people also The findings of research on the impact of An alternative to mandatory mini- bear examination. mum sentencing provisions, which mandatory sentencing laws on the crimi- would protect sentencing policy, Crime. Evaluations of mandatory sen- nal justice system have been summa- preserve legislative control, and still tencing have focused on two types of rized by a prominent scholar.8 He found toughen sentences for repeat violent crimes—those committed with handguns that officials make earlier and more se- offenders, is the use of presumptive and those related to drugs (the offenses lective arrest, charging, and diversion sentences. most commonly subjected to mandatory decisions; they also tend to bargain less Other possibilities include: minimum penalties in State and Federal and to bring more cases to trial. Specifi- courts). An evaluation of the Massachu- cally, he found that: ● Directing mandatory sentencing setts law that imposed mandatory jail • Criminal justice officials and prac- laws at only a few especially serious terms for possession of an unlicensed titioners (police, lawyers, and judges) ex- crimes and requiring “sunset” provi- handgun concluded that the law was an sions. ercise discretion to avoid application of effective deterrent of gun crime,3 at least laws they consider unduly harsh. ● Subjecting long mandatory sen- in the short term. tences to periodic administrative re- • Arrest rates for target crimes decline However, studies of similar laws in view to determine the advisability of soon after mandatory sentencing laws Michigan4 and Florida5 found no evi- continued confinement. take effect. dence that crimes committed with fire- ● Including a funding plan in sen- arms had been prevented. An evaluation • Dismissal and diversion rates increase tencing legislation to ensure aware- of mandatory gun-use sentencing en- ness of and responsibility for long- at early stages of case processing after hancements in six large cities (Detroit, mandatory sentencing laws take effect. term costs. Jacksonville, Tampa, Miami, Philadel- ● Developing policy that makes phia, and Pittsburgh) indicated that the • For defendants whose cases are not more effective and systematic use of laws deterred homicide but not other dismissed, plea-bargain rates decline intermediate sanctions. violent crimes.6 An assessment of New and trial rates increase. York’s Rockefeller drug laws was unable to support the claim for their efficacy as • For convicted defendants, sentencing delays increase. 2 R e s e a r c h i n A c t i o n • Enactment of mandatory sentencing laws has little impact on the probabil- ity that offenders will be imprisoned About the Key Legislative Issues Series (when the effects of declining arrests, indictments, and convictions are taken I n 1995 the National Institute of Jus- State policymakers expressed a strong de- into account). tice (NIJ) contracted with Abt Associates sire for more timely and useful informa- Inc. to interview legislators and policy- tion about research findings on important • Sentences become longer and more makers throughout the country to iden- criminal justice policy issues they were ad- severe. tify important criminal justice topics being dressing. However, they voiced reserva- considered by State legislatures and to tions about gleaning useful information The research review concluded that determine the information they need to from technical research reports. mandatory sentencing laws: help them make more informed deci- sions. Altogether, 89 legislators, legisla- Reviews and summaries of the research • Do not achieve certainty and pre- tive staff members, and other criminal literature on the four key topics identified dictability because officials circum- justice policymakers (e.g., sentencing present the information in a way that is vent them if they believe the results commission members) were interviewed more accessible to policymakers. Of the are unduly harsh. in 23 States. The interviews were con- four reports, this one summarizes what is ducted during the opening weeks of the known about mandatory sentencing and • Are redundant with respect to pro- 1995 State legislative sessions.