DOCUMENT RESUME ED 043 927 24 CG 006 047 AUTHOR Petrie, Hugh G. TITLE The Logical Effects of Theory on Observational Categories and Methodology in Verbal Learning Theory. Final Report.. INSTITUTION Northwestern Univ., Evanston, Ill.. SPONS AGENCY Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C. BUREAU NO BR -8.E -023 PUB DATE Jul 59 CONTRACT °EC-4-8-080023-3569(010) NOTE 152p. EDRS PRICE EDRS Price MF-$0.75 HC-$7.70 DESCRIPTORS Definitions, *Learning Theories, Linguistics, Philosophy, Psycholinguistics, Psychology, *Verbal Development, *Verbal Learning ABSTRACT This report attempts to determine to what extent the thesis that observation is theory-dependent holds in the area of verbal learning theory. This area was chosen because: (1) a philosophical criticism of verbal learning theory will contribute to the difficult task of investigating the border area between philosophy and psychology; and (2)no one theory has yet emerged as pre-eminent so that the difficulties of handling competing theories are not existent. While no "theory" has yet been produced three general positions have emerged: gestaltism, functional associationism, and transformational linguistics. Discussed are: (1) some of the grounds for suspecting that the theory-dependency thesis holds for verbal learning theory; (2) that theoretical terms must be ultimately definable in terms of operations describable in some theory-neutral observation language; (3) some of the criticisms of operationalism to the more general question of whether there can be a theory-neutral observation language at all; and (4) details of the controversy between Skinner for the associationists and Chomsky for the transformational linguists. An appendix includes a paper which explains the philosophical underpinnings of the theory-dependency thesis as presented by Wittgenstein. (Author/CJ) otfxg_e-dg5 cv c 67.- re% LAJ THE LOGICAL EFFECTS OF THEORY ON OBSERVATIONAL CATEGORIES AND METHODOLOGY IN VERBAL LEARNING THEORY Hugh G. Petrie Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH. EDUCATION & WELFARE OFFICE OF EDUCATION THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF FINAL REPORT VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECES- SARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDU- Office of Education CATION POSITION OR POLICY. Contract No. 0-8-080023-3669(010) Final Report Project No. 8-E-023 Contract No. OEC 0-8-080023-3669(010) Observational Categories in Verbal Learning Theory Hugh G. Petrie Department of Philosophy Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois 60201 July, 1969 The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a contract with the Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Contractors undertaking such projects under Government sponsorship are encouraged to express freely their professional judgment in the conduct of the project. Points of view or opinions stated do not, therefore, necessarily represent official Office of Education position or policy. U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE Office of Education Bureau of Research Office of Education Contract No. 0-P-080023-3669(010) FINAL REPORT: The Logical Effects of Theory on Observational Categories and r,ethodolo.7y in Verbal Learning Theory Hugh G. Petrie June 20, 1969 Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois Page Chapter Is Introduction 1 Chapter Why Has Leurninrr, Theory Failed to Teach Us How to Learn? 7 Chapter III: A Dogma of Operationalism 22 Chapter IV: SeeinR and Seeing As 45 Chapter Vs Chomsky and Shinners A Partial Case Study 66 Appendix: Science and Metaphysics: A Wittgensteinian Interpretation. 95 I. INTRODUCTION Ever since scientific research was placed on a firm empirical footing by the work of Bacon, Galileo, Newton, Mill and others, it has been generally assumed that the laws and theories of any science must arise directly out of observation and experimentation. Based on this assump- tion a great deal of work in philosophy and methodology of science has gone into making explicit what might well be called the "logic" of scientific discovery. This work reached its zenith in logical positivism where an attempt was made once and for all to base the rules of discovery and theoretical meaningfulness on a scientifically neutral observation language. It was assumed that an unproblematic observation language did exist, i.e., a language which was not itself theoretically determined but was agreed on by all, and which could be used to state the observable facts once and for all. The problem was then conceived as how to re- late this neutral 2anguage to the highly abstract theoretical language, thereby showing the relation of theory to experi- ence and the precise logical role of experience, formulated in the observation language, in providing an empirical con- tent for the theories. The great clarity which the positivists were able to achieve in this attempt has led to a recognition of the prob- lems and inadequacies of this approach. Recently a number of philosophers and scientists have come to abandon the earlier model of empirical science as arising solely from careful observation and collection of data. These men, led by such as Thomas Kuhn, Willard Van Orman. Quine and N. R. Hanson, have begun to argue that scientific theories are radically underdetermined by experience and that although scientific theories must have empirical content, in that they must be testable by experience, they dO not and cannot arise solely out of experience. It has been argued that what even counts as relevant data is essentially theory de- pendent. That is, two scientists may look at the "same" thing and, because of different theoretical. perspectives, may literally not see the same object. What is relevant data for one theory may be totally ignored by another theory and may not even be capable of being observed. Such a conception of science is both radical and dis- turbing. If it is true, it raises some profound foundational and methodological questions. It deserves to be investigated in all its ramificatiOns and implications. One of the pos- sible implications of such a conception of science, is the extent to which the methodology of science is affected by the inability even to see certain data from certain theoretical perspectives. On the one hand, it might be argued that the essential limitation of a general theoretical perspective would, of course, be manifested in differing methodologies 3 and experimental results, which, because of the differing perspectives, could not be said to contradict each other but rather to talk "through" each other. On the other hand, s. it could also be plausibly maintained that although such a relativity of theoretical perspective and hence relativity of observation may be important on a very high level of theory construction and evaluation, nevertheless on the levels of methodology or of experimentation such a relativity is not present or can be safely ignored for practical pur- poses. This report attempts to explore some of these implications and to determine to what extent the thesis that observation is theory-dependent holds in a particular area of scientific inquiry. The case chosen for examination here is verbal learning theory at its present state of development. Why verbal learning theory? The reasons are two: First, a philosophical criticism of verbal learning theory will, if nothing else, contribute to the lengthy and difficult task of investigating the border area between philosophy and psychology Significant philosophical questions have been raised, notably by Wittgenstein, which point to an intimate connection betweeen the fundamental structure of language and how we acquire our ability to use language, but the nature of this connection remains problematic. Verbal learning theory as an empirical inquiry may shed some light on this philosophical issue. On the other hand, an inquiry into verbal learning theory from a philosophical point of view may reveal conceptual problems which may in turn lead to resolution of some of the theoretical difficulties that plague the field. Thus both philosophy and psychology stand to gain from such an inquiry. The second reason is more directly relevant to the enterprise of confirming or disconfirming the theory- dependency thesis. Heretofore, discussion of the thesis has been based primarily on examples of competing theories drawn from the history of science; e.g.; the Ptolemaic system of astronomy vs. the Copernican, the phlogiston vs. the kinetic theories of heat, Newtonian vs. relativistic mechanics, etc. While such examples may be highly sugges- tive, the danser is present (especially if the theory-dependency thesis is true) that our current set of scientific theories and our interpretations of the history of science may distort our conclusions as to what the influences were of an outdated theory on those who held it. We do not today accept the phlogiston theory of heat and hence have difficulty deter- mining how heat phenomena were seen by adherents of that theory. Our historical perspective prevents, or at least makes ex- tremely difficult, any attempt to "see" from a discarded point of view. Such difficulties can be avoided; however, by con- sidering a current issue in science, where no one theory has 5 yet emerged as pre-eminent. The investigator must, of course, not yet have committed himself to one of the competing theories. Verbal learning theory in its present state of develop- ment is extremely well-suited to this type of investigation. A substantial amount of experimental work has been done in this field; and although nothing that has been dignified with the name of "theory" has as yet been produced, three general positions have emerged with regard to learning theory: gestaltism, functional associationism, and transformational linguistics. These positions can be examined with respect to their various observational categories and with respect to their polemical parts vie A vis each other. The results should show what influences there may be on observation and methodology due tothe differences in basic point of view within the field.