Activity Report 2016

ACTIVITY REPORT 2016

Review Investigations, Control of Special
Intelligence Methods and Recommendations

Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies
Review Committee

Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee
Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland
e Dutch and French language versions of this report are the official versions. In case of conflict between the Dutch and French language versions and the English language version, the meaning of the first ones shall prevail.

Activity Report 2016. Review Investigations, Control of Special Intelligence Methods and Recommendations Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee

Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee Rue de Louvain 48, 1000 Brussels – Belgium + 32 (0)2 286 29 11 [email protected] www.comiteri.be

ISBN 978-1-78068-642-4 D/2018/7849/27 NUR 823

All rights reserved. Nothing from this report may be reproduced, stored in an automated database or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior consent of the publishers, except as expressly required by law.

CONTENTS

List of abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

Table of contents of the complete Activity Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Review investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Control of special intelligence methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

APPENDICES

Extract of the Act of 18 July 1991 governing Review of the Police and Intelligence Services and the Coordination Unit for reat Assessment. . . . . 125

Extract of the Act of 30 November 1998 governing the Intelligence and Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BCC BCCP BICS BOJ
Belgian Criminal Code Belgian Code of Civil Procedure Belgacom International Carrier Services Belgian Oﬃcial Journal
CCB
Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (Centrum voor

Cybersecurity België – Centre pour la cybersécurité Belgique)

requirements management Chief of Defence Control Agency for Management of Police

Information (Controleorgaan voor politionele informatie – Organe de contrôle de l’information policière)

CHOD C.O.C.

Radicalisation
CTG CUTA
Counter Terrorist Group Coordination Unit for reat Assessment

relation to the processing of personal data (Wet tot

bescherming van de persoonlijke levenssfeer ten opzichte van de verwerking van persoonsgegevens – Loi relative à la protection de la vie privée à l’égard des traitements de données à caractère personnel)

FCCU FTF
Federal Computer Crime Unit Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GCCR GCHQ GISS
Governmental Coordination and Crisis Centre General Communications Headquarters (UK) General Intelligence and Security Service of the

Armed Forces (Algemene Dienst Inlichting en Veiligheid van de Krijgsmacht – Service Général du Renseignement et de la Sécurité des Forces armées)

List of abbreviations

Intelligence Services Act Act of 30 November 1998 governing the intelligence

and security services (Wet houdende regeling van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdienst – Loi organique des services de renseignement et de sécurité)

NTF OSINT OVG Parl. doc PNR POC Review Act
National Task Force Open Source Intelligence Operation Vigilant Guardian Parliamentary Document Passenger Name Record Point of contact Act of 18 July 1991 governing the review of police and intelligence services and of the Coordination Unit

for reat Assessment (Wet tot regeling van het toezicht op politie- en inlichtingendiensten en op het coördinatieorgaan voor de dreigingsanalyse – Loi organique du contrôle des services de police et de renseignement et de l’organe de coordination pour l’analyse de la menace)

SEP SIGINT SIM
Scientiﬁc and Economic Potential Signals Intelligence Special Intelligence Methods

collection methods used by the intelligence and

security services (Wet betreﬀende de methoden voor het verzamelen van gegevens door de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten – Loi relative aux méthodes de recueil de données par les services de renseignement et de sécurité)

monitoring the speciﬁc and exceptional intelligence collection methods used by the intelligence and security services
SLA

viii
Service Level Agreement

List of abbreviations

(Vast Comité van Toezicht op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten – Comité permanent de contrôle des services de renseignement et de sécurité)

Standing Police Monitoring Committee (Vast Comité

van Toezicht op de politiediensten – Comité permanent de contrôle des services de police)

Standing Committee P State Security reat Assessment Act

Veiligheid van de Staat – Sûreté de l’État

Act of 10 July 2006 on reat Assessment (Wet

betreﬀende de analyse van de dreiging – Loi relative à l’analyse de la menace)

INTRODUCTION

e Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee (hereaﬅer Standing Committee I) is a permanent and independent review body. It was set up by the Review Act of 18 July 1991 and has been operational since May 1993.¹
e Standing Committee I is responsible for reviewing the activities and functioning of the two Belgian intelligence services: the civil intelligence service, State Security, and his military counterpart, the General Intelligence and Security Service. In addition, it supervises, together with the Standing Committee P, the functioning of the Coordination Unit for reat Assessments²and its various supporting services.
e review relates to the legitimacy (supervision of observance of the applicable laws and regulations), effectiveness (supervision of the efficiency of the intelligence services), and coordination (the mutual harmonisation of the work of the services concerned). With regard to the supporting services of the Coordination Unit for reat Assessments, the review only relates to their obligation to pass on information on terrorism and extremism.
e Standing Committee I performs its review role through investigations carried out on its own initiative or on the request of the Parliament or the competent minister or authority. Additionally, the Standing Committee I can act on request of a citizen and of any person holding a civil service position, as well as any member of the armed forces, who has been directly concerned by the intervention of one of the intelligence services.
Since 1 September 2010, the Standing Committee I has also been acting as a judicial body in the control of the special intelligence methods used by the intelligence and security services. e so-called SIM Act of 4 February 2010 has provided the two Belgian intelligence services with an extensive additional arsenal of special (specific or exceptional) powers. However, they come under the judicial control of the Standing Committee I.
e Standing Committee I and its Investigation Service have many powers.
For example, the reviewed and controlled services must send, on their own initiative, all documents governing the conduct of the members of the service, and the Committee can request any other text or document. e fact that many

12
e Standing Committee I celebrated its 20^thanniversary in 2013 (VAN LAETHEM, W. and

VANDERBORGHT, J., Inzicht in toezicht – Regards sur le contrôle, Antwerpen, Intersentia,

2012, xxx + 265 p.).

Belgian Standing Committee I (ed.), All Source reat Assessments in the Fight Against Terrorism – Fusion Centres throughout Europe, 2010, 220 p.

Introduction

documents of the intelligence services are classified in accordance with the Classification Act of 11 December 1998, does not detract from this. Indeed, all employees of the Committee hold a security clearance of the “top secret” level. e Committee can also question anybody. e members of the reviewed services can be summoned if necessary and required to testify under oath. Furthermore, the supervisory body can make all useful findings and seize all objects and documents in any location. Finally, the Committee can demand the assistance of experts and interpreters, and the assistance of the police.
e Standing Committee I is a collective body and is composed of three members, including a chairman. e incumbent members are appointed or renewed by the Chamber of Representatives.³e Standing Committee I is assisted by a secretary and his administrative staff, and by an Investigation Service.
Pursuant to Article 35 of the Review Act of 18 July 1991, the Standing
Committee I annually draws up a general activity report. ese activity reports are drawn up in Belgium’s national languages Dutch and French and can be found on the website of the Committee (see www.comiteri.be). With increased globalisation in mind, the Standing Committee I wishes to meet the expectations of a broader public. e sections of the Activity Report 2016 that are most relevant to the international intelligence community (the review investigations, the control of special intelligence methods, the recommendations and the table of contents of the complete activity report), have therefore been translated into English. is book is the sixth to be published in English by the Standing Committee I, aﬅer the

Activity Report 2006-2007, the Activity Report 2008-2009, the Activity Report 2010-2011, the Activity Report 2012-2013 and the Activity Report 2014-2015 (see

www.comiteri.be). e Standing Committee I has now opted for an annual publication of its reports translated into English.

Guy Rapaille, Chairman Gérald Vande Walle, Counsellor Pieter-Alexander De Brock, Counsellor Wouter De Ridder, Secretary

1 December 2017

Committee I has been created and is composed of 13 MPs.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of abbreviations Preface

Chapter I. Follow-up of the recommendations made by the Standing Committee I

Chapter II. Review investigations

II.1.1. II.1.2. II.1.3.
A constant evolution Legal framework Assessment of the information position of the intelligence services
II.1.4. II.1.5.
Intelligence services and local task forces Cooperation with the judicial authorities
II.2.

II.3.
Information position of State Security and the failed attack on the high-speed alys train II.2.1. II.2.2. II.2.3. II.2.4.
e facts Was the perpetrator known to State Security? Context of the case ﬁle Findings and conclusions
Information position of the two intelligence services before the Paris attacks II.3.1. II.3.2. II.3.3.
Events in brief Fast-evolving legal context Information position of the services and the contribution of the various collection resources
II.3.4. II.3.5. II.3.6.
Cooperation at national level Cooperation at international level When and how did the intelligence services inform the competent authorities of the threat? How did the services respond to the evolving threat? Several structural problems and risks General conclusions
II.3.7. II.3.8. II.3.9.

Table of contents

in Zaventem and Maalbeek II.4.1. II.4.2. II.4.3. II.4.4. II.4.5. II.4.6. II.4.7. II.4.8.
Summary of the facts Structure of the review investigation Information position of the intelligence services Collection disciplines Cooperation at national level Cooperation at international level e weeks before the attacks, from State Security’s perspective Conclusions
II.5.

II.6.
Protection of scientiﬁc and economic potential and the Snowden revelations II.5.1. II.5.2.
Introduction Findings
State Security and the cooperation protocol with penal institutions II.6.1. II.6.2. II.6.3. II.6.4. II.6.5.
Exchange of information with the prison administration Application of the protocol over the years Ad hoc evaluation of the protocol: ﬁndings State Security initiatives outside the protocol Conclusion
II.7.

II.8. II.9.
Monitoring a potential threat against a foreign visitor II.7.1. II.7.2.
Contextualisation Findings
A complaint against an indiscreet colleague II.8.1. II.8.2.
Findings Conclusions
A complaint concerning whether or not a payment is due
II.10. A complaint concerning an intervention by two protection assistants II.11. A complaint concerning an intervention by CUTA
II.11.1. Assessment memoranda of CUTA II.11.2. One of CUTA’s powers?
II.12. Individual threat assessments by CUTA
II.12.1. Investigative structure II.12.2. Legal framework II.12.3. reat assessments by CUTA (2011–2015) II.12.4. A new methodology
II.13. Speciﬁc dysfunctions within CUTA II.14. A complaint concerning a security investigation at GISS
II.14.1. Contextualisation II.14.2. Findings
II.15. Investigations in which investigative steps taken during 2016 and investigations initiated in 2016

Table of contents

II.15.1. Information position of CUTA before the Paris attacks II.15.2. International exchange of data on foreign terrorist ﬁghters

Chapter III. Control of special intelligence methods

III.1. Four legislative amendments from 2016
III.1.1. A new assignment for the intelligence services III.1.2. Identification of the user of telecommunication or of a used means of communication as an ordinary method
III.1.3. A new data retention law for the intelligence services III.1.4. Identification of a prepaid-card holder
III.2. Statistics relating to specific and exceptional methods
III.2.1. Methods with regard to GISS III.2.2. Methods with regard to State Security
III.3. Activities of the Standing Committee I as a jurisdictional body and a pre-judicial consulting body III.3.1. Figures III.3.2. Decisions
III.4. Conclusions and recommendations

Chapter IV. Monitoring the interception of communications broadcast abroad

Chapter V. Assignments for parliamentary inquiry committees

V.1.1. V.1.2.
Sending investigation reports Overview of the recommendations in the ﬁght against terrorism and extremism
V.1.3. V.1.4. V.1.5.
Intermediary for consulting secret documents Evidence for the inquiry committee Performance of additional investigation assignments

Chapter VI. Veriﬁcation of common databases

VI.1. What is a common database?
VI.1.1. Purpose and rules VI.1.2. Consultation VI.1.3. Obligation to feed the common database

Table of contents

VI.1.4. Special players
VI.2. Common database on foreign terrorist ﬁghters
VI.2.1. Intelligence records VI.2.2. Level of accesses VI.2.3. Information cards VI.2.4. Carrying out other diﬀerent roles VI.2.5. Data validation system VI.2.6. Data management VI.2.7. International cooperation VI.2.8. Ultimate accountability and general obligations
VI.3. Monitoring by Control Agency for Management of Police Information
(C.O.C.) and the Standing Committee I VI.3.1. Initial advisory opinion VI.3.2. Second advisory opinion

Chapter VII. Advice, studies and other activities

VII.1. Advice of the Standing Committee I on the bill to amend the
Intelligence Act
VII.2. Advice on the bill governing private security VII.3. Information dossiers VII.4. Expert at various forums VII.5. Cooperation protocol on human rights VII.6. Contacts with foreign review bodies VII.7. Monitoring of special funds VII.8. Media presence

Chapter VIII. Criminal investigations and judicial inquiries

Chapter IX. Administration of the Appeal Body for security clearances, certiﬁcates and advice

Chapter X. Internal operations of the Standing Committee I

X.1. X.2. X.3. X.4. X.5.
Composition of the Standing Committee I Meetings with the Monitoring Committee Joint meetings with the Standing Committee P Financial resources and administrative activities Training

Table of contents

Chapter XI. Recommendations

IX.1. Recommendations related to the protection of the rights conferred on individuals by the Constitution and the law IX.1.1. Closing the legal loophole in relation to data retention IX.1.2. Use of unlawfully obtained intelligence IX.1.3. Exchange of information and cooperation with foreign services
IX.1.4. Technical assistance to the judiciary IX.1.5. Compliance with Article 36bis of the Privacy Act
IX.2. Recommendations related to the coordination and efficiency of the intelligence services, CUTA and the support services IX.2.1. Recommendations specifically aimed at fighting terrorism and radicalism
IX.2.2. Recommendations with general scope XI.2.3. Recommendations on special intelligence methods IX.2.4. Recommendations on the protection of the scientific and economic potential
IX.2.5. Recommendations on cooperation with the penal institutions IX.2.6. Recommendations on the operation of CUTA
IX.3. Recommendation related the effectiveness of the review
IX.3.1. Interception Plan

Appendices

Appendix A. Overview of the main regulations relating to the operations, powers and review of the intelligence and security services and CUTA (1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016)

Appendix B. Overview of the main legislative proposals, bills and resolutions relating to the operations, powers and review of the intelligence and security services and CUTA (1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016)

Appendix C. Overview of parliamentary questions, requests for explanations, and oral and written questions concerning the operation, powers and review of the intelligence and security services and CUTA (1 January 2016 to 31 December 2016)

Table of contents

Appendix D. Advisory opinion on the bill governing private security

Appendix E. Advisory opinion on the bill to amend the Act of 30 November 1998 governing the intelligence and security service (Intelligence Services Act)

Appendix F. Joint advisory opinion no. 01/2016 of 20 June 2016 on the prior report of the common database for foreign terrorist ﬁghters Joint advisory opinion no. 02/2016 of 1 December 2016 on the prior report of the common database for foreign terrorist ﬁghters

Activity Report 2016

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