Number 25 — April 2015 TITUTE FO S R IN N N EA O R T G E A N I S H T S P A O L W I C E RESEARCH NOTES Y H T Ideas. Action. Impact. 3 0 ng THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY years stro LIBYA’S CIVIL WAR Rebuilding the Country from the Ground Up Andrew Engel ibya’s postrevolutionary transition to democracy León, the head of the United Nations Support Mission has been completely upended by civil war and in Libya (UNSMIL), has warned that Libya is “very Lthe extension of the so-called Islamic State to Libyan close to total chaos”9 and that the country is increas- lands.1 The country’s disintegration has been referred ingly being compared to “a Somalia”10 or “Mosul”11 on to as “the Middle East’s second war zone”2 and “a war the Mediterranean. to watch in 2015.”3 An estimated 2 million Libyans The central argument of this paper is that out of a population of 6.2 million have been affected UNSMIL’s current top-down approach in pursuit of by the escalation in fighting—with at least 454,000 a unity government—backed by the European Union Libyans displaced since November 2014,4 some for and the United States—will prove unable to deliver the fourth or fifth time5—exacerbating an already stability. Worse, it could further fan the conflagration, untenable humanitarian crisis. given that the UN Security Council could loosen its Meanwhile, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), arms embargo in the event a unity government is including the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), formed,12 allowing more weapons to enter a coun- which now claims the Islamic State in Libya (ISL) as try already oversaturated with them. The situation part of its caliphate, continue to expand throughout could also be aggravated by the arrival of EU member the country’s three provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, country troops to Libya to back a unity government.13 and Fezzan. Jonathan Powell, the British special envoy Weapons delivered to a central government lacking to Libya, described the country on January 14 as “a official armed forces could be diverted to the various honey pot” for VEOs such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic armed groups that have, since 2011, undermined the Maghreb (AQIM) and even Boko Haram,6 which on emergence of a strong unity government in the first March 7 pledged allegiance to ISIS.7 The deadly March place. An influx of weapons to Libya could also exac- 18 attack against the Bardo National Museum in Tunis erbate terrorism-related security challenges facing by ISIS gunmen trained in ISL territory underscores Libya’s neighbors.14 The presence of foreign soldiers the VEO threat to the region emanating from the in Libya to protect government buildings and infra- country.8 It is therefore no surprise that Bernardino structure would directly support VEO recruitment Andrew Engel, a former research assistant at The Washington Institute, received his master’s degree in security studies at Georgetown University and currently works as an Africa analyst. He traveled across Libya after its official liberation. He is the author of the Washington Institute Research Note Libya as a Failed State: Causes, Consequences, Options. © 2015 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. All rights reserved. Andrew Engel efforts, and could very well end in a “Black Hawk last General National Congress (GNC) that was Down” scenario. Furthermore, the fragility and fac- reinstated in August 2014 and is still led by Nuri Abu tionalism within Libya’s warring coalitions puts into Sahmain and, until recently, the “National Salvation question whether these groups could ever be brought Government” of Prime Minister Omar al-Hassi in under a “big tent,” with hardline spoilers threatening Tripoli. Hassi was dismissed by the GNC and his to undermine any unity government agreement. ministers for poor leadership on the economy, and A bottom-up approach to Libya’s civil war that was replaced by his deputy, Khalifa Ghwell, also an engages power brokers at the local level—local armed Islamist.15 Broadly speaking, Operation Dignity con- forces, tribes, shura councils, and municipal coun- sists of traditional Arab nationalists, federalists, anti- cils—best accords with the reality of power dynam- Islamists, and former regime elements, while Opera- ics in Libya. Such a piecemeal approach is certainly tion Dawn comprises a loose coalition of hardline difficult, complicated, and time intensive, not unlike revolutionaries, Islamists, and Amazigh in the north- assembling a puzzle. But a patchwork of successes west. Each alliance outwardly exhibits the impression holds greater promise than any politically expedient of unified command and control, but there is tension top-down approach. and diffusion among their many parts. The study proceeds in four parts. The first addresses Libya’s crisis reflects broader regional tensions and the various actors driving instability in Libya—that conflicts16 and, as such, has been subject to varying is, the components that constitute Operation Dignity types of foreign intervention. States advocating polit- and Operation Libya Dawn—and fissures within the ical Islam, such as Qatar, Turkey, and Sudan, support respective military-political alliances. The second part factions within Operation Dawn, and their regional provides an overview of Libya’s VEO landscape, and and ideological competitors, the United Arab Emir- how ISL is both driving and benefiting from polar- ates, Saudi Arabia, and in particular Egypt, support ization of the country’s jihadist milieu. The third part factions of Operation Dignity, which also receives provides a battlefield update for each of Libya’s four backing from Russia.17 VEOs such as ISL receive active fronts, including risks to Libya’s hydrocarbon outside support in the form of foreign fighters, the wealth. Fourth and finally, the study turns to existing likely smuggling of weapons and goods, and propa- efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement, and ganda that drives recruitment and hijra (immigra- recommendations for a course of action. tion) to caliphate territory in Libya. The growth of ISL increases the likelihood of additional direct for- ■ Greater Violence eign interventions, as requested by neighbors such and Fragmentation as Mali18 and Chad,19 or along the lines of Egypt’s Two competing military-political alliances are at the February 16 bombing of Darnah in response to ISL’s heart of Libya’s cleavage. Based primarily in the east killing of twenty Egyptian Coptic Christians and one is Operation Dignity, led by Gen. Khalifa Haftar and other Christian, a video of which was released Febru- 20 consisting of remnants of the armed forces within the ary 15. Indeed, Thini reportedly called for the Arab Libyan National Army (LNA), along with irregular League’s newly created joint force, now intervening in 21 and tribal forces. Zintani brigades in the western Yemen, to intervene on his side in Libya. Nafusa Mountains also operate under the banner of Operations Dawn and Dignity have both contrib- Operation Dignity. The political elements consist of uted to escalating violence. Indiscriminate shelling the elected and internationally recognized House of and human rights abuses have reportedly occurred Representatives (HOR) in Tobruk, which is led by on all fronts,22 including through the use of cluster its speaker, Aguila Saleh Essa, and the government munitions,23 most probably from Operation Dignity of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thini in Bayda. In forces.24 Dignity has capitalized on its relative aerial opposition is Operation Dawn, primarily in the west, superiority over Dawn to conduct airstrikes along consisting of a rump parliament from the country’s Libya’s coastline, with some dozen MiG-23s, L-39s, 2 RESEARCH NOTE 25 Rebuilding Libya from the Ground Up numerous helicopters,25 and three new MiG-21s deliv- ensuring unity among their enemies who might not ered to the Libyan Air Force (LAF) from Egypt.26 In otherwise have found common ground. By August contrast, Dawn forces have just two27 or three28 air- 25, 2014, Haftar had nominally integrated his forces craft that have been used in attacks against Zintani under the command of Army chief of staff Abdul forces, and one was recently shot down near Zintan Razzaq Nazuri,36 who was appointed by the HOR,37 with a man-portable air-defense system (MANPAD) achieving the appearance of unity of effort. 29 on March 23. Dawn jets have also bombed the Dig- Speaking to a pro-Operation Dignity news outlet nity-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) at the on November 3, 2014, Operation Dignity commander oil export terminals of Ras Lanuf and al-Sidra in the Faraj al-Barassi estimated that some 80 percent of 30 Gulf of Sirte. As Libyan national identity contin- Dignity fighters are regular armed service members.38 31 ues to devolve to the level of region, tribe, and town, However, a video made public on March 1 shows 32 violence has also become more intimate, especially Barassi telling an audience that “the percentage of sol- in Benghazi, Darnah, the Nafusa Mountains, and diers actually fighting in the battlefield does not exceed the country’s southwest. In Benghazi, for example, fifteen to twenty percent. The rest are policemen, civil- residents with ties to Tripolitania—particularly those ians, and volunteers.”39 A UN Security Council panel from Misratah—are being targeted and forced out of of experts wrote on February 23 that the LNA, from the city. The Laithi district in particular has seen an May to August 2014, “could not be considered to exodus of families to Misratah. Hardline federalists represent an ‘official army’ any more than could their seeking greater autonomy or even independence for opponents.”40 Command and control is also unclear.