SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM by Thomas E. Copeland B.A. Political Science, Geneva College, 1991 M.P.I.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1992 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Thomas E. Copeland It was defended on April 12, 2006 and approved by Davis Bobrow, Ph.D. Donald Goldstein, Ph.D. Dennis Gormley Phil Williams, Ph.D. Dissertation Director ii © 2006 Thomas E. Copeland iii SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM Thomas E. Copeland, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2006 This study aims to evaluate whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors – failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information – contribute to intelligence failure. This study applies existing theories of surprise and intelligence failure to case studies of five mass casualty terrorism incidents: World Trade Center 1993; Oklahoma City 1995; Khobar Towers 1996; East African Embassies 1998; and September 11, 2001. A structured, focused comparison of the cases is made using a set of thirteen probing questions based on the factors above. The study concludes that while all four factors were influential, failures of public policy leadership contributed directly to surprise. Psychological bias and poor threat assessments prohibited policy makers from anticipating or preventing attacks. Policy makers mistakenly continued to use a law enforcement approach to handling terrorism, and failed to provide adequate funding, guidance, and oversight of the intelligence community. The study has implications for intelligence reform, information sharing, Congressional oversight, and society’s expectations about the degree to which the intelligence community can predict or prevent surprise attacks. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE...................................................................................................................................... xi 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. KEY CONCEPTS........................................................................................................... 3 1.1.1. Strategic Surprise.................................................................................................... 3 1.1.2. Intelligence Failure................................................................................................. 6 1.1.3. The “New Terrorism” ........................................................................................... 11 1.1.3.1. Qualitative and Quantitative Changes in the Terrorist Thre......................... 11 1.1.3.2. The Challenge to Government...................................................................... 17 1.2. GUIDING QUESTIONS.............................................................................................. 21 1.3. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY................................................................................ 23 1.3.1. Use of Open and Secondary Sources.................................................................... 23 1.3.2. Problems of Hindsight Bias and Retrospective Coherence .................................. 25 1.4. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY................................................................................ 27 1.5. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 28 1.5.1. Design ................................................................................................................... 28 1.5.2. Theoretical Framework......................................................................................... 29 1.5.2.1. Leadership and Policy Failures..................................................................... 30 1.5.2.2. Organization.................................................................................................. 32 1.5.2.3. Problems with Warning Information ............................................................ 33 1.5.2.4. Analysis......................................................................................................... 35 1.5.3. Structuring the Focused Comparison.................................................................... 36 Table 1.1 Probing Questions........................................................................................................ 37 1.5.4. Selection of Cases................................................................................................. 38 1.6. CHAPTER OUTLINE.................................................................................................. 40 2. FEBRUARY 26, 1993: THE WORLD TRADE CENTER.................................................. 42 2.1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 42 2.1.1. What was the nature of the surprise? .................................................................... 45 2.2. LEADERSHIP FAILURES.......................................................................................... 48 2.2.1. Psychology, Perception and the Threat Environment........................................... 48 2.2.2. Setting Priorities for Intelligence Collection ........................................................ 52 2.2.3. Failures of Public Policy Leadership .................................................................... 54 2.2.3.1. Policy toward Israel and the Palestinians...................................................... 55 2.2.3.2. Iraq Policy..................................................................................................... 57 2.2.3.3. Immigration Policy....................................................................................... 61 2.3. ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES........................................................................... 66 2.3.1. Obstacle #1: FBI Culture and Confidential Informants........................................ 66 2.3.2. Obstacle #2: Federal-State Coordination.............................................................. 69 2.3.3. Obstacle #3: FBI-CIA Turf Wars ......................................................................... 70 2.3.4. Obstacle #4: FBI Investigations vs. Intelligence .................................................. 71 v 2.3.5. Obstacle #5: Executive and Legislative Restrictions............................................ 72 2.4. THREAT AND WARNING INFORMATION.......................................................... 755 2.4.1. Threat Indicators – Hiding in Plain Sight ............................................................. 75 2.4.2. Warning Indicators – Signals vs. Noise................................................................ 80 2.4.2.1. Where: The Twin Towers ............................................................................. 80 2.4.2.2. What: The Car Bomb.................................................................................... 81 2.4.2.3. When: A Date with History – The Liberation of Kuwait ............................. 82 2.4.2.4. Who: Individuals – A Story of Missed Opportunities .................................. 83 2.4.3. Missed Opportunities............................................................................................ 92 2.5. ANALYTICAL CHALLENGES.................................................................................. 93 2.5.1. Failures within the Intelligence Cycle .................................................................. 93 2.6. THE FIRST AVOIDABLE SURPRISE? ..................................................................... 98 2.7. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................... 101 3. April 19, 1995: OKLAHOMA CITY ................................................................................. 103 3.1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 103 3.1.1. What was the nature of the surprise? .................................................................. 106 3.2. LEADERSHIP FAILURES........................................................................................ 108 3.2.1. Psychology, Perception, and the Threat Environment........................................ 108 3.2.1.1. The Perceived Threat Environment ............................................................ 110 3.2.2. Failures of Public Policy Leadership .................................................................. 112 3.2.2.1. Broad Federal Policy Are............................................................................ 112 3.2.2.2. Waco and Ruby Ridge ................................................................................ 115 3.2.2.3. Gun Control................................................................................................ 115 3.3. ORGANIZATIONAL OBSTACLES......................................................................... 117 3.3.1. The First Amendment and Domestic Surveillance ............................................. 117 3.3.2. Law Enforcement Culture and Attitudes ...........................................................